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Chapter 1
Introduction
In many sectors, in which revenue management procedures are applied or could be applied, it is no-
ticeable that corporations build strategic alliances. Revenue management can be successfully adopted
in markets in which customers possess different willingness to pay for the same service or product and,
therefore, customer segmentation can be realized by the companies. The objective of revenue manage-
ment is to control the demand by means of pricing and capacity control decisions to maximize revenues
from a limited capacity (compare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 1.1). The implementation of
strategic alliances causes new decision problems especially for revenue management. Considering the
capacity allocation, in case of alliances, the capacity control not only has to sort out how many capac-
ity units should be allocated to the different customer segments, but also how the capacity is divided
among the alliance partners.
So far, existing literature discusses numerous capacity control strategies for single corporations which, in
fact, is already a complex problem. There is hardly any literature concerning capacity control decision
problems in strategic alliances and practical experience as well does not provide an answer to solve
the problem. To overcome the missing attention of capacity control problems in strategic alliances, the
major aim of this thesis is the development of a capacity control method which dynamically decides on
the acceptance or the rejection of customer requests for products or services of the alliance partners. The
goal of the capacity control method is to maximize the combined revenue of the alliance partners.
In this thesis, we focus on strategic alliances in the airline industry. The major strategic alliances in
the passenger transport airline industry are Star Alliance, SkyTeam, and oneworld. The deregulation
of the airline industry had consequences on the market. Major traditional airlines are confronted with
the competition of low-cost carriers entering the markets and, therefore, have to process an increasing
amount of their traffic within airline alliances.
The capacity control method proposed in this thesis comprises of an optimization part and a simulation
part:
In the optimization part, we consider different optimization techniques as the Deterministic Linear
Model (DLP) introduced, e.g., by Williamson (1992), Section 4.1, and the Expected Marginal Seat Rev-
enue heuristics (EMSR) presented by Belobaba (1987, 1989) to calculate booking limits, the control vari-
ables of the capacity control, for a single airline on a single flight leg. In this thesis, the DLP model and
the EMSR heuristics are extended to fit the requirements of a strategic alliance with two partners. We
consider real options to divide the seat capacity in the aircraft among the members of the alliance.
In the simulation part, we adopt event-driven simulation models to simulate the booking process of
the partners in the alliance and to evaluate the capacity control strategy determined in the optimization
part. The stochastic demand is taken into account in the simulation models to generate a more realistic
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setting. The perceptions gained by the simulation can be used to improve the optimization. Therefore, a
simulation-based optimization procedure is used which updates the calculated control variables within
an iterative process.
Additionally, two different genetic algorithm approaches are implemented to search for enhanced book-
ing limits for the alliance partners. To improve the solution of the capacity control method, determined
in this thesis, the transfer prices, which the partner airlines pay in the option-based capacity control
method to share the capacity, is iteratively updated.
This thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we will present the conditions for revenue management
application and the instruments of revenue management. We will limit the theoretical discussion to the
revenue management concepts that are necessary to follow the course of this work. A brief introduction
of strategic alliances will be followed by a detailed discussion of strategic alliances in sectors in which
revenue management can be applied in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will introduce an option-based capacity
control procedure and will illustrate how the booking limits are determined for the alliance partners.
The simulation of the booking processes of the alliance partners considering capacity control with real
options will also be described in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, a simulation-based optimization procedure
will be introduced to improve the booking limits for the partners within the strategic alliance. Chapter
6 will present two different types of a genetic algorithm approach to control the capacity of the strategic
alliance. A negotiation process will be introduced in Chapter 7 to improve the capacity control by the
determination of optimal transfer prices that accrue between the alliance partners. In each chapter,
in which new capacity control procedures for strategic alliances will be presented, the results of the
procedures will be introduced and discussed. We will summarize our study in Chapter 8 with comments
on further research.
2
Chapter 2
Conceptual Foundation of Revenue
Management
In this chapter, selected topics of revenue management will be introduced to provide the theoretical
background of the revenue management problems discussed in this thesis. After a brief introduction
of the historical development of revenue management (Section 2.1), the conditions for a successful ap-
plication of revenue management (Section 2.2.1) as well as different revenue management instruments
(Section 2.2.2) will be discussed.
2.1 Historical Development of Revenue Management
The origins and history of revenue management theory are closely connected to a single industry: the
airline industry. Revenue management is a concept that dates back to the deregulation of fares in the
U.S. airline industry in the late 1970’s. Until 1978, the U.S. airline industry was regulated by the Civil
Aeronautics Board. Thereby, the Civil Aeronautics Board strictly controlled the markets airlines could
enter, the destinations airlines could serve, and the fares airlines could charge, based on standardized
price and profitability targets. With the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the U.S. Civil Aviation Board
phased out the governmental control of airline fares and services. Due to deregulation, airlines are free
to set prices, schedules and services without the approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Compare, e.g.,
Bailey et al. (1985), Chapter 2, Mayer (2001), Section 2.1, Morrison and Winston (1995), Chapter 2, and
U.S. GAO (1996), Chapter 1, for a detailed description of the deregulation of the U.S. air traffic.
The deregulation of the airline industry had further consequences on the market. Major airlines were
confronted with the competition of low-cost and charter carriers entering the markets. Most of the low-
cost airlines could offer tickets at lower prices compared to the major airlines mainly due to considerably
low costs which are, among other things, based on no-frills services, low labor costs, and simpler opera-
tions (compare, e.g., Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 1.2.1). To respond to the low price strategy of
the low-cost airlines, American Airlines, one of the major airlines, adopted a price differentiation mech-
anism to offer discounts with purchase restrictions. By attaching the discount availability on purchase
restrictions as, e.g., the condition that discounted tickets had to be purchased 30 days in advance, busi-
ness travelers should be deterred from accessing the new low fares. The purchase restrictions enabled
American Airlines to successfully compete with the new low-cost airlines by offering discounted flight
tickets without loosing revenues generated by business travelers (compare, e.g., Klein, 2005, Section 1.1).
The adoption of the segment-orientated price differentiation mechanism, however, required the devel-
opment and application of other planning instruments. Since most requests for low-priced flight tickets
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are assumed to occur before the requests for higher-priced tickets during the booking process, it must be
ensured that there are enough flight tickets for seats in the aircraft on the considered flight left to meet
the demand of the customers with a higher willingness to pay. Otherwise the demand for lower-priced
flight tickets pushes aside the demand for higher-priced tickets which leads to revenue losses. There-
fore, the capacity needs to be controlled to enable proper decisions about the acceptance or rejection of
requests during the booking process. A forecasting system identifies the stochastic demand expected for
the flight tickets with different fares to support the decisions to control the capacity (compare Corsten
and Stuhlmann, 1999). Cross (2001), Chapter 4, and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 1.2.1 and 10.1,
describe the historical development of revenue management in the U.S. airline industry.
Although the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry and the resulting price competition between the
major airlines and the low-fare airlines caused an intensive development of revenue management tech-
niques, airlines already used the revenue management instrument overbooking before the deregulation
to increase their revenue (compare McGill and van Ryzin, 1999).
The briefly discussed revenue management instruments, namely segment-oriented price discrimination,
capacity control, and overbooking and the forecasting system which supports the revenue management
techniques, will be defined and described in detail in Section 2.2.2.
Smith et al. (1992) point out the successful development and application of the revenue management
instruments at American Airlines. The potential of segment-orientated price differentiation and over-
booking was already discovered before the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. However, the advance-
ment of the techniques and development of the capacity control instrument were necessary since the
deregulation caused additional complexity in the application of revenue management concepts, e.g., at-
tributable to an increased number and variety of discounted prices.
The application of revenue management instruments by American Airlines lead to an enormous rev-
enue augmentation. American Airlines estimated an increase in revenue of approximately 1.4 billion
dollars over a three-year period due to an effective revenue management application (compare Smith
et al., 1992). This on the other hand caused that American Airlines crowded out low-cost carriers (e.g.,
PeopleExpress). As a consequence, revenue management techniques were adapted by airlines world-
wide which also noticed increasing revenues without mentionable added costs (compare Klein, 2005,
Section 1.1). Klophaus (1998) refers to the Deutsche Lufthansa AG which gained 1.4 billion Deutsche
Mark additional revenue with the aid of revenue management in 1997.
Although the concept of revenue management was initially developed to solve problems of the airline
industry, revenue management techniques can also be applied by other sectors of the service industry.
After other service industry sectors noticed the increasing revenues of the airline industry and the ap-
plicability of the revenue management concept in their sectors, revenue management techniques were
enhanced and adopted. Section 3.2 addresses the different service industry branches which apply rev-
enue management instruments. The origins of revenue management are described in more detail by
Boyd and Bilegan (2003) and Smith et al. (1992).
The successful implementation of revenue management techniques in practice caused an increasing
theoretical research activity. Among the first publications dealing with revenue management are papers
by Rothstein (1971, 1974) on airline and hotel overbooking and Littlewood (1972) presenting a capacity
control approach. Boyd and Bilegan (2003), Cross (1995), McGill and van Ryzin (1999), Tscheulin and
Lindenmeier (2003a), and Weatherford and Bodily (1992) present comprehensive reviews of revenue
management research history with different primarily focuses. An overview of the most recent research
on revenue management is given by Chiang et al. (2007) and Müller-Bungart (2006).
Specific conditions are needed to implement revenue management instruments in the airline industry
as well as in other service sectors. These conditions will be presented in the following section as well as
some revenue management definitions and the description of the revenue management instruments.
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2.2 Theoretical Basics of Revenue Management
Revenue management is also called yield management by some authors (compare, e.g., Kimes, 1989;
Netessine and Shumsky, 2002; Tscheulin and Lindenmeier, 2003a; Weatherford and Bodily, 1992). Be-
lobaba (1987), Chapter 1, e.g., defines yield in the airline industry as average revenue gained by an
airline per passenger and flown air mile. The term revenue management is predominant in practice and
theoretical publications since the factor yield could reach its maximal value if only one single passenger
books the observed flight. Therefore, the maximization of the yield factor is not a reasonable objective
(compare Kimms and Klein, 2005; Weatherford and Bodily, 1992). The labeling revenue management
can be ascribed to the goal of revenue maximization which is aspired by the application of revenue
management instruments, e.g., in primary application areas such as the airline industry (compare Klein,
2005, Section 2.1.1).
There are numerous definitions for revenue management in literature which often focus on a specific
application area or revenue management instrument. Corsten and Stuhlmann (1999) as well as Kimms
and Klein (2005) list several specific and general definitions of revenue management given in relevant
literature. They also compare the definitions balancing their assets and drawbacks. A general defini-
tion of revenue management is given by Klein (2001) describing revenue management as a management
concept for efficiently using the capacity which is largely inflexible and only available in a limited pe-
riod of time. Thereby, the concept contains quantitative methods for the decision about the acceptance
or rejection of uncertain demand which arrives in different points in time and has different revenue
values. This definition is taken as a basis for the present work which follows the definition in focus-
ing on quantity-based revenue management. A differentiation between quantity-based and price-based
revenue management will be given in the following paragraph.
The present work concentrates on the aim of revenue maximization by applying capacity control mech-
anisms for strategic alliances. This objective, however, is one of many which can be pursued by revenue
management. Alternative objective targets of revenue management are described by Klein (2005), Sec-
tion 2.2, and Weatherford and Bodily (1992).
A concept that is often mentioned in connection with revenue management is dynamic pricing, compare,
e.g., Klein (2005), Section 2.3, and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Chapter 5. Boyd and Bilegan (2003)
and Bitran and Caldentey (2003) describe the relationship between revenue management and dynamic
pricing: The company applying a dynamic pricing concept defines prices for offered goods and services
and indirectly controls the capacity by price modifications. There is no predefined price for the goods
and services, the prices are treated as variables. If the company adopts revenue management control,
the company sets predefined prices for the goods and services for each customer segment by means of
the segment-orientated price differentiation and allocates the capacity to customer segments by means
of the revenue management instrument capacity control. If customers recognize different prices for
the same service, it is not due to a variable price setting of the company but caused by a changing
availability of capacity for the different customer segments. E.g., if an airline defines different booking
classes based on the determined customer segments, the capacity that is available in one of the booking
classes changes during the booking process due to the capacity usage of accepted requests. As soon as
the available capacity is zero the respective booking class will be closed and, therefore, the price for a
flight ticket in the closed booking class is no longer available.
There are several preconditions to implement a dynamic pricing concept such as the possibility to adjust
prices without significant costs or other efforts and the existing freedom of action to fix the prices not
well in advance (compare, e.g., Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994).
Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 5.1.1, differentiate between quantity-based revenue management
and price-based revenue management where the former contains capacity control and overbooking and
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the latter includes the dynamic pricing concept and auctions. Although many authors share this differ-
entiation (compare, e.g., Boyd and Bilegan, 2003 and Klein, 2005, Section 2.3), others, e.g., Elmaghraby
and Keskinocak (2003) and Phillips (2005), Chapter 6, classify capacity control and overbooking as a
special case of pricing with constrained supply. For a direct comparison of the revenue management
instrument capacity control and the dynamic pricing concept compare Müller-Bungart (2006), Section
1.4.3. Auctions provide another way to dynamically adjust prices compared to dynamic pricing (com-
pare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 6.1). However, applying auctions in revenue management
is not a well-discussed topic. Chiang et al. (2007) lists a few publications which discuss auctions in the
revenue management concept.
The present work focuses on capacity control mechanisms for strategic alliances and regards capacity
control as marked-off from the dynamic pricing concept. For a broader overview of dynamic pricing,
we refer to the relevant dynamic pricing literature presented, e.g., by Bitran and Caldentey (2003), El-
maghraby and Keskinocak (2003), as well as Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Chapter 5.
To successfully apply revenue management instruments, certain preconditions need to be fulfilled.
These will be described in the following.
2.2.1 Characteristics of Revenue Management Problems
Revenue management can be successfully applied to situations which have certain common character-
istics. Many publications in revenue management literature describe revenue management by defining
these characteristic aspects since there is no short and concise revenue management definition as de-
scribed before. Kimes (1989) lists the following defining characteristics which are similarly picked up
by multiple other publications (compare, e.g., Friege, 1996; Klein, 2001; Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b,
Section 1.3.3; Tscheulin and Lindenmeier, 2003b; Weatherford, 1998; Weatherford and Bodily, 1992):
relatively fixed capacity, ability to segment markets, perishable inventory, products sold in advance,
fluctuating demand, and high marginal capacity change costs vs. low marginal sales costs. These char-
acteristics will not be further discussed since they can be restructured. Corsten and Stuhlmann (1999)
as well as Kimms and Klein (2005) present a different, more advanced categorization of characteristics.
Among other improvements, additional factors concerning the successful application of revenue man-
agement are taken into account. For an elaborate discussion on the classification criteria and an exten-
sive study of the literature concerning revenue management characteristics compare Kimms and Klein
(2005). In the following, the four basic characteristical aspects, established by Corsten and Stuhlmann
(1999) and Kimms and Klein (2005), will be described.
2.2.1.1 Requirement of External Factor Integration
The service provision necessitates the integration of an external factor, e.g., because the offered goods
and services cannot be stored. The consumer of the goods and services needs to bring in the external
factor to the creation process which is why the factor is called extern (compare, e.g., Müller-Bungart,
2006, Section 1.2). The integration of an external factor requires that the goods and services cannot be
generated prior to their sale and, therefore, cannot be stored. It is essential to offer the goods and ser-
vices prior to their creation and sales to induce the customers to provide the required external factors.
To give an example: In the airline industry, the product transportation from location A to location B
cannot be produced before the departure date of the aircraft. An unsold seat in the aircraft cabin expires
and cannot be stored as soon as the aircraft lifts off. The flight tickets, however, are offered and usually
purchased long before the departure date which induces and provokes the integration of the external
factor by the passengers. The requirement to integrate an external factor is originally defined to be a
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characteristic aspect of service industries. Compare, e.g., Corsten and Stuhlmann (1997) and Fitzsim-
mons and Fitzsimmons (2006), Chapter 2, defining the customers as the inputs for services. According
to Klein (2005), Section 2.1.2.2, and Müller-Bungart (2006), Section 1.2, the integration of external factors
is also necessary in make-to-order manufacturing. In this sector, the production process cannot start
prior to the specification of the order by the customer. The mutual characteristic of integrating exter-
nal factors into the creation process describes one of the parallels between the service industries and
the make-to-stock manufacturing sector. Compare the study in Kimms and Müller-Bungart (2003) in
which the characteristics of problems requiring the application of revenue management instruments in
the service sector are compared to the ones in the make-to-stock manufacturing industry.
2.2.1.2 Restricted Operational Flexibility of Capacity
The second characteristic enabling the efficient application of revenue management instruments is lack-
ing capacity flexibility of the considered resource. Some authors, e.g., Kimes (2002) mention a relatively
fixed capacity in this context. This imprecise declaration is criticized by Corsten and Stuhlmann (1999),
Kimms and Klein (2005), and Weatherford and Bodily (1992). However, the capacity considered in
revenue management application areas cannot be assumed as totally fixed since there are capacity ad-
justments possible in special situations. Consider, e.g, the airline industry. According to Kimms and
Klein (2005), airlines can react to the respective demand to some extent, e.g., by changing the seating in
the affected aircraft or by using aircrafts with different seat capacity. Despite this adjustment potential,
airlines are often forced to reject requests due to an insufficient capacity that is not flexible enough to be
adjusted to the demand. Corsten and Stuhlmann (1999) describe the capacity as lacking flexible (com-
pare also Kimms and Klein, 2005). This means that the available capacity cannot be flexibly adapted to
the variable demand in short-term. Thereby, the flexibility of the capacity is dependent on the amount of
adjustment, the adjustment costs, and the time available to the adjustment (compare Klein, 2005, Section
2.1.2.3). Pursuing the airline example: If an airline recognizes during the booking process a demand on
a specific flight that is higher than forecasted one, the airline cannot spontaneously switch the aircraft.
The adjustment costs would be too high and the time available for the adjustment too short. To sum
up: In situations which give rise to revenue management problems, the capacity cannot be adjusted in
short-term due to technical or economical restrictions which shows the operational inflexibility of the
capacity as pointed out by Müller-Bungart (2006), Section 1.2.
So far only capacity enlargements were considered. The limited operational flexibility of the capacity,
however, additionally causes a restricted short-term reduction of capacity. The perishable inventory
characteristic, mentioned in other publications, can be interpreted in the context of restricted capacity
flexibility. The capacity can only be used in a specific period of time. After that period, unused capacity
cannot be stored or sold anymore and, therefore, does not gain any income for the company (com-
pare Netessine and Shumsky, 2002). As pointed out by Kimms and Klein (2005), the lacking possibility
of short-term capacity reduction causes potential idle time costs in terms of lost benefits like rejected
requests. E.g., an unsold seat in an aircraft expires with the aircraft’s take off and cannot be stored
afterward. This seat is not available and, therefore, cannot be sold by the airline in an aircraft operat-
ing a flight in the future. This characteristic induces some authors to refer to revenue management as
Perishable-Asset Revenue Management (PARM) as proposed, e.g, by Weatherford and Bodily (1992).
Another characteristic, mentioned in prior publications, is related to the limited operational flexibility
of the capacity: high marginal capacity change costs vs. low marginal sales costs. As mentioned above,
the limited operational flexibility of the capacity is, among others, caused by the high expenses when
providing additional capacity (compare Kimes, 1989). In the airline industry these fixed costs are, e.g,
for maintenance of the aircrafts and hubs. Nevertheless, selling an additional unit of inventory and the
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resulting usage of the already available capacity provokes only low marginal sales costs as pointed out
by Kimms and Klein (2005). In the airline industry, these marginal sales costs are, e.g., costs for the
passenger’s catering on board and the costs for handling the passenger, arising during the passenger
transport. Revenue management instruments can be applied to situations in which this characteristic is
missing.
2.2.1.3 Heterogeneous Demand Behavior
The consumers prefer different points in time for their purchases. The amount of the service and the
individual willingness to pay also varies. These circumstances allow for market segmentation into dif-
ferent types of customers.
For the application of revenue management, the different points in time for purchases represent an im-
portant condition. According to Kimms and Klein (2005), the purchase of the product in different points
in time can be dependent on the customer’s level of information or the customer’s need for planning
reliability. Kimes (1989) gives an example: Time-sensitive and price-sensitive customers are differenti-
ated in the airline industry, distinguishing business from leisure travelers. Business travelers are more
time-sensitive and have a higher willingness to pay, which can be capitalized by the airlines. A more de-
tailed discussion concerning the market segmentation and price differentiation will be given in Section
2.2.2.1, describing the revenue management instrument segment-orientated price differentiation. If the
customers’ preferences in terms of the point in time of their purchase are not diverse, there is no decision
about accepting a request or reserving the capacity for customers with a higher willingness to pay arriv-
ing in the future. This decision, however, describes the main problem which can be solved applying the
revenue management instrument capacity control. Assuming consumers with different willingness to
pay but equal preference to purchase the goods and services at the same point in time, there are proce-
dures that are more efficient than the revenue management concept such as auctions (compare Kimms
and Klein, 2005). For an introduction to general aspects concerning the design of auctions compare,
e.g., McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Milgrom (1989). Caldentey and Vulcano (2007) and Vulcano et al.
(2002) describe auctions in the context of revenue management.
According to Weatherford and Bodily (1992), there is another way to segment customers. In this practice,
the business generated by the customer represents the segmentation basis, whereas the selling company
offers larger discounts to customers with a higher demand. This quantity discounting is classified to be
a marketing tool apart from revenue management by Weatherford and Bodily (1992). However, accord-
ing to Kimms and Klein (2005), a varying amount of inquired goods and services can generate different
valuations of demand which is why this aspect should be considered applying revenue management
instruments. Considering, e.g., the cargo transportation sector with its quantity discounts and bonus
programs. If the available capacity is less than the total incoming demand, a differing valuation of de-
mand could be the result of a differing scope of services assuming constant prices for each requested unit
of goods and services. E.g., considering a hotel, accepting a request for an one-night accommodation
could inhibit that the hotel room will be booked for an entire week.
The differing willingness to pay of the customers for an identical service is another condition for apply-
ing revenue management. The possibility to sell the same goods and services charging different prices
in the same market segments results from such differences. As pointed out in Kimms and Klein (2005),
the supplier can generate additional requests by lowering the prices and eliminating or shifting demand
to resources with left over capacity by increasing the prices. If the demand of all customers would be ho-
mogeneous in valuations, there would not be a need for the laborious capacity control. Müller-Bungart
(2006), Section 1.2, suggests in this case to accept the incoming requests in a first-come-first-served man-
ner until there is no capacity left. In most sectors, the application of revenue management instruments is
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essentially motivated by the potential revenue augmentation due to capitalizing the different customers’
willingness to pay.
Another characteristic in this context is the existence of varying and uncertain demand. The total de-
mand for the offered goods and services as well as the distribution of incoming requests and the inquired
amount is assumed to be non-constant and uncertain, as pointed out by Klein (2001) and Stuhlmann
(1999). Although, this stochastic demand characteristic is not a required condition for revenue man-
agement application, it highly affects the design of the revenue management instruments, especially
capacity control (compare Kimms and Klein, 2005).
2.2.1.4 Standardized Products
In a standardized product range, the scope of services of the products is fixed and well defined and the
products are offered for a long period of time. In the airline industry, a product is a combination of a
flight from A to B and the booking class offered on the respective flight (compare Müller-Bungart, 2006,
Section 1.2). Assuming the characterization of standardized products guarantees two conditions for the
application of revenue management. On the one hand, the revenue management instruments segment-
orientated price differentiation and capacity control are based on a standardized product range (com-
pare Kimms and Klein, 2005). On the other hand, the expected demand for the different products can
only be adequately predicted if the product’s attributes are given and fixed. In this case, the continuity
of the goods and services within the product range is given which is necessary for the identification
of the data base required for the forecast. The effective application of all revenue management instru-
ments is supported by a proper forecast of the customers’ willingness to pay and demand behavior, as
according to Harris and Pinder (1995).
2.2.2 Revenue Management Instruments
In sectors, in which the aforementioned characteristics and conditions apply, the main object of rev-
enue management is to provide instruments for an effective capacity arrangement and utilization. The
revenue management instruments: segment-orientated price differentiation, overbooking, and capacity
control will be described in the next sections, following the remarks by Kimms and Klein (2005), con-
sidering the forecasting as foundation for the application of revenue management instruments. Since
the main focus of this work lies in the conception of capacity control mechanisms for strategic alliances,
the description of the revenue management instrument capacity control is emphasized. The product
mix is assumed to be well defined when applying the revenue management instruments. In the airline
industry, the product mix of an airline defines the air connections offered by the airline with start and
destination airports as well as day of departure and departure time. Furthermore, the capacity avail-
able for the company and the capacity utilization are assumed to be specified. This corresponds to the
allocation of a particular type of aircraft with preexisting capacity to each air connection in the airline
industry. Due to these assumptions, the strategical-tactical planning level covering the definition of the
product mix and the capacity strategy of the corporation does not need to be carried out within the
revenue management concept. Kimms and Klein (2005) as well as Klein (2005), Section 2.2.1, elaborately
describe the different planning levels, their correlation, the planning tools arranged, and the objectives
pursued on the planning levels. The revenue management instruments described in this section are
considered on the tactical-operative planning level.
The forecast, in the context of revenue management, will not be considered as an autonomous rev-
enue management instrument. In fact, forecasting is a component of the other instruments and satisfies
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diverse functions depending on the revenue management instrument for which the forecast should pro-
vide crucial information. According to Chiang et al. (2007), the quality of decisions, made in segment-
orientated price differentiation, capacity control, or overbooking, depends on a precise forecast. To
apply the segment-orientated price differentiation, forecasting needs to determine appropriate criteria
for segmentation and the customer’s willingness to pay, according to Kimms and Klein (2005). To give
an example: In the airline industry, the airline needs to decide in which segments the passengers will be
partitioned. Additionally, the fares customers are willing to pay for a seat on an air connection need to
be estimated to implement the segment-orientated price differentiation. The capacity control instrument
depends on the prediction of the expected development of the demand for single products. Weatherford
and Belobaba (2002) discuss some commonly used heuristic decision rules for seat allocation in capacity
control and examine the impact of errors in the willingness to pay forecasts and demand predictions
on their revenue performance. The authors state that in airline revenue management the predicted fare
value associated with a booking class and the demand forecasted for a fare class on an arranged future
flight are critical inputs to any capacity control seat allocation model. For applying the overbooking
instrument, additionally to the identification of the expected demand, the amount of cancellations and
no-shows needs to be forecasted as precisely as possible (compare McGill and van Ryzin, 1999). Though,
a forecast is often difficult due to an unavailable or obsolete data set. Additionally, the future consumer
behavior is often poorly predictable since the passengers have multiple behavioral alternatives that are
changing in the course of time, especially in the airline sector. As pointed out by McGill and van Ryzin
(1999) several thousand price changes reported per day in the U.S. domestic airline industry complicate
the forecast. In the publication of Chiang et al. (2007), this dynamic nature of situations in which rev-
enue management instruments are applied, is held responsible for challenging the demand forecast. In
the airline industry, the demand forecast is hindered additionally to the various price changes, e.g, by
unpredictable changes of flight schedules. There is another challenge occurring: If the determination of
data for the demand prediction is based on a historical set, the demand observed in the past, e.g., for an
air connection, does not reflect the actual demand. In fact, it corresponds to the amount of bookings and
underestimates the actual demand. Since there are no incoming requests for the offered products after
closing the booking period, the actual demand cannot be identified by historical information (compare
Boyd and Bilegan, 2003). The process of generating true demand history from sales history is called
unconstraining. As pointed out by Boyd and Bilegan (2003), unconstraining, which is not unique to
revenue management (compare, e.g., Hartley and Hocking, 1971; Little, 1982; Tobin, 1958), has proven
to be the most popular technique to account for censored historical data. For elaborate remarks on
this technique in the context of revenue management compare McGill (1995), Talluri and van Ryzin
(2004b), Section 9.4, and Zeni (2001), Section 2.8. In the simulation models included in the capacity con-
trol mechanism proposed in the present work, the demand forecast will not be observed. The demand
distribution adopted in the simulation models is implied as already determined by a suitable forecast.
Section 4.2.4 covers the discussion concerning a proper choice of demand distribution in this context
and the description of simulation models. According to Chiang et al. (2007), all revenue management
forecasting tasks need to treat several issues such as the determination of what needs to be forecasted,
the choice of the forecasting method, the choice of which data to use, and the definition of the aggre-
gation level and accuracy of the forecast. The references revealed in the following, illustrate diverse
forecasting methods applied in revenue management. Beckmann and Bobkoski (1958) compare several
frequency distributions of the booking request arrivals in the airline industry. The models introduced by
Littlewood (1972) describe a demand estimation including cancellations. Gallego and van Ryzin (1994),
Lee and Hersh (1993), and Subramanian et al. (1999) present stochastic processes that model booking
requests during the booking process. Boyd and Bilegan (2003), McGill and van Ryzin (1999), Talluri
and van Ryzin (2004b), Chapter 9, as well as Zeni (2001), Chapter 2, elaborately describe the varying
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application of forecasting methods and give an extensive overview of forecasting literature. Boyd and
Bilegan (2003) additionally define two forecasting approaches specialized for airlines operating in flight
networks.
Several of the revenue management instruments specified in the following paragraphs influence other
instruments if they are adopted. For instance, a simultaneous application of segment-orientated price
differentiation and capacity control should be preferred. However, in theory and practical experience
the simultaneous implementation of the instruments turned out to be too complex. Therefore, most
authors and practitioners choose a step-by-step approach. The segment-orientated price differentiation
problem is solved first and subsequently the capacity control problem with prices that were determined
in the segment-orientated price differentiation follows (compare Kimms and Müller-Bungart, 2003). The
segment-orientated price differentiation represents the basis for capacity control (compare Kimms and
Klein, 2005). Similarly, the instruments overbooking and capacity control should be adopted simulta-
neously since the overbooking influences the capacity control. This as well is often not possible due to
complexity reasons. Therefore, in most applications, the overbooking level is determined first. After-
wards, the capacity control is implemented on basis of the information gained by solving the overbook-
ing problem (compare Kimms and Klein, 2005).
2.2.2.1 Segment-Orientated Price Differentiation
Segment-orientated price differentiation is essential for application of the revenue management con-
cept. It can be described as fragmentation of the total market into several segments based on customers
willing to pay different prices for the product and the isolated pricing of the different segments. In
some publications, the segment-orientated price differentiation is presented as basic concept respec-
tively starting point of revenue management rather than as instrument which emphasizes this indis-
pensability (compare Pak (2005), Section 2.2.2, Pak and Piersma (2002), Wiggershaus (2008), Section
3.1.1). The total potential opportunity for profit improvement from price differentiation, established in
the field of microeconomics, reaches from the profit the corporation gains by charging a single price
for the offered product up to charging each potential customer exactly what the customer is willing to
pay. The second procedure is called perfect price differentiation (compare Varian, 1999, Chapter 25).
Segmenting the market and charging different prices in the segments for equal or only slightly differing
products enables for a skimming of the consumer’s surplus which gains profit improvements. Consider,
e.g., airlines: Airlines try to smooth the demand by means of segment-orientated price differentiation
to use the seat capacity offered in the classes of carriage on the operated flights to full capacity. Klein
(2005), Section 3.1.3.1, differentiates between carriage classes and booking classes. A class of carriage is
a spatial separated area in the cabin of an aircraft, whereupon the carriage classes differ for the purpose
of a product differentiation, e.g., via different service features. The implementation of carriage classes
induces the segmentation of consumers. The price differentiation is achieved by assigning different
booking classes to each class of carriage. Furthermore, individual rates are assigned to each booking
class. Segmenting the passengers into several groups due to their willingness to pay and assigning the
groups to defined booking classes with individual ticket rates enables the airline to sell identical seats
at divergent prices. Consequently, flight tickets can be sold to low-willingness-to-pay customers to at-
tract passengers that would not pay higher prices to fill up the unsold seat capacity and generate profit
improvements. There are several criteria that can be applied for segmenting a market as pointed out in
Faßnacht (1996), Section 4.2, as well as Homburg and Krohmer (2009), Section 12.3.1.2.2. Corporations
could charge different prices at different points in time. Applying a time-dependent price differentia-
tion implies that the price for a flight ticket that is sold by an airline for seats in an aircraft depends on
the time of sale during the booking process (compare Pak and Piersma, 2002). To obtain the mentioned
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profit improvements, an appropriate market segmentation and sophisticated restrictions to effectively
seal off the market segments are required. In Section 4.5.3, Phillips (2005) describes how to find the best
segmentation and names the conditions which need to be existent to apply segment-orientated price
differentiation. Phillips (2005), Section 4.2, also describes the mentioned restrictions, also referred to as
rules or booking fences (compare McGill and van Ryzin, 1999), which are necessary to prevent canni-
balization or arbitrage. The demand cannibalization effect appears if customers in high-price segments
find a way to pay the lower price. In the airline industry high-willingness-to-pay customers (e.g., busi-
ness travelers) could purchase discounted tickets under certain circumstances (compare Smith et al.,
1992). Arbitrage is another limit to price differentiation. It appears if a third-party finds a way to buy
the products in a segment with lower prices and resells them below the market price in another segment
to high-willingness-to-pay customers (compare Phillips, 2005, Section 4.2). To provide a proper fencing
of the segments, airlines often attach at least one condition to the discounted fares such as linking the
purchase of a discounted ticket to a minimum stay of four days at the destination. Since business trav-
elers cannot fulfill this restriction most of the time, these high-willingness-to-pay customers access the
higher priced tickets. Furthermore, the airlines prohibit a ticket transfer to other passengers to prevent
a circumvention of the airline’s efforts to increase revenue by segment-orientated price differentiation
(compare Kimms and Müller-Bungart, 2003). Further remarks on the revenue management instrument
segment-orientated price differentiation are to be found amongst others in Anjos et al. (2004), Botimer
(1996), Botimer and Belobaba (1999), Faßnacht and Homburg (1997), and Klein (2005), Section 3.1.
The capacity control mechanism for strategic alliances presented in this work requires predefined prices
for the considered products to calculate the control variables. These prices, which correspond to the
revenue the corporations gain by selling the products, need to be determined by a segment-orientated
price differentiation prior to capacity control.
2.2.2.2 Overbooking
In addition to variable demand, full capacity utilization is hindered since not every accepted request
leads to an occupied capacity unit and corresponding revenue. In the airline industry, this phenomenon
occurs since bookings made by passengers can be canceled in the course of the booking period. Ad-
ditionally, so called no-shows can emerge, where passengers with valid reservations do not show up
shortly before the departure of the aircraft without cancellation (compare Kimms and Klein, 2005).
Klophaus (1998) states that the Deutsche Lufthansa AG was exposed to more than four million no-
shows in 1997, which shows the potential of overbooking. The cancellation and no-show phenomenons
also arise in other application areas such as the car rental industry and hotel sector. The capacity re-
served for the canceled requests and no-show passengers is not gainfully used which causes that the
company runs the risk to face opportunity costs based on the loss of potential profit (Dunleavy, 1995).
To face this difficulty, the resources are overbooked beyond the actual existent capacity. Considering
airlines, the objective of overbooking is to identify how many bookings will be accepted beyond the
existent capacity for each class of carriage on each flight. Basically, the overbooking limit should be
defined so that full capacity utilization can be realized without any denied boardings at the departure
of the aircraft (compare Klein, 2001). Denied boardings describe the rejection of passengers with valid
reservations. The rejection is necessary if, due to overbooking, more passengers with valid reservations
show up at flight time than seats are available in the class of carriage on the air connection (compare
McGill and van Ryzin, 1999). There is also the possibility of upgrading or downgrading, which means
that the passenger is seated in another class of carriage than the class the passenger previously booked.
If this is not possible, the airline could search, e.g., by means of auctions (compare Rothstein, 1985) for
passengers who agree to switch to a later flight for compensation. These possibilities should be checked
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by the company previous to a denied service decision, since the degree of dissatisfaction of the passen-
gers and customers in general can be quite significant if the company denies the service. Additionally,
denied boardings can lead to costs that accrue, e.g., from compensation payments the airline needs to
pay to the rejected passengers. These costs need to be traded off against the additional expected rev-
enue arising from the overbooking and thereby prevented idle capacity (compare Chatwin, 1998). Since
there are application areas in which overbooking plays a minor role or is even irrelevant, overbook-
ing is, compared to segment-orientated price differentiation and capacity control, not a general revenue
management instrument (compare Klein, 2005, Section 3.3.1). E.g., overbooking methods are of little
importance for the make-to-order manufacturing sector, according to Rehkopf (2006), Section 3.3.2, and
Wiggershaus (2008), Section 3.4.
The following references discuss approaches for solving the overbooking problem. Littlewood (1972)
presents a static decision model to determine the overbooking limit for a limited seat capacity on non-
stop flights. In a static model, the overbooking limit is determined without the consideration of incom-
ing bookings or cancellations during the booking period (compare Klein, 2005, Section 3.3.2.1). Further
static overbooking models to control the seat capacity of carriage classes are pointed out by Coughlan
(1999) as well as Shlifer and Vardi (1975). Stochastic dynamic models for overbooking seat capacity on
a non-stop flight are described by Chatwin (1998) and Rothstein (1971). Dynamic models adjust the
overbooking limit whenever a request comes in based on the current booking data or forecasts for pos-
sible cancellations and no-shows (compare Klein, 2005, Section 3.3.2.1). Aydin et al. (2010) propose new
static and dynamic models for single-leg overbooking problems. Chiang et al. (2007) and McGill and
van Ryzin (1999) present an extensive list of publications in overbooking.
In the capacity control approaches introduced in this work overbooking is not considered. It is assumed
that the given capacity contains the overbooking limit (if necessary) which is determined based on the
forecast of cancellations and no-shows. Alternatively, the overbooking and capacity control could be
applied simultaneously (compare, e.g., Hersh and Ladany, 1978; Ladany and Bedi, 1977; Subramanian
et al., 1999; Zhao and Zheng, 2001). However, in most applications, simultaneous use of overbook-
ing and capacity control is not realizable which is why capacity control is often implemented after the
overbooking level was determined based on the information from overbooking.
2.2.2.3 Capacity Control
By applying a capacity control mechanism, the capacity of a single resource or a bundle of different re-
sources is allocated to different market segments or demand classes in order to maximize the expected
revenue (compare Chiang et al., 2007). To maximize the revenue of a future flight in the airline industry,
the limited capacity available in an aircraft is allocated to different booking classes by means of capacity
control (compare Tscheulin and Lindenmeier, 2003a). The instrument capacity control is regarded as the
most important new development associated with the revenue management concept and is, therefore,
appreciated as primary instrument and core element (compare, e.g., Kimms and Klein, 2005; Pak and
Piersma, 2002). In addition to the term capacity control, there are other names in anglophone literature:
discount seat allocation (compare, e.g., Smith et al., 1992), passenger mix (compare, e.g., Glover et al.,
1982), seat allocation (compare, e.g., Andersson, 1998; Brumelle and McGill, 1993), seat inventory control
(compare, e.g., Pak, 2005), and seat management (compare, e.g., Wollmer, 1992). Since the procedures
developed in this work are capacity control policies for companies within strategic alliances, the capac-
ity control instrument is described in more detail, especially the basic concepts underlying the newly
developed procedures.
Analyzing the capacity control instrument, it is important to differentiate between mathematical op-
timization methods and control methodologies. In the first step of capacity control, the optimization,
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varying methods can be used to determine the so called control variables which define the allocation
of capacity to different products. The control variables arrange the allocation of seats to the different
booking classes on the considered flights in the airline industry (compare Williamson, 1992, Section
4.2). Booking limits, protection levels, and bid prices are so called control variables (compare Müller-
Bungart, 2006, Section 2.1) which will be illustrated in the following paragraphs. In the second step of
capacity control, control methodologies are adopted to manage the compliance of the capacity allocation
by means of control variables determined in the optimization step. To maximize the revenue by man-
aging the capacity, the actual capacity control is just as important as the optimizing process (compare
Williamson, 1992, Section 4.2).
Klein (2005), Section 3.2.1.5, describes assumptions underlying the basic capacity control models for
both single-resource capacity control and network capacity control. Applying a single-resource capac-
ity control in the airline sector, only single-leg flights can be considered while network capacity control
allows for the consideration of multiple flight legs which need to be considered jointly, so called flight
networks. The first assumption defines that the stochastic demand for the products is independent and
that there are available forecast values indicating the expected, uncertain demand. Additionally, it is
assumed that the demand for the different products remains constant even if the capacity control deci-
sions cause that one of the products is not longer available for booking requests. The assumption that
the incoming booking requests are all requests for a single capacity unit, e.g., a single seat in the air-
craft, allows for incoming group requests which, however, is considered as sequence of single bookings.
Furthermore, cancellations and no-shows are assumed to be non-existent which is why an integrated
capacity control and overbooking policy is not required. Another assumption supposes that the prices
of the products, in the airline industry the flight ticket prices, cannot be adapted to changing basic con-
ditions during the booking process. Moreover, the sale of tickets for products which underly a product
differentiation is separately controlled. Passengers in the airline industry, e.g., cannot be upgraded from
a class of carriage with lower ticket prices to another carriage class with higher ticket prices to fulfill
the high demand for the considered class of carriage with lower ticket prices, even if in consequence
of a low demand for the carriage class with higher ticket prices seats remain free in that class. Finally,
it is assumed that there is no competition between companies so that the capacity control cannot cause
a migration of consumers between the competitors. Other publications, compare, e.g., McGill and van
Ryzin (1999) and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 2.2, list assumptions that are similarly grouped
as in Klein (2005), Section 3.2.1.5. The discussed assumptions are adopted also in the capacity control
mechanisms demonstrated in this work.
The optimization approaches for single-resource and network capacity control problems can be dif-
ferentiated in static and dynamic approaches. Both, static and dynamic approaches, imply the afore-
mentioned assumptions. Static approaches, however, assume an additional specification: The requests
for the different products arrive in delimited, non-overlapping intervals and the requests from low-
willingness-to-pay segments arrive preliminary to requests from the customers with high-willingness-
to-pay which is why the assumption is often called low-to-high-revenue order principle. Dynamic mod-
els, however, relax this assumption. They permit an arbitrary arrival order of incoming requests for the
different products (compare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 2.2 and Section 2.5).
The capacity control policies can be carried out in different modes. There are booking limit controls,
bid price controls, and control policies based on stochastic dynamic optimization (compare Klein, 2005,
Section 3.2.1.3). However, as stated by Klein (2005), Section 3.2.1.3, the booking limit control and bid
price control are the basic types of capacity control policies. The approaches based on stochastic dy-
namic optimization are not practice-orientated so far due to the computing time associated with their
application. As mentioned before, the problem which necessitates the application of capacity control is
linked to the different valuations of demand ascribed to the price differentiation. There could be a loss
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in sales if the capacity available for the corporation is less than required to handle the total demand and
if the demand for the different price segments arises in diverse points in time. There can be a crowding
out of sales, assuming that the demand from customers with low-willingness-to-pay arrives at first and
the company needs to decide fast about accepting or rejecting the request and, therefore, tends to ac-
cept all incoming requests as long as capacity is available (compare Domschke et al., 2005; Friege, 1996;
Kimms and Müller-Bungart, 2006). Once the capacity is occupied by customers in the low-willingness-
to-pay segment, it cannot be sold to customers willing to pay a higher price arriving later in the booking
process. On the other hand, there is a chance of loss in sales and idle time costs if the low-willingness-
to-pay customers will be rejected and the customers in the high-willingness-to-pay segment turn out
to be fewer than expected. In this scenario, unused capacity will be left over (compare Tscheulin and
Lindenmeier, 2003b). To avoid these kinds of losses, the booking limit capacity control compares the
capacity units sold for a product until the considered point in time with a given reference value, the
booking limit or protection level of the respective products to decide about the acceptance or rejection
of incoming requests in order to maximize the expected benefit. Thus, a certain number of capacity
units is protected for the customers purchasing the higher priced product from the access of customers
willing to pay less but arriving prior in the booking process. The bid price control policy is based on
the comparison of the revenue generated by accepting a customer request for a certain product and a
bottom price. A bid price describes such a bottom price (compare Klein, 2005, Section 3.2.1.3).
Single-Resource Capacity Control
In booking limit capacity control policy, the available capacity is allocated to the different market seg-
ments prior to the booking process. A booking limit control policy confines the capacity which can be
sold to a specific market segment (compare Harris and Pinder, 1995). Considering airlines, a booking
limit for a particular booking class shows the number of passengers to accept in this booking class and,
therefore, the number of seats that are authorized for sale to the booking class (compare Pak, 2005).
The single-resource capacity control problem would be trivial if all high fare passengers book before the
passengers with low-willingness-to-pay. In this case, the requests could be accepted in order of arrival
(in a first-come-first-served manner) until the total capacity of the resource is reached or until there is
no future demand, respectively (compare Williamson, 1992, Section 2.1). In the following, the booking
limit of product j = 1, ..., n is denoted as bj. The booking limits are assumed to be nonnegative (bj ≥ 0).
Booking limits are either partitioned or nested (compare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 2.1.1.1).
Partitioned booking limits describe the maximal amount of capacity which is exclusively reserved for
the requests for a particular product. There is an optimal capacity control with underlying partitioned
booking limits if the demand is certainly known (compare Kimms and Klein, 2005). The available total
capacity is partitioned in separate blocks, also called buckets, to determine the partitioned booking lim-
its. The sum of the partitioned booking limits equals the total available capacity which is denoted by
C:
n
∑
j=1
bj = C
Every booking limit bj corresponds to a protection level pj. A protection level specifies the amount of
capacity which is reserved (protected) for a particular product or a group of products and which is ex-
clusively available to these products. Protection levels can be partitioned or nested as well, whereupon
the partitioned protection level of a certain product j matches the partitioned booking limit of product j
(compare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 2.1.1.2). This correlation is presented in Figure 2.1.
We do not consider group arrivals in the following and, therefore, assume that every incoming request
asks for one capacity unit. A booking request for product j is accepted if the amount of requests already
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Figure 2.1: Partitioned Booking Limits and Protection Levels (compare Lee and Hersh, 1993)
accepted for product j, hj, plus the incoming request is less than or equal to the booking limit for the
considered product (hj + 1 ≤ bj, for all j = 1, ..., n), respectively the protection level for product j
(hj + 1 ≤ pj, for all j = 1, ..., n).
Partitioned booking limits for a single resource can be determined by means of the following determin-
istic linear program, presented, e.g., by Bertsimas and Popescu (2003), de Boer et al. (2002), Williamson
(1992), Section 4.1, for network capacity control assuming several resources. Let vj > 0 be the revenue
the company gains when accepting a booking for product j with v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn. E[dj] > 0 denotes
the expected demand for product j.
max
n
∑
j=1
vjbj (2.1)
subject to
bj ≤ E[dj] j = 1, ..., n (2.2)
n
∑
j=1
bj ≤ C (2.3)
bj ≥ 0 j = 1, ..., n (2.4)
The objective function (2.1) maximizes the revenue over all booking classes. The condition (2.2) ensures
that the booking limits of the single products must not exceed the expected demand for the respective
product. Additionally, the partitioned booking limits need to be determined so that the total available
capacity is not exceeded (2.3). The booking limits of the booking classes are greater than or equal to zero
(2.4).
The models developed in this work to calculate partitioned booking limits for the partners within a
strategic alliance are based on the deterministic linear program described above. However, there are
other models for booking limit calculations described in literature. E.g., Kimms and Müller-Bungart
(2003) present a non-linear probabilistic model with underlying probability distributions assumed to be
given for the quantity demanded for the different products. A linear probabilistic model for partitioned
booking limit calculation, which is the linear equivalent to the model described by Kimms and Müller-
Bungart (2003), is formulated by Müller-Bungart (2006), Section 2.2.1.
According to Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), partitioned booking limit controls possess methodical draw-
backs if the demand is stochastically variable as it is often the case in reality. If there are requests beyond
the booking limits of the more profitable products, the additional booking requests for these products
are declined even if there are still capacity units available. This can lead to loss of revenue. In a nested
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booking limit control, capacity allocated to the least profitable products is made available to more prof-
itable products as well (compare McGill and van Ryzin, 1999). Lee and Hersh (1993) specify that nested
booking limits can also be described as nested protection levels. As pointed out by Talluri and van
Ryzin (2004b), Section 2.1.1.2, nested protection levels are defined as the capacity which is protected for
the products j, j− 1, ..., j = 1 from the access of the lower yielding products. Whereupon j = 1 equals the
highest yielding product as defined before. The nested protection levels as well as the nested booking
limits are defined for a set of products which is hierarchically arranged in a proper order. The princi-
ple of nested booking limits and protection levels by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 2.1.1.1 and
Section 2.1.1.2, is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
.??.??.
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Figure 2.2: Nested Booking Limits and Protection Levels
The nested booking limit b1 for the highest yielding product is equal to the total capacity (b1 = C) just as
the nested protection level pn which represents the capacity protected for all products j = 1, j = 2, ..., n
(pn = C). For the nested booking limits of the products j = 2, ..., n counts: The nested booking limit
for product j is equal to the difference between the total capacity and nested protection level of product
j − 1 (bj = C − pj−1, for all j = 2, ..., n). The characteristic of the nested booking limits and protection
levels compared to the total capacity can be demonstrated as follows:
C =
{
bj j = 1
bj + pj−1 j = 2, ..., n.
A nested booking limit of a particular product j is equal to the sum of the partitioned booking limit
of that product and the partitioned booking limits of all lower yielding products (compare Klein, 2005,
Section 3.2.1.3). The nesting order, which indicates the ranking of products according to their valency,
needs to be declared if nested control variables are applied. A permutation of the products is specified
so that product j is higher yielding than product k if j < k. The nesting order defines that product j
can access the capacity reserved or protected for product k if product j is higher yielding than product
k (compare Müller-Bungart, 2006, Section 2.2.2). Considering the single-resource capacity control, the
identification of the nesting order is trivial if there are no group bookings allowed. Since, without
loss of generality, for all products j = k can be assumed that vj = vk, the nesting order is defined as
j < k if product j is higher yielding than product k, thus, the revenue gained by selling product j is
higher than the revenue for selling product k (vj > vk). The determination of a nesting order is more
complicated if there are multiple resources that need to be considered (network capacity control), if
group bookings requesting different amounts of capacity units cannot be partially accepted, and if a
customer choice behavior needs to be considered (compare Lee and Hersh, 1993; Talluri and van Ryzin,
2004a). Controlling the capacity by nested booking limits, a booking request for product j is accepted if
the sum of requests accepted so far for product j and all lower yielding products is smaller than booking
limit bj of product j (compare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 2.1.1.3). Therefore, a booking request
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for product j is accepted if
n
∑
i=j
hi + 1 ≤ bj, for all j = 1, ..., n.
Otherwise the request is rejected (compare Lee and Hersh, 1993). If this condition is satisfied, the total
capacity is not exceeded since the booking limit of product j = 1 characterizes the total capacity. To
guarantee that this condition is valid during the entire booking period, the respective nested booking
limits need to be decreased after accepting a request for a particular product. If nested booking limits
would be handled such as partitioned booking limits, which do not need to be updated after accepting
a request, the total capacity could not be adhered to or, with a respective demand for higher yielding
products, there would not be capacity left for these from a certain point in time in the booking period
(compare Müller-Bungart, 2006, Section 2.2.2). Nested protection levels need to be updated as well after
accepting a booking request when controlling the capacity with these control variables. Standard nesting
and theft nesting are two methods which can be applied to update nested booking limits, respectively
nested protection levels, to execute the capacity control (compare Bertsimas and de Boer, 2005; Talluri
and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 2.1.1.3). In both procedures, the available capacity needs to be decreased
by one after accepting a booking request. Therefore, if the q-th request for product j is accepted, the
capacity available for request q + 1, cq, is updated by means of the following rule (compare Müller-
Bungart, 2006, Section 2.2.2):
cq = cq−1 − 1. (2.5)
In 2.5, c is denoted as cq to avoid confusion. The total capacity C corresponds to c0, the available capacity
in the booking process when none of the requests for the products is accepted. In standard nesting con-
trol, after accepting a booking request q for booking class k, the booking limit of the requested booking
class is reduced by one, as well as the booking limits of all booking classes that are higher yielding than
booking class k (neglecting group bookings). The decreased booking limits need to be non-negative in
the standard nesting control (bj ≥ 0). This condition is fulfilled since the booking limits of the lower
nested booking classes are not reduced when accepting a request for a higher nested booking class.
Recall, a nested booking limit of any booking class is always higher than the nested booking limits of
all lower nested booking classes. However, the booking limits of the higher nested classes need to be
higher than or equal to the booking limits of the respective lower nested booking classes after the re-
duction of the booking limits. To guarantee this condition, the booking limit for the respective lower
nested booking classes is updated after the acceptance of a request for class k by setting the booking
limits of all lower nested classes equal to the smaller value of the values: the decreased booking limit
for the higher nested class bqk or the unchanged booking limit for the considered lower nested class b
q−1
j
(compare Müller-Bungart, 2006, Section 2.2.2). Accepting a request q for booking class k, the booking
limits are updated so that
bqj =
{
bq−1j − 1 j ≥ k
min{bq−1j , b
q
k} j < k
j = 1, ..., n. (2.6)
In 2.6, bj is denoted as b
q
j to avoid confusion. The case differentiation in 2.6 is introduced by Müller-
Bungart (2006), Section 2.2.2, following the description of Klein (2005), Section 4.3.2.3. In theft nesting
control, after accepting a booking request q for booking class k, the booking limit of all booking classes
j = 1, ..., n is reduced by one (compare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 2.1.1.3). Consequently,
the acceptance of a request for booking class k not only decrements the capacity allocated to booking
class k, but also steals capacity units allocated to booking classes that are lower nested than booking
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class k, even if the capacity allocated to booking class k is still unexhausted. Controlling the capacity
by booking limits in the theft nesting approach, it needs to be ensured that the booking limits are non-
negative, contrary to the procedure in standard nesting. Accepting a request q for booking class k the
booking limits are updated so that
bqj = max{0, b
q−1
j − 1}, for all j = 1, ..., n.
When applying a protection limit capacity control, the protection levels also need to be revised after
accepting requests. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 2.1.1.3 illustrate the procedure in standard
and theft nesting considering protection levels.
Other possible control variables underlying capacity control policies are the aforementioned bid-prices.
A bid-price represents a minimum price that the company wants to achieve selling a product (compare
Boyd and Bilegan, 2003). According to McGill and van Ryzin (1999), some authors refer to bid-prices as
minimum acceptable fares, probabilistic shadow prices, displacement costs, or probabilistic dual costs.
Considering a single-resource capacity control policy, the bid-price is equal to the price of the lowest
nested product for which a positive contingent of capacity units has been allocated (compare Klein,
2005, Section 3.2.1.3). A booking request q for product j is accepted if sufficient capacity units are avail-
able and the acceptance of the booking request yields a revenue vj that is at least equal to the bid-price
πj. Otherwise the request is rejected (compare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 2.1.1.4). In the
aviation industry, the airline accepts an incoming request if the remaining seat capacity is greater than
zero and the revenue, the airline gains by accepting the booking request, is greater than or equal to the
bid-price. Contrary to the calculation of booking limits and protection levels, only one control vari-
able for each resource needs to be determined when calculating the bid-prices underlying the capacity
control (compare Pak, 2005, Section 2.3.2), unless bid-prices are time-dependent. However, this advan-
tage involves a shortcoming since bid-prices do not reserve or protect capacity for customers in higher
yielding segments from the access of lower yielding customer segments if both customer segments are
within the group of segments which are willing to pay a price at least equal to the considered bid-price
(compare Klein, 2001). This drawback can be reduced if the bid-prices are updated during the booking
process, e.g. after each request acceptance. Several updating possibilities for bid-prices are presented by
Klein (2005), Section 4.2.1.1. The number of stored values, necessary for the capacity control considering
updated bid-prices, can be very high, which can eliminate the aforementioned advantage of bid-price
policies (compare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 2.1.1.4). Williamson (1992), Section 4.4.1, de-
scribes the determination of bid-prices for a single resource which are called leg-based bid prices when
considering airlines. E.g., Williamson (1992), Section 4.2.3, uses dual prices from a deterministic linear
program to determine marginal values for an incremental capacity unit on a resource. Since bid-prices
are calculated for each resource separately, the bid-price determination in single resource capacity con-
trol and network capacity control are similar. Further information on capacity control with underlying
bid-prices and the determination of bid-prices are presented, e.g., by Bertsimas and Popescu (2003),
Klein (2005), Section 4.2.1, Müller-Bungart (2006), Section 2.3, Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section
3.2, and Williamson (1992), Section 4.2.3. The following analysis will concentrate on the application of
booking limits as variables to control the capacity within strategic alliances.
The control methodologies of capacity control can be classified into a static and dynamic execution of
control. In a static control, the control variables determined at first, before the booking process, will stay
unchanged during the entire booking process. Considering dynamic control, the booking limits deter-
mined at first are revised based on additional information received during the booking process. New
information could be provided, e.g., by analyzing the booking requests already received in the book-
ing process and the demand forecasts that can be recalculated based on the new information (compare
Belobaba, 1989).
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The sequence of incoming booking requests is relevant for the calculation of nested control variables.
As described before, the static optimization approaches to determine nested booking limits assume
the requests for the particular products to arrive in a low-to-high-revenue order due to simplification
reasons. Additionally, it is assumed that the amount and structure of the demand does not change
in the course of the booking process. Hence, the nested booking limits obtained by means of static
optimization procedures are optimal only if the actual amount and structure of demand during the
booking period is just as assumed, as pointed out by (compare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section
2.2). In the earliest reference with respect to nested capacity control, a static approach to optimize nested
control variables for an airline operating a non-stop flight is described by Littlewood (1972). In the
approach, which became famous as Littlewood’s Rule, Littlewood considers two booking classes with
ticket fares v1 > v2. The decision rule decides on the acceptance or rejection of a booking request based
on the expected revenue resulting from accepting or rejecting the request. Assume that h2 requests for
the second booking class (or product) are already accepted by the airline and the remaining available
capacity in the aircraft is defined by c. If an additional request for the second booking class arrives,
the revenue v2 can be collected by accepting the request. This revenue, however, needs to be compared
with potential opportunity costs for the first booking class, resulting from the capacity decrement when
the request is accepted and so the capacity is not longer available for the access of requests for the first
booking class. These opportunity costs occur only if the demand for the first booking class D1 is greater
than or equal to the remaining capacity c = C − h2. P(D1 ≥ c) describes the probability for that case.
So, the expected opportunity costs for the second booking class can be described as marginal revenue
v1P(D1 ≥ c) for the first booking class. The expected revenue from reserving the c-th capacity unit for
the first booking class is also called expected marginal revenue. Requests for the second booking class
are accepted as long as the revenue gained by accepting the request exceeds the described expected
marginal revenue:
v2 ≥ v1P(D1 ≥ c). (2.7)
The right-hand side of 2.7 increases with decreasing remaining capacity c. Assuming a continuous
distribution there is an optimal protection level p∗1 satisfying:
v2 = v1P(D1 > p∗1) ⇒ p∗1 = F−11 (1−
v2
v1
),
with Fj(·) denoting the probability function of the demand for product j. The booking limit for the
second booking class results from b∗2 = c − p∗1. For a more detailed description of Littlewood’s rule
compare Klein (2005), Section 3.2.2.1 and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 2.2.1. The EMSR ap-
proach (Expected Marginal Seat Revenue approach), described by Belobaba (1987, 1989), is based on
the decision rule defined by Littlewood. Belobaba’s approach considers more than two nested booking
classes, although the approach determines optimal booking limits only in the case of two considered
booking classes. The booking limits are heuristically determined if more than two booking classes are
present (compare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 2.2.4). Both variants of the EMSR approach, the
EMSR-a and EMSR-b heuristic, will be described in Section 4.2.3 in which the capacity control approach
for strategic alliances with underlying EMSR heuristics will be introduced. Brumelle and McGill (1993),
Curry (1990), as well as Wollmer (1992) describe models to calculate optimal nested booking limits for a
single-leg airline revenue management problem with multiple booking classes (also called fare classes)
when low fare passengers book before high fare passengers. If the low-to-high revenue order is consid-
ered with multiple booking classes, the demand for the different booking classes is assumed to arrive in
blocks, which is why the literature speaks of a blocked demand model. Both references prove that the
optimal capacity control policy under blocked demand is a nested booking limit method.
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So far, only static booking limit control policies have been considered. Dynamic booking limit policies
to determine nested booking limit permit an arbitrary order of request arrivals. Therefore, the low-to-
high revenue order assumption is relaxed. The nested booking limits and protection levels calculated
by means of dynamic models are time-dependent since the incoming demand varies with time during
the booking process. This time-dependent demand affects the expected demand and thereby the deter-
mined control variables. In most capacity control systems in practice, the booking limits and protection
levels determined by the dynamic booking limit policies are fixed and periodically updated since the
value function most likely does not change intensely over a short period of time (compare Talluri and
van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 2.5.2). McGill and van Ryzin (1999) present an extensive overview of dynamic
programming research related to single-resource capacity control. Brumelle and Walczak (2003), Lee
and Hersh (1993), Subramanian et al. (1999), and Zhao and Zheng (2001) provide dynamic approaches
to determine booking limits for the single-leg case. Lee and Hersh (1993) include group bookings in
their approach. In the procedure of Subramanian et al. (1999), group bookings are not considered, how-
ever, the authors extend the basic model presented by Lee and Hersh (1993) considering cancellations,
no-shows, and overbooking methods. Brumelle and Walczak (2003) introduce a dynamic model con-
sidering overbooking and group bookings (also called batch arrivals). Zhao and Zheng (2001) present a
dynamic procedure considering a single airline leg with two booking classes and three customer types
incorporating customer-choice behavior into the protection level calculation. Another reference consid-
ering passengers behavior in the single-leg case is published by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004a). Detailed
descriptions concerning single resource capacity control methods and the influence of group bookings
and customer-choice behavior on control variable calculations can be looked up in the monograph of
Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Chapter 2.
Network Capacity Control
According to McGill and van Ryzin (1999), revenue management policies should account for arising
network effects. Since these effects cannot be accomplished by single-resource capacity control, special
network capacity control policies need to be implemented. The arising network effects can be demon-
strated using the example of the airline application area. The number of passenger itineraries that con-
tain different flight legs has dramatically increased due to the expansion of hub-and-spoke networks.
An origin-destination itinerary booking class combination, also called origin-destination itinerary fare
class combination (ODF) describes a product in the airline network example. Therefore, network capac-
ity control is also called origin-destination control (compare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 3.1
and Vinod, 1995). Since many different origin-destination itineraries involve jointly used flight legs, a
booking for a certain itinerary influences the available capacity not only for the booked itinerary but also
for all origin-destination combinations which access the respective flight legs. Consider, e.g., two pos-
sible origin-destination itineraries: a non-stop flight from Düsseldorf (DUS) to Frankfurt/Main (FRA)
and a flight from Düsseldorf via Frankfurt/Main to Bangkok (BKK) which involves the same flight leg
as the flight DUS – FRA. Controlling the flight legs separately could cause a lack of capacity on one
of the legs involved in the DUS – FRA – BKK itinerary. Since there need to be capacity units avail-
able on both flight legs to accept a request for the long haul flight, booking requests for DUS – FRA
– BKK, which generate a higher total revenue, cannot be accepted anymore. This can cause a loss in
revenue for the airline. To prevent this, airlines need to apply a network capacity control simultane-
ously considering all respective flight legs (compare Klein, 2001, Section 3.3). Considering the network
effects in revenue management applications can lead to high potential revenue benefits. On the other
hand, network capacity control policies are challenging due to implementation, methodological, and
organizational difficulties, as pointed out by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 3.1.1. Since network
capacity control problems are already difficult to solve in single airline revenue management policies,
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the problem gets even more complex if multiple airlines share capacity within a strategic alliance. For
that reason, the capacity control procedures implemented in this work focus on single-resource capac-
ity control to develop promising alliance capacity control procedures which can be extended to alliance
network capacity control approaches in future research. However, to conclude the theoretical revenue
management background, we refer to the elaborate descriptions of network capacity control presented
by Boyd and Bilegan (2003) and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Chapter 3. For an overview of network
capacity control research we refer to Chiang et al. (2007), and McGill and van Ryzin (1999). Two control
methods, namely virtual nesting control and bid-price methods, have been dominating the literature
of network capacity control (compare Boyd and Bilegan, 2003). Bid-price methods have already been
mentioned for single-resource capacity control. The bid-prices capacity control for multiple resources
is a simple extension to the bid-price underlying capacity control considering a single resource (com-
pare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 3.2.1.3). Virtual nesting is a method that reduces the problem
size of network capacity control problems which improves the efficiency of procedures applied for net-
work capacity control. Smith and Penn (1988) introduced the Displacement Adjustment Virtual Nesting
(DAVN), a control policy to implement virtual nesting capacity control. Other references using DAVN
are Bertsimas and de Boer (2005), van Ryzin and Vulcano (2008a,b), and Williamson (1992), Section 4.4.3.
Other approaches that are applied in network capacity control are mentioned by McGill and van Ryzin
(1999) referring to the respective literature. E.g., Curry (1990) presents a mathematical programming
approach combined with a marginal seat revenue approach, capturing several important elements of
network capacity control. The combined approach handles large origin-destination problems and ac-
counts for nested booking classes. There are references considering customer-choice behavior also in
network capacity control problems, compare Bront et al. (2009) as well as Liu and van Ryzin (2008).
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Chapter 3
Remarks on Strategic Alliances
This chapter introduces strategic alliances. Definitions and basic information concerning strategic al-
liances will be shortly discussed (Section 3.1) before an extensive overview of revenue management
application areas, in which corporations form strategic alliances, will be presented (Section 3.2).
3.1 Defining Strategic Alliances
Opdemom (1998), Section 3.1, defines a strategic alliance as a form of cooperation between at least two
legally separate corporations operating in the same industry sector that compete on the same market
level. Backhaus and Piltz (1990) add that corporations form strategic alliances to combine the indi-
vidual strengths in the various business segments so that the corporations can realize mutual strategic
relevant competitive advantages. There is high potential for success in single business areas which can
be ensured or even newly developed if corporations achieve these advantages by forming strategic al-
liances. Since strategic alliances are cooperations between current or potential competitors in a business
sector, all partners within the strategic alliance focus on the same strategic business sector. Therefore,
strategic alliances can also be perceived as horizontal cooperations (compare Backhaus and Piltz, 1990).
According to Zhang and Zhang (2006) strategic alliances represent an important form of cooperation
that can be seen as a weak form of a merger. Since the partners within a strategic alliance stay distinct
business entities with own decision-making autonomy, strategic alliances do not arise from a merger.
In network-orientated industries, strategic alliances are especially prevalent. Network-orientated in-
dustries are, e.g., the airline, logistic, multimodal transport, shipping, and telecommunication industry
(compare Zhang and Zhang, 2006). In the following section, the industries in which capacity control
concepts for strategic alliances can be applied will be further discussed. Other forms of cooperations,
despite from strategic alliances, theoretical theories discussing alliances, basic conditions of coopera-
tions, as well as driving forces of cooperations can be retrieved in Zentes et al. (2005). Casson and
Mol (2006) offer an examination of current literature on alliances from a broad theoretical perspective.
An extensive discussion of horizontal strategic alliances and the mutual strategic goals of the alliance
partners is given by Lutz (1993). In this study, Lutz (1993), Section 2.1.1, lists the main objectives of
the alliance partners as: market entry, access to new technologies, risk and cost reduction, realization
of synergy effects, and reduction of competition as well as avoidance of competition law or barriers
of trade. As pointed out in Zhang and Zhang (2006), corporations can realize advantages by forming
strategic alliances, e.g., due to the expansion of their networks, advantages of product complementaries
which can be taken, gaining economies of scale and scope, and enhancing product quality and customer
services. However, these potential benefits that can inure to the benefit of firms and customers cannot
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be realized by all corporations since there are restrictions in building strategic alliances due to antitrust
aspects. According to Dussauge and Garrette (1999), Chapter 1, antitrust authorities are most suspicious
when it comes to alliances between competitors. Consider the airline industry: airlines operating on in-
ternational routes usually face only few competitors. The degree of competition could be significantly
reduced on the respective origin-destination routes if two major competitors form an alliance. Therefore,
antitrust authorities need to consider any possible anticompetitive effect when they decide whether do-
mestic airlines should be restricted or encouraged to expand their networks by joining a foreign strategic
alliance (compare Zhang and Zhang, 2006). The critical aspect of antitrust law considerations and the
legal relevance for cooperations in Europe is outlined by Basedow and Jung (1993) and Schulte (2003).
Dussauge and Garrette (1999), Chapter 1, examine the legal context and regulations given to interfirm
cooperations. In the publication of Oum et al. (2001), regulatory issues which are related to international
airline alliances are surveyed. Chen and Ross (2000) explore strategic alliances in which the partners
share production capacity and some possible anticompetitive entry-deterrence effects of these types of
alliances. When forming strategic alliances, corporations need to consider additional business require-
ments which could limit their scope of action. To ensure that all partners within the alliances cooperate
fairly, the future alliance members should contract agreements. Several aspects can be modeled in such
alliance contracts. E.g., the contract could limit network extensions and frequency of cooperations in
the mutual network. Additionally, certain revenue allocation agreements could be established. Other
business requirements are, e.g., regulations set by the government or unions (compare O’Neal et al.,
2007).
In this work, alliances between rivals which coordinate their revenue management decisions locally
are considered. The outcome of the study carried out by Morris and Hergert (1987) shows that alliances
between competitors account for more than 70% of all cooperation agreements. Collaborations of corpo-
rations in strategic alliances influence the revenue management decisions made by the alliance partners.
Vinod (2005) resorts to the airline industry and states that the airlines within an alliance manage the traf-
fic flow in the alliance network to maximize revenues. Capacity control to manage the seat availability
and traffic flow, however, is influenced by the collaboration and is, therefore, different to capacity control
mechanisms considering only a single airline. According to Vinod (2005), in an optimal environment for
revenue management decisions of alliance partners, all partners share data, such as the fares the partners
request on the origin-destination combinations and the bookings which were already recorded by the
individual revenue management systems. Due to several considerations including, e.g., organizational,
geographical, and antitrust aspects, this environment is, however, unrealistic and not arrangeable. Boyd
(1998) points out that centralized decisions on the basis of combining flight networks of alliance partners
and treating them as a single network cannot be made in alliances in the airline industry. The existence
of airline specific, highly complex revenue management IT-systems and the need for processing a large
amount of data in real-time makes a centralized control system nearly impossible. Another aspect mil-
itates for a decentralized coordination: The airlines (if they do not merge) are autonomous and their
revenue management concepts are developed for their special needs which improves the airlines com-
petitive situation. Not only do technical objections lead to a decentralized treatment but also antitrust
arguments forbid centralized solutions. Due to these three aspects, only decentralized solutions are of
practical relevance.
Netessine and Shumsky (2005) analyze capacity control problems under horizontal and vertical compe-
tition. Horizontal competition is defined as the competition between two airlines for passengers on the
same flight leg and in the vertical competition scenario the airlines operate different legs on a combined
multi-leg origin-destination itinerary.
There are research fields which can be compared to the capacity control problem occurring in strategic
alliances. As it is pointed out in Shumsky (2006), the coordination in a strategic alliance can be com-
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pared to the coordination in a physical supply chain. In a supply chain for physical goods the supply
chain can be regarded as an alliance with manufacturers or suppliers and retailers being the alliance
partners. In that case, the products within the alliance are shipped from manufacturers or suppliers
to retailers. Of course, there are significant differences between the coordination in supply chains and
the capacity control problem in alliance revenue management. Shumsky (2006) lists these differences:
First, the products exchanged by the alliance partners are not storable. Consider once again an airline
alliance. The seats in the operating carrier’s aircraft, corresponding to the products exchanged within
the alliance, cannot be held as inventory. Once the aircraft of the operating carrier takes off, the airlines
can no longer sell tickets for the possible spare seats in the aircraft on the flight. Second, most of the
publications addressing traditional supply chains concentrate on selling one product to one customer
type. In airline alliances, the partner airlines can sell a single seat to hundreds of customer types, respec-
tively in network structures to miscellaneous of customer type and itinerary combinations. Third, the
traditional supply chain literature usually defines the partners in the supply chain either as manufac-
turers and suppliers or as retailers. In an airline alliance, a partner airline can operate a flight on a flight
leg by providing seat capacity in an aircraft and simultaneously the same airline can act as ticketing
carrier, accessing seat capacity from a partner airline on another flight leg. Furthermore, in supply chain
management the manufacturers or suppliers are assumed to sell their products only to the retailers in
contrast to the partners within an alliance which can sell their products to other partners or customers in
the market. However, despite the mentioned differences, capacity control in a strategic alliance can be
compared to the coordination in a supply chain by means of contracts. Cachon (2003) offers an overview
of literature discussing supply chain coordination with contracts. In Section 7.1 the supply chain coor-
dination by means of contracts will be compared to the capacity control mechanism in strategic airline
alliances.
As this work is focused on capacity control, the examples in the following section describe revenue
management application areas with strategic alliance occurrence emphasizing the capacity control in-
strument.
3.2 Application Areas of Revenue Management in Combination with
Strategic Alliances
As described before, revenue management problems occur in different industry sectors. The application
areas of revenue management instruments are elaborately discussed in previous publications. Compre-
hensive overviews concerning these application sectors are given by Chiang et al. (2007), Kimms and
Klein (2005), Kimms and Müller-Bungart (2003), McGill and van Ryzin (1999), Talluri and van Ryzin
(2004b), Chapter 10, and Tscheulin and Lindenmeier (2003a). In the following paragraphs, the existence
of strategic alliances in revenue management application areas will be discussed. The passenger airline
industry will be discussed more detailed compared to the other industries due to the great importance
the revenue management literature attaches to this industry and due to the fact that the capacity control
methods in this work are explained for strategic airline alliances.
3.2.1 Passenger Airline Industry
As mentioned before, the origins of revenue management can be traced back to the airline industry. A
wide range of publications bear on air passenger transportation to give examples for composed theories
or explicitly formulate models and methods for the passenger airline revenue management problem.
Compare the examples given in Section 2.2.2 which explain revenue management instruments by means
of application in the passenger airline industry.
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The deregulation of the airline industry, discussed in Section 2.1, had consequences on the airline market
beyond the ones influencing the deployment of revenue management instruments. Major airlines were
confronted with the competition of low-cost carriers entering the markets. To meet arising challenges,
major airlines, not able to profitably offer flights to markets with low demand, began to cooperate with
regional carriers which could meet the demand for low density markets profitably. According to Shum-
sky (2006), major traditional carriers are forced by low-cost competitors to process an increasing amount
of their traffic in airline alliances. Chiang et al. (2007) state that an airline needs to become a member
of an alliance to defend market share. Airlines have different incentives to cooperate with other airlines
within a strategic alliance due to new expected revenue potentials founded by greater airline networks,
coordinated flight schedules, and access to protected markets. Moreover, there are cost-cutting poten-
tials justified by a higher load factor. Another motivation for building strategic alliances could be the
generation of market entry barriers. In a competitive environment, airlines can attract more passen-
gers by offering flights to numerous destinations in the world and enhancing services, as pointed out
in Oum and Park (1997). By means of combining the partners’ flight networks, the respective airlines
can expand their service networks. Additionally, the combined flight networks allow major airlines to
provide services on markets on which profitable operated flights are not possible for the major airlines
without the alliance partners. In some small markets, the total demand for flight tickets is so low that op-
erating these markets with own aircrafts would not be profitable for major airlines (compare Oum and
Park, 1997). This application environment is observed in the capacity control mechanisms deployed for
strategic alliances in the present work. A single flight leg is assumed on which the considered flight
can only be profitably performed by the operating airline if another airline also offers flight tickets for
the same flight pooling together the incoming demand. Besides enlarged origin-destination flight of-
fers, customers benefit from airlines building an alliance, e.g., due to shorter traveling times and the
eliminated need to re-check baggage, as pointed out by Park et al. (2001). Partners within an alliance
are able to coordinate flight schedules better than single airlines which reduces the passengers overall
travel time. However, airlines building strategic alliances can also cause disadvantages for customers
if the airlines behave anticompetitive. This anticompetitive behavior can result in higher flight ticket
fares for the customers (compare Oum et al., 2001). As pointed out before, the antitrust authorities need
to distinguish the anticompetitive behavior and take legal action against it. Oum and Park (1997) list
further incentives for airlines to join strategic alliances. As pointed out by Oum et al. (1993), single air-
lines cannot expand their flight network on their own in the amount as it is possible for partner airlines
within an alliance due to insufficient financial, organizational, and time resources.
The major strategic alliances in the passenger transport airline industry are Star Alliance, SkyTeam, and
oneworld. Historical developments of multiple airline alliances are described by Oum et al. (1993).
According to Field and Tacoun (2005), in 2004 alliances carried more than 50% of the world passen-
ger traffic, showing the increasing impact of alliances in the passenger airline traffic. There are several
different cooperation forms and types of airline alliances which are categorized, e.g., by Barringer and
Harrison (2000), Oum and Park (1997), and Vinod (2005). Oum et al. (2001) affirm that a key character-
istic of international airline alliances are so called code-sharing agreements among the partners within
the alliance. Flights offered by the alliance are called code-shared flights if an airline within the alliance
allows their partner airlines to sell flight tickets for seats on flights operated by the considered airline
(compare O’Neal et al., 2007). These code-shared flights are usually offered with different flight num-
bers since each airline sells flight tickets under its own brand as an own product even if the flight tickets
are sold for flights operated by a partner airline (compare Park and Zhang, 1998). Boyd (1998) raises
the question that comes up if airlines are in a code-share agreement: how many seats on the consid-
ered flight can be accessed by the non-operating partner airlines? This question brings up new decision
problems concerning the capacity allocation if airlines build strategic alliances. In case of alliances, the
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capacity control not only has to sort out how many seats should be allocated to the different fare classes
but also how the seats are divided among the alliance partners. A range of possible concepts is imagin-
able from a free sale to apportioning blocks of capacity among the partners of the alliance. Boyd (1998)
specified two common decision control mechanisms used in practice: In a free sale, the airline operat-
ing the considered flight provides access to the seats in the aircraft by providing information about seat
availability to the non-operating alliance partners. The alliance partner airlines are allowed to access the
seats, for example, in a first-come-first-served order. In a blocked seat allotment procedure, each airline
individually controls the seats they have been assigned to before the booking process. The drawbacks
of capacity control methods so far applied for strategic alliances are: In a free sale setting, no capacity
is reserved for higher yielding booking classes while in a blocked seat allotment procedure, each airline
individually controls the seats they have been assigned to which leads to static allotments (hard blocks).
The allotments assigned to the airlines in a blocked seat allotment procedure should be updated during
the booking process depending on the demand observed so far (soft blocks) to overcome the drawback
of static allocations (compare Boyd, 1998). Park and Zhang (1998) also bring up the subject of blocked
seat allotments, calling them block-space sale agreements, and give an example: Delta Air Lines and
Swissair had a block-space agreement on the origin-destination route from New York to Zurich. Swis-
sair was actually operating the flight and Delta Air Lines accessed seats on the flight by buying a block
of seats from Swissair. By means of this example, the new capacity control decision mechanism for two
partners within an alliance will be introduced in the following.
In the airline alliance literature, there are several publications analyzing general aspects of alliances, but
only a few regarding airline alliances combined with aspects that are interesting for revenue manage-
ment. Oum and Park (1997) analyze diverse alliance aspects, such as, e.g., government policy towards
strategic airline alliances and the degree of collaboration between the partners within an alliance, based
on an extensive study considering 46 alliances among the world’s major 30 airlines. Oum et al. (1996)
and Park and Zhang (2000) provide empirical studies discussing the effect of alliances on air fares. Park
and Zhang (1998) analyze the effects of airlines building a strategic alliance on the passenger traffic
changes of the partner airlines occurring on flights operated by the alliance partners compared to the
non-alliance flights. Park (1997) and Park et al. (2001) theoretically examine two types of airline alliances
and the different effects they have on air fares, the airlines’ profits, and the economic welfare. Brueckner
(2001) also studies the effects of alliances on fares, traffic levels, and welfare by means of a simulation
analysis. Brueckner and Whalen (2000) also conducted a study analyzing the effects of strategic al-
liances on carriers’ prices. Brueckner (2003) confirms in a follow-up study of the analysis in Brueckner
and Whalen (2000) that there are price advantages for passengers on international interline itineraries
due to code sharing agreements. O’Neal et al. (2007) developed a system that automatically detects and
selects the flights that should be offered as code-sharing flights. The amount of revenue enhancement
is dependent on the right choice of these flights. The authors tested their code-share flight-profitability
system at Delta Air Lines. Boyd (1998) and Vinod (2005) describe coordination mechanisms for strategic
alliances in the airline industry being considered by the carriers in practice. Another field of alliance
revenue management research deals with the allocation of alliance revenues to the partner airlines. Af-
ter the booking period, when all decisions concerning the acceptance or rejection of a request are made,
the problem of how the revenue is shared fairly among the airlines in the alliance arises (compare, e.g.,
Çetiner and Kimms, 2009; Wright et al., 2010). This downstream problem, however, is not an issue in this
work. To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature that describes option-based capacity control
models or methods for strategic alliances which will be introduced in the following chapters.
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3.2.2 Air Cargo Sector
So far, in the examples given to discuss the application of revenue management instruments, passenger
air traffic problems were specified. However, revenue management measures can also be exercised in
the air cargo business segment. Since cargo claims other air transport conditions than passengers, the
revenue management concept needs to be adjusted. According to Kasilingam (1996), the following four
characteristics distinguish passenger from cargo revenue management: The total capacity is uncertain
since it depends on the amount of baggage the passengers check in, the capacity is tree-dimensional
and can be described by weight, volume, and number of container positions, cargo can be shipped on
multiple routes as long as it arrives in time, and the allotments which are reserved due to contracts
concluded with major shippers and forwarders make an amount of capacity not available for general
sale. Billings et al. (2003) also list general air cargo revenue management aspects and discuss business-
process solutions available for cargo carrier. A practice paper is presented by Slager and Kapteijns
(2004), describing cargo revenue management implementations at KLM. Pak and Dekker (2004) solve a
multidimensional on-line knapsack problem to determine a bid-prices capacity control policy for cargo
revenue management. Bartodziej et al. (2007) present an air cargo network capacity control approach
based on mathematical programming which incorporates capacity allocation decisions already made
on a higher management level. Amaruchkul et al. (2007) formulate the cargo booking problem on a
single-leg flight as Markov decision process.
Revenue management mechanisms are additionally discussed in literature assuming special situational
aspects. Products and services can, e.g., be flexible which means that they can be produced in several
ways. A customer buying a flexible (also called opaque) product cannot identify some of the product’s
characteristics until after purchasing. There are flexible products, for instance, in the air cargo sector
since most of the time cargo needs to arrive at the destination airport at a certain point in time but
does not need to be transported over a route previously announced by the customer. Therefore, the
cargo airline holds several options how to transport the cargo. Gallego and Phillips (2004), Kimms
and Müller-Bungart (2007a), Müller-Bungart (2006), and Petrick (2009) discuss revenue management
in the existence of flexible products. A capacity control mechanism incorporating opaque products is
described by Gönsch and Steinhardt (2010).
Also cargo alliances form strategic alliances. As reported by Karp (2004), the two major strategic al-
liances in the air cargo sector are SkyTeam Cargo and WOW Alliance. By now, however, the revenue
management literature discussing capacity control problems occurring in the air cargo sector refers to
single airlines.
3.2.3 Passenger Railroad Sector
Although the conditions for applying revenue management instruments are present in the railroad
sector, some special factors complicate revenue management decisions. As stated by Müller-Bungart
(2006), at German Railways (Deutsche Bahn AG), e.g., passengers buying a regular ticket can choose
the departure time, the respective train, and even the route of travel, considering some limitations. This
uncertainty complicates, for instance, capacity control decisions. Ciancimino et al. (1999) incorporate
this aspect into a deterministic linear programming model and a probabilistic non-linear programming
model to solve network railroad capacity control problems.
Although, there are no horizontal strategic alliances within the passenger railroad sector, some operative
cooperations can be noticed. E.g., the European high-speed train Thalys connects the cities Paris, Brus-
sels, Amsterdam, and Cologne. This transportation service is operated jointly by the French, Belgian,
Dutch, and German railroad.
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3.2.4 Freight Sector
Revenue management cargo problems are rarely discussed for shipping, trucking, freight railroad, and
intermodal companies, although revenue management instruments can also be applied in these sectors.
Strasser (1996) explores the use of revenue management in the railroad freight market. Revenue man-
agement is used to segment the railroad freight market into higher priced high-priority freight and lower
priced low-priority freight. A reference considering a sea cargo revenue management problem is given
by Lee et al. (2007). The authors solve a single-leg revenue management problem with postponement
possibility heuristically.
Sibelit SA is an international alliance with railroad freight partners from different countries. In the ship-
ping industry, there are two major strategic alliances, namely New World Alliance and Grand Alliance.
The shipping companies expect to enhance the offered services from building strategic alliances (com-
pare Zhang and Zhang, 2006).
3.2.5 Tourist Sectors
Kimms and Klein (2005) classify the sectors in which the revenue management concept can be adapted
in the airline sector, the touristic sector, and the customer make-to-order manufacturing sector. The
tourist sector includes the hotel business, the gastronomy industry, and the automobile rental sector.
In this classification, cruise liners, tour operators, and casinos can also be added to the tourist sectors
applying revenue management procedures. One aspect occurs in most of the tourist businesses that
needs to be considered in addition to the standard revenue management aspects: There are additional
but uncertain profits possible besides the direct revenues. Consider, for instance, the hotel sector. A
guest in a hotel generates additional revenue for the hotel besides the direct revenues paid for the hotel
room, e.g., by dining in the restaurants and bars or by booking spa treatments or conference rooms.
This extra revenue needs to be considered when applying revenue management procedures (compare
Müller-Bungart, 2006). Although there are multiple references in hotel revenue management litera-
ture, compare, e.g., Badinelli (2000), Bitran and Gilbert (1996), Bitran and Mondschein (1995), Goldman
et al. (2002), Koide and Ishii (2005), and Rothstein (1974), only a few references examine cruise liners
(compare Hoseason, 2002), tour operators (compare Hoseason and Johns, 1998), and casinos (compare
Hendler and Hendler, 2004). Bertsimas and Shioda (2003), Johns and Rassing (2004), and Kimes et al.
(2002) focus on revenue management procedures for restaurant businesses. A typical characteristic of
the car rental industry is an asymmetric traffic similar to the air cargo and freight industry. The aspect
that a wide range of customers return a rental car at a station that is not the same station which rented
out the car needs to be considered in revenue management application. Additionally, car rental compa-
nies have to face uncertain rental durations and return stations since customers can return the rental car
earlier or later and even at another station than previously announced (compare Müller-Bungart, 2006).
References dealing with rental revenue management are Carroll and Grimes (1995) and Geraghty and
Johnson (1997). Steinhardt and Gönsch (2009) consider upgrades and capacity control decisions simul-
taneously in the proposed approach which is applicable to car rental revenue management problems.
Strategic alliances are very rare in the tourist sector. In the hotel sector, however, some hotels form
vertical alliances with, e.g., tourist agencies, tour operators, airlines, car rental companies, or credit card
companies. Horizontal cooperations in a small setting are sometimes arranged by neighboring hotels
if the revenue management instrument overbooking is applied. Some hotels overbook their capacity
in the high season and shift customers to another hotel in the neighborhood if customers with valid
bookings cannot be served due to overbooking.
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3.2.6 Manufacturing Sector
There are further areas in which revenue management instruments can be applied. In the manufactur-
ing sector, revenue management is applicable if customers need to integrate an external factor in the
production process. This is necessary in the make-to-order production environment since customers
need to specify their order previous to the production process. In make-to-order production, the com-
panies are not able to satisfy the incoming demand from stock (compare Müller-Bungart, 2006). There
are some publications considering revenue management in make-to-oder production processes, com-
pare, e.g., Defregger and Kuhn (2007), Hintsches et al. (2009), Kolisch and Zatta (2009), Quante et al.
(2009), Spengler and Rehkopf (2005), and Spengler et al. (2008).
Strategic alliances formed by manufacturing corporations are also described in supply chain manage-
ment literature. In Simchi-Levi et al. (2004), Chapter 5, supply chain-related strategic alliances are
pointed out. However, the definition of strategic alliances differs in supply chain literature from the
strategic alliance descriptions mentioned above. In supply chain literature also vertical cooperations as
retail-supplier partnerships are defined as strategic alliances (compare Simchi-Levi et al., 2004, Section
5.1). Although vertical cooperations build the basis to supply chain management, some authors also
consider horizontal cooperations, e.g., alliance purchasing (compare Essig, 2000).
3.2.7 Miscellaneous Sectors
Other areas of application include, e.g., media and broadcasting (extensively discussed in Müller-Bungart,
2006, Chapter 6, and Kimms and Müller-Bungart, 2007a), golf courses (compare Kimes and Schruben,
2002), tickets for sports events (compare Barlow, 2002), and health care (compare Chapman and Carmel,
1992). Strategic alliances, however, cannot be detected in these sectors.
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Chapter 4
Capacity Control with Real Options
The fundamental question in revenue management capacity control considering strategic alliances is
how to allocate the capacity among the members of the strategic alliance. As mentioned before, real
options will be considered in the following to divide the capacity between the alliance partners. As
a basis for the later on described solution concepts, the theoretical background of real options will be
described in Section 4.1. After this short excursion, the determination of booking limits, the control
variables in the developed solution concepts, will be outlined in Section 4.2. The solution concepts
will be described by means of an example from the airline industry, following revenue management
literature and practice also emphasizing the airline industry. In a computational study in Section 4.3,
the performance of the proposed procedures will be discussed. This chapter is based on Graf and Kimms
(2009).
4.1 Remarks on Real Option Theory
Real options are derived from financial options which are elaborately discussed in finance literature
(compare Hilpisch, 2006, Section 1.4). A financial option is defined by Trigeorgis (1996), Section 3.1, as
a right, but not an obligation, to purchase or sell the specified financial asset at or up to a defined date
by paying a preassigned price (strike price or exercise price). Amram and Kulatilaka (1999), Chapter 1,
define an option in a more general way: Options constitute the right, without an associated obligation,
to take an action in the future. An option that justifies to buy the asset is defined as call option whereas
a put option permits to sell the financial asset (compare Trigeorgis, 1996, Chapter 1). If an option can
be exercised on and additionally at any time before the predefined date, the option is called American
option. A European option on the other hand can be exercised only exactly on the previously specified
point in time (compare Brealey et al., 2006, Section 20.1). An extensive survey of options in finance is
given by Brealey et al. (2006), Chapter 6, and Hull (2008). Myers (1977) transferred the concept of fi-
nancial options to operational decision practice and real economy for the first time. Due to Trigeorgis
(1996), Chapter 3.1, a real asset or capital project is the underlying asset to a real option. A classification
of real options as well as a survey of literature, describing industries utilizing real options, is introduced
in the monographs of Amram and Kulatilaka (1999) and Trigeorgis (1996). There are also references on
real options especially in the context of revenue management. Anderson et al. (2004) present a real op-
tion approach to revenue management that is dedicated to the car rental business. Gallego and Phillips
(2004) mention real options in the context of flexible products in revenue management. In his thesis,
Hellermann (2006) discusses option contracts to develop a capacity-option pricing model for air cargo
revenue management. As described before, the capacity control in strategic alliances is similar to the
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coordination in a supply chain. Barnes-Schuster et al. (2002) present options to coordinate a buyer-
supplier system. In this system, the buyer purchases options for supplier capacity. After the first of
two considered periods, the buyer exercises some of the options (at a strike price) dependent on the
demand observed so far. Rudi and Pyke (2000) use real options to share risk between a manufacturer
and a retailer in a newsboy model. These real options are defined as the right, without the obligation
to physically receive or deliver a good or service on or before a specific exercise date to a preassigned
price, as pointed out by Kleindorfer and Wu (2003).
The underlying idea of real options used in the capacity control procedures proposed in the present
work for strategic alliances can be described by means of the airline example as follows: An airline
within an alliance can buy an option by paying the option price up front to possess the right of buying a
flight ticket for a seat in the partner airline’s aircraft (the underlying asset) at a fixed price in the future.
The option can be exercised by the airline after the option was purchased until the airplane takes off
which classifies the option as an American call option. To actually buy the underlying asset, the airline
holding the option has to pay a predefined strike price. The interaction between the airline offering
options and the airline purchasing options will be discussed in Section 4.2.1.
4.2 Determination of Booking Limits
The determination of booking limits, the variables to control the capacity in revenue management, will
be explained in the following subsections. First, the interaction between the airline partners within the
strategic alliance will be outlined, followed by the description of the booking limit calculations by means
of deterministic linear models and EMSR heuristics.
4.2.1 Interaction Between Airlines
The following assumptions can be made in order to calculate the booking limits which partition the
capacity and allocate the capacity to each fare class, as the control variables in capacity control. An
alliance with two airlines is considered. One of the airlines, the operating carrier (OC), provides seats in
an aircraft that is operated on a single flight leg. The other airline, the ticketing carrier (TC), can access
the seats of the operating carrier by buying call options for the seats. We have chosen the term ticketing
carrier based on the remarks of Brueckner (2003). Other references point to the non-operating airline as
marketing carrier (compare Shumsky, 2006). In our application, the ticketing carrier does not operate a
flight that is a direct substitute to the one operated by the operating carrier. In practice, however, it is
not uncommon for both airlines to act as operating and ticketing carriers simultaneously, depending on
which flight leg is being considered. That means, if an airline is the operating carrier on a specific flight
leg, the airline may serve as ticketing carrier on other flight legs.
Figure 4.1 shows the interaction between the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier before and dur-
ing the booking process. Before the booking process starts for a particular flight operated by the oper-
ating carrier, the operating carrier decides how many options to sell to the ticketing carrier. After the
operating carrier announces the number of options available for sale, the option price and the strike
price to the ticketing carrier, the ticketing carrier determines how many options to buy from the operat-
ing carrier. The number of options ranges from zero to the number of options the operating carrier offers
to the ticketing carrier. The ticketing carrier pays the option price per seat to the operating carrier to re-
serve the seats by using options. During the booking process, the ticketing carrier can exercise an option
by paying the strike price to the operating carrier. Consequently, the ticketing carrier can sell a flight
ticket for a seat in the aircraft of the operating carrier. If the demand for flight tickets within one of the
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Figure 4.1: Interaction between OC and TC
ticketing carrier’s classes is less than assumed, some of the options the ticketing carrier purchased from
the operating carrier remain unexercised. To provide a form of re-optimization, the operating carrier has
the right to buy back options from the ticketing carrier during the booking process. By paying back the
option price to the ticketing carrier, the operating carrier can access the seats reserved for the ticketing
carrier. Such a buy-back opportunity can be described as an option on options with option price zero
since no option price has to be paid by the operating carrier to the ticketing carrier prior to the buy-back
of the option. The strike price for executing the option and buying back the right to sell flight tickets for
the seats reserved through the options is equal to the option price payed by the ticketing carrier. Such an
option on options is often applied in different resource allocation problems (compare Trigeorgis, 1996,
Section 4.7). An option on options is called compound option in the field of real option and financial
option theory (compare Geske, 1979, and Moore, 2001, Chapter 11). In an optimal alliance solution,
however, the operating carrier only accesses seats reserved for the ticketing carrier if the revenue that
the operating carrier receives for accepting a seat request is greater than or equal to the strike price plus
the option price. Without the buy-back option for the operating carrier, the introduced method would
be similar to a blocked seat allotment which holds the drawback of being inflexible. Once the airlines
within the alliance agree how many options to sell and buy, the capacity is fixed during the booking
process in a blocked seat allotment procedure. So, there is no possibility to change capacity during the
booking process in order to level out varying and unexpected demand. Of course, one can discuss if
a buy-back should be penalized by setting the buy-back price higher than the option price so that the
operating carrier has to pay more for accessing seats reserved for the ticketing carrier than the operating
carrier receives by selling an option to the ticketing carrier. Since implying a penalty is just a special case
that can be included easily in our real option approach described in this work, we decided to model the
more general case. In Section 4.3.2, the performance of the method with buy-back opportunity of the
operating carrier (introduced in our applications) will be compared to the performance of the method
without buy-back opportunity.
A brief example in Figure 4.2 clarifies the situation during the booking process: The small boxes in Figure
4.2 illustrate seats in the aircraft of the operating carrier. The color of the seats shows the access rights
of the alliance partners during the booking process. The white seats are only available for the operating
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Figure 4.2: An Illustration of the Two-Airline Case
carrier, so the ticketing carrier cannot sell flight tickets for these seats (no matter if the operating carrier
already sold the tickets or not). The ticketing carrier bought options for the black/white seats and
payed an option price per seat to the operating carrier. By paying a strike price to the operating carrier,
the ticketing carrier can sell a ticket for one of these seats. The operating carrier can access the seats
reserved for the ticketing carrier by paying back the option price to the ticketing carrier. The ticketing
carrier already sold tickets for the black seats. Therefore, the ticketing carrier exercised the options that
allowed access to these seats. To actually sell tickets for seats in the operating carrier’s aircraft, the
ticketing carrier paid the option price and the strike price to the operating carrier. We assumed the
access rights of the alliance partners to be given in the described example. In the following subsection,
the segmentation of the seats in the aircraft will be illustrated.
4.2.2 Deterministic Models to Calculate Booking Limits
We consider deterministic models to obtain partitioned booking limits for the alliance partners on the
considered single flight leg. The models proposed in this work are based on a Deterministic Linear
Program (DLP) presented, e.g., by Williamson (1992) and discussed in Section 2.2.2.3.
In the following, the index of the operating carrier is l = 1. The ticketing carrier is indexed by l = 2. Let
n1 be the number of booking classes of the operating carrier and n2 be the number of booking classes
of the ticketing carrier. Let vjl > 0 be the revenue of a single ticket in booking class j of airline l with
v1l ≥ v2l ≥ ... ≥ vnl l . The total seat capacity is C and E[djl ] > 0 describes the expected demand for
tickets in booking class j of airline l. Denote the option price by x and the strike price by s (x, s ≥ 0).
OP ≥ 0 describes the number of options the ticketing carrier purchases from the operating carrier. The
decision variable is the booking limit bjl of booking class j of airline l.
The following linear optimization model determines the optimal number of seats that should be avail-
able to each booking class of the operating carrier:
max
n1
∑
j=1
vj1bj1 (4.1)
subject to
bj1 ≤ E[dj1] j = 1, ..., n1 (4.2)
n1
∑
j=1
bj1 ≤ C (4.3)
bj1 ≥ 0 j = 1, ..., n1 (4.4)
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The objective function (4.1) maximizes the revenue over all booking classes of the operating carrier,
assuming that the booking limits of the single booking classes must not exceed the expected demand of
the booking classes (4.2). Additionally, the sum of the booking limits of the booking classes has to be
smaller than or equal to the available total seat capacity on the single flight leg (4.3). The booking limits
of the booking classes are greater than or equal to zero (4.4).
This model can be solved optimally without linear programming: The booking limits of the booking
classes can be set equal to the expected demand corresponding to the considered booking class (bj =
E[dj1]) in the order of decreasing prices of the booking classes as long as there is enough remaining seat
capacity (c ≥ E[dj1]). As soon as the remaining seat capacity is smaller than the expected demand for
the considered class (c < E[dj1]), the booking limit of the booking class is set equal to the remaining seat
capacity (bj = c). If not all of the booking classes are considered until then, the booking limits of the
residual classes are set equal to zero (bj = 0).
In the presence of a ticketing carrier, the operating carrier considers the requests coming from the tick-
eting carrier as an additional, independent booking class n1 + 1 with its own expected value of demand
(E[dn1+1,1]) and revenue (vn1+1,1). The operating carrier forecasts how many flight tickets the ticketing
carrier will inquire on the considered flight and regards this forecast as the expected value of demand
of the additional class. The revenue of the additional class equals to the sum of option price and strike
price (x + s), which corresponds to the revenue the operating carrier gains if the ticketing carrier sells
one ticket for the considered flight.
max
n1+1
∑
j=1
vj1bj1
subject to
bj1 ≤ E[dj1] j = 1, ..., n1 + 1
n1+1
∑
j=1
bj1 ≤ C
bj1 ≥ 0 j = 1, ..., n1 + 1
After solving the model, the booking limit (bn1+1,1) of the additional class n1 + 1 displays the number of
seats the operating carrier should make available to the ticketing carrier.
With the following linear optimization model, the booking limits for the different classes of the ticketing
carrier are determined. The ticketing carrier has to decide on the number of options to purchase from
the operating carrier. Therefore, the model introduced before has to be modified. The capacity of the
ticketing carrier CTC corresponds to the number of seats the operating carrier makes available to the
ticketing carrier, i.e. CTC = bn1+1,1.
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max
n2
∑
j=1
(vj2 − x − s)bj2 (4.5)
subject to
bj2 ≤ E[dj2] j = 1, ..., n2 (4.6)
n2
∑
j=1
bj2 ≤ CTC (4.7)
bj2 ≥ 0 j = 1, ..., n2 (4.8)
In the objective function (4.5), the option price and strike price must be subtracted from the revenue
the ticketing carrier receives for one flight ticket. The option price and the strike price represent the
costs the ticketing carrier has to pay to the operating carrier for one sold seat. The model’s objective is
the maximization of the ticketing carrier’s profit contribution. Constraint (4.6) ensures that the booking
limits of the single booking classes do not exceed the expected demand of the booking classes. The sum
of booking limits of all booking classes must be less than or equal to the capacity which is available to
the ticketing carrier (4.7). In the model for the ticketing carrier, the booking limits of the booking classes
are greater than or equal to zero (4.8).
After solving the model for the ticketing carrier, the sum of booking limits indicates how many options
the ticketing carrier purchases from the operating carrier (∑n2j=1 bj2 = OP).
The above presented model can also be solved optimally without linear programming: If the revenue of
a ticket in booking class j is smaller than or equal to the sum of option price and strike price (vj2 ≤ x+ s),
the booking limit corresponding to the class is zero (bj = 0) since the ticketing carrier’s costs are higher
than or equal to the revenue the ticketing carrier gains from one sold ticket in that class (x + s ≥ vj2).
The booking limits of the classes, for which x + s < vj2 is true, can be set equal to the expected demand
corresponding to the considered class (bj = E[dj2]) in the order of decreasing prices of the classes as long
as there is enough remaining seat capacity (c ≥ E[dj2]). As soon as the remaining seat capacity is smaller
than the expected demand for the considered class (c < E[dj2]), the booking limit of the class will be
set equal to the remaining seat capacity (bj = c). If not all of the classes are considered until then, the
booking limits of the residual classes will be set equal to zero (bj = 0).
After calculating the booking limits for the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier, there are several
booking limits imaginable which could be applied to the two classes of the operating carrier in the book-
ing process. Considering the booking limits calculated by the model which regards the demand of the
ticketing carrier as an additional class in the simulation of the booking process might lead to unrealistic
results. If the ticketing carrier asks for less tickets than the operating carrier offers (OP < bn1+1,1), less
than full capacity is considered when simulating the booking process. Recall that the calculated book-
ing limits partition the capacity so that the sum of the calculated booking limits equals the capacity. We
present two procedures which adjust the booking limits of the two classes of the operating carrier to
guarantee that the whole capacity is covered by the booking limits of the two airlines.
Procedure 1
The model of the operating carrier could be solved considering the additional class of the ticketing
carrier. After the ticketing carrier decided how many options will be purchased from the operating
carrier, the spare seats (if they exist) could be assigned to the class of the operating carrier with the
maximum revenue for one sold ticket that is smaller than or equal to the option price plus the strike
price (max
{
vj1 : j=1, ..., n1, vj1 ≤ (x + s)
}
). If the revenue for one sold ticket of the lowest yielding class
of the operating carrier is greater than the option price plus the strike price (vn11 > (x + s)), the spare
seats could be assigned to the booking limit of the lowest yielding class of the operating carrier. The
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described procedure (Procedure 1) will be illustrated using an example at the end of this section.
Procedure 2
After solving the model of the operating carrier with the additional class of the ticketing carrier to de-
termine how many sets the operating carrier makes available to the ticketing carrier, the model of the
operating carrier could be solved a second time without considering the additional class representing
the demand coming from the ticketing carrier. The booking limits that are reached after solving the
model without the additional class divide the capacity of the operating carrier’s aircraft. This procedure
(Procedure 2) as well will be illustrated in the following with an example (compare the end of the exam-
ple at the end of this section). In Section 4.3.2 the performance of the two different procedures will be
analyzed.
A small example is used to illustrate the procedures. Assume two booking classes for each airline
(n1 = 2, n2 = 2) and C = 100 available seats. Let the option price be 20e and the strike price be
150e. The revenue of the tickets in the different classes is shown in Table 4.1 and the expected demand
is given in Table 4.2. In this small example, the demand for the ticketing carrier in the higher yielding
fare class is assumed to be higher than the demand for the higher yielding fare class of the operating
carrier, although v11 is lower than v12. This assumption can be made since higher demand could occur
for example due to a frequent flyer program that binds customers to the ticketing carrier (compare the
segmentation mechanisms discussion in Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 11.1.1.2).
l
vjl 1 2
1 200 250
j
2 100 150
Table 4.1: Revenue of the Tickets
l
E[djl ] 1 2
1 30 50
j
2 80 70
Table 4.2: Expected Values of Demand
In this example, the operating carrier forecasts that the ticketing carrier will ask for 60 options on the
considered flight and regards this forecast as the expected demand for the additional class. The request
coming from the ticketing carrier is considered as an additional, independent booking class with an
expected value of demand E[d31] = 60 and a revenue of v31 = 170e. The revenue is the sum of option
price and strike price which equals the revenue that the operating carrier gains if the ticketing carrier
exercises an option.
The model of the operating carrier considering the demand of the ticketing carrier is solved to determine
how many seats the operating carrier should make available to the ticketing carrier. Since the described
model determines partitioned booking limits, the seat capacity of the operating carrier is divided into
seats exclusively available for the different booking classes of the operating carrier. Solving the model
with the assumed parameters results in a booking limit vector: b1 = (30, 10, 60)T . That means the
operating carrier makes 60 seats available to the ticketing carrier.
Solving the model for the ticketing carrier with the capacity the operating carrier provides for the tick-
eting carrier CTC = b31 = 60, yields the partitioned booking limits for the ticketing carrier b2 = (50, 0)T .
As a result, we gain the booking limit vector for the alliance b = (b1,b2)T where b1 = (b11, b21)T and
b2 = (b12, b22)T , which equals to b = ((30, 10)T , (50, 0)T)T in the described example. Note that in this
case the booking limit for the second class of the ticketing carrier is zero since the ticketing carrier’s
revenue for the second class is less than the option price plus the strike price, equal to the costs for the
ticketing carrier. If the ticketing carrier decides not to buy options for all of the seats offered by the oper-
ating carrier (b31 > b12 + b22), not the whole capacity is considered in simulating the booking process. In
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the described example, the sum of the booking limits (b = ((30, 10)T , (50, 0)T)T) equals 90 which leads
to unrealistic results since the sum is less than the capacity C = 100 .
If the ticketing carrier asks for less tickets than the operating carrier offers, the operating carrier has two
options as described above:
Procedure 1: The operating carrier could add the spare seats, the ticketing carrier did not buy options
for, to the class with the maximum revenue for a sold ticket that is smaller than or equal to the option
price plus strike price, in this example the lowest yielding class (v21), resulting in booking limits for the
operating carrier: b1 = (30, 20)T (b = ((30, 20)T , (50, 0)T)T).
Procedure 2: The model of the operating carrier is solved a second time assuming that the operating
carrier can access the total capacity (ignoring the demand coming from the ticketing carrier). After solv-
ing the model for the two classes of the operating carrier with the assumed parameters, we receive the
partitioned booking limits vector b1 = (30, 70)T , tolerating to accept more requests of the lower ordered
class of the operating carrier (b = ((30, 70)T , (50, 0)T)T).
4.2.3 EMSR Heuristics to Calculate Booking Limits
An interesting question is how the performance of the option-based capacity control procedure changes
if heuristics instead of deterministic linear programs are used to calculate the booking limits for the
operating carrier and the ticketing carrier. As described in Section 2.2.2.3, the two versions of the EMSR
heuristics developed by Belobaba (1987, 1989) can be applied to determine nested booking limits for
multiple booking classes in single-resource capacity control problems.
We replace the deterministic linear models with the booking limit calculation procedure in the EMSR
heuristics and include our real option idea in both versions of the EMSR heuristic. First, the booking
limits for the operating carrier are calculated by means of the EMSR heuristics, considering the requests
coming from the ticketing carrier as an additional, independent booking class. As described in Section
4.2.2, the operating carrier offers the ticketing carrier options for seats in the amount of the booking
limit of the additional class. Second, the booking limits for the ticketing carrier are calculated with the
EMSR heuristics. In doing so, the capacity of the ticketing carrier corresponds to the number of options
the operating carrier makes available. If the ticketing carrier purchases less options than the operating
carrier offers, the spare seats are added to one of the booking limits of the operating carrier (compare
Procedure 1 in Section 4.2.2). The option-based procedures with underlying EMSR heuristics and in-
cluded real option idea are referred to as EMSR-a+Options and EMSR-b+Options, respectively.
EMSR-a (Expected Marginal Seat Revenue – Version a)
The EMSR-a heuristic is based on the idea of approximating the n-class problem in solving two-class
problems by means of Littlewood’s Rule, considering each pair of booking classes j + 1(2 ≤ j + 1 ≤ n)
and k(1 ≤ k ≤ j). The protection level for each pair of booking classes pj+1k is calculated as described
in Section 2.2.2.3 mentioning Littlewood’s Rule. The determined protection level pj+1k shows how much
capacity needs to be reserved for booking class k from the access of booking class j + 1. The protection
level pj, describing the capacity that needs to be protected for booking class j and all higher yielding
booking classes, is equal to the sum of the respective protection levels calculated for the booking class
pairs:
pj =
j
∑
k=1
pj+1k .
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The EMSR-a heuristic is precisely described in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 2.2.4.1.
In the example introduced in Section 4.2.2, the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier offer two book-
ing classes (n1 = 2, n2 = 2) on a flight with seat capacity C = 100. Since the operating carrier considers
the ticketing carrier’s demand as additional booking class (n + 1 = 3), three pairs of booking classes
need to be considered calculating the protection levels pj+1k1 for the operating carrier (p
2
11, p
3
11 , and p
3
21)
by means of Littlewood’s Rule. The demand for the booking classes of the operating carrier is assumed
to be independent and normally distributed with positive mean µj1 and standard deviation σj1. In the
unlikely event of the demand being negative, the demand is set equal to zero. The demand behavior for
the operating carrier’s booking classes as well as the flight ticket revenues vj1 of the operating carrier’s
booking classes are presented in Table 4.3. The booking classes need to be sorted according to their flight
ticket revenue in order to compare the booking class pairs with each other. Due to the sorting process,
the additional booking class with flight ticket revenue v31 = 170, normally labeled as booking class j = 3
of the operating carrier, is now considered as second booking class j = 2 of the operating carrier.
j µj1 σj1 vj1
1 16.99 5.67 200
2 48.46 9.93 170
3 55.73 7.47 100
Table 4.3: Mean, Standard Deviation, and Revenue for Booking Classes of Operating Carrier
The resulting protection levels for each pair of booking classes are p211 = 11, p
3
11 = 17, and p
3
21 = 46. To
determine the protection levels for each booking class of the operating carrier, the respective protection
levels are aggregated: The protection level p211 = 11 is equal to the protection level of booking class
j = 1, p11 = 11. The aggregated protection levels p311 = 17 and p
3
21 = 46 specify the protection level
for booking class j = 2 of the operating carrier, p21 = 63 and the protection level for the lowest yielding
class of the operating carrier is equal to the assumed capacity p31 = 100. Converting the protection
levels into booking limits by means of bj1 = C − pj−1,1, for all j = 2, ..., n and b11 = C results in the
following booking limits: b11 = 100, b21 = 89, and b31 = 37. The booking limit corresponding to the
additional booking class b21 provides the information about the number of seats the operating carrier
should make available to the ticketing carrier. After the operating carrier communicates the number of
seats the ticketing carrier can access (b21 = CTC), the ticketing carrier calculates the protection levels
for the ticketing carrier’s booking class pairs. The demand behavior for the ticketing carrier’s booking
classes as well as the flight ticket revenues vj2 of the ticketing carrier’s booking classes are presented in
Table 4.4.
j µj2 σj2 vj2
1 12.89 4.66 250
2 40.95 6.37 150
Table 4.4: Mean, Standard Deviation, and Revenue for Booking Classes of Ticketing Carrier
Only one pair of booking classes (p212) needs to be considered in calculating the respective protection
level by means of Littlewood’s Rule since the ticketing carrier offers two booking classes. The resulting
protection level is p212 = 12 which is equal to the protection level for the first booking class of the tick-
eting carrier. For the lowest yielding booking class and all higher booking classes, the full, capacity the
ticketing carrier can access, is protected: p22 = 89. The corresponding booking limits of the ticketing
carrier, determined by bj2 = CTC − pj−1,2, are b12 = 89 and b22 = 77.
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EMSR-b (Expected Marginal Seat Revenue – Version b)
The EMSR-b procedure is similar to the one of the EMSR-a heuristic. Instead of aggregating the pro-
tection levels as described in the EMSR-a heuristic, the demand of all higher yielding booking classes is
aggregated. To determine the protection level pj for booking class j, the aggregated future demand for
classes j, j − 1, ..., 1 is defined by
Sj =
j
∑
k=1
Dk,
considering each booking class j+ 1(2 ≤ j+ 1 ≤ n). By means of the aggregated demand, the weighted-
average revenue (denoted by vj) needs to be calculated by:
vj =
∑
j
k=1 vkE[Dk]
∑
j
k=1 E[Dk]
.
Thereafter, the protection levels yj are determined by means of Littlewood’s Rule (described in Section
2.2.2.3), considering again pairs of booking classes. Booking class j + 1 with flight ticket revenue vj+1 is
compared to the aggregated booking class with demand Sj and flight ticket revenue vj.
As stated in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 2.2.4.2, it is common to assume the demand for
each booking class j to be independent and normally distributed with mean µj and variance σ2j when
applying the EMSR-b heuristic. Consider the example given above, demonstrating the EMSR-a proce-
dure. First, the weighted-average revenues for the booking classes of the operating carrier are calculated:
v11 = 200 and v21 = 177.8. The resulting protection levels of the operating carrier are p11 = 11, p21 = 64,
and p31 = 100 which correspond to the following booking limits: b11 = 100, b21 = 89, and b31 = 36. The
ticketing carrier can access (b21 = 89) seats in the operating carrier’s aircraft. Second, after calculating
the weighted-average revenues for the booking classes of the ticketing carrier (v12 = 250), the protection
levels are determined by means of Littlewood’s Rule: p12 = 12 and p22 = 89 with the corresponding
booking limits b12 = 89 and b22 = 77.
Compare Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 2.2.3.2, for a detailed description of the EMSR-b heuris-
tic. Although, the booking limit results of the EMSR-a and EMSR-b heuristic are very similar in this
example, the results can be significantly different in other examples. As stated in Talluri and van Ryzin
(2004b), Section 2.2.4.2, the EMSR-b heuristic is more popular in practice than EMSR-a. In a study by Be-
lobaba (1992), in which both EMSR heuristics perform well, the EMSR-b heuristic performs better than
the EMSR-a heuristic. However, neither EMSR heuristic is dominating the other in general as stated in
other computational studies in revenue management literature. We compare the performance of the pro-
cedure based on booking limits calculations by means of the EMSR-a heuristic and the EMSR-b heuristic
to the results of the procedure with underlying DLPs for booking limit calculations in Section 4.3.2.
4.2.4 Simulation of Booking Processes
In general, the term simulation indicates the implementation of a system which imitates the character-
istics of a real system with suitable input data typically using computers and adequate software as well
as the analysis of the respective results. Simulations are normally used for real-world systems beeing
too complex to be evaluated analytically (compare Law, 2007, Section 1.1). Other aspects of simulations,
such as different simulation types, verification and validation of simulation models, the generation of
random numbers, and the analysis of simulation output are characterized by Bratley et al. (1987). Law
(2007) additionally describes different simulation software and probability distributions of the simula-
tion’s input data. The booking processes of the alliance partners are simulated in this work in order to
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represent customer requests arriving in different points in time and the acceptance and rejection deci-
sions made by the alliance partners. By means of the simulation processes described in this section, the
booking limits calculated in Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, underlying the capacity control procedure, can be
evaluated.
The simulation of the booking processes of the partner airlines within the alliance considering real op-
tions that help to divide the capacity among the alliance partners will be described in this section. The
booking processes are modeled as discrete event-driven simulations. In our setting, the state variables
of the simulation models represent the state of the systems in period t during an ongoing booking pro-
cess of length T. Two discrete variables are defined: the capacity availability of the aircraft at t and the
number of bookings at time t. The state variables change if a request is accepted by one of the airlines.
The simulations are discrete since the time of the booking process is divided in a countable number of
points in time in which the state variables of the systems can change. If the state variables vary contin-
uously over time, the simulations are classified as continuous simulations (compare Law, 2007, Section
1.2). Discrete simulations can be further distinguished depending on different occasions which change
the system in discrete points in time. In the discrete-event simulation, the state variables may change
in the case of an occurring event whereas the state variables change in predefined time intervals in the
fixed-increment time simulation (compare Kuhn and Wenzel, 2008). Other classifications of simulations
are described by Kelton et al. (2004), Section 1.2.3.
During the booking processes, requests for flight tickets of the two airlines arise at different points in
time. Therefore, it is necessary to model the uncertain demand for the flight tickets regarding the to-
tal amount of demand and its temporal distribution (compare Klein, 2005, Section 5.1.1). According to
McGill and van Ryzin (1999), the implementation of a Poisson distribution to model the demand distri-
bution is recommended so that inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed. The inter-arrival times,
matching a Poisson process with arrival rate λ, are exponentially distributed with the parameter 1λ . In
reality, the arrival rate is rarely constant. In this case, a non-stationary Poisson process with arrival rate
λ(t) is used. A non-homogeneous Poisson process to model the arrival of booking requests in their sim-
ulation of the booking process is applied by de Boer et al. (2002), Gosavi et al. (2007), and Klein (2005,
2007). Kimms and Müller-Bungart (2007b) specify an algorithm to generate random streams of demand
data for test-instances needed to evaluate network revenue management procedures. The authors use
a Beta distribution with different parameters in order to model the passenger arrivals throughout the
reservation period. In the simulation models described in this work, the booking processes of the al-
liance partners are divided in three time intervals (typically called Data Collection Periods (DCP’s))
with different request arrival rates. The latter are constant within a particular time interval to approxi-
mate a non-stationary Poisson process. The simulations of the booking processes start by generating the
arrival times of the requests according to the exponentially distributed inter-arrival times. Thereafter,
the requests are sorted according to their arrival times in chronological order and numbered with index
m. The request numbered with zero is the first request arriving at the airline’s reservation system. After
the airline’s decision whether to accept or to reject the customer request, the index m is increased by one
and the next request, according to the sorted arrival times, can be handled by the airline. The arrival
time of incoming requests is set equal to the simulation time every time a new request arrives. The sim-
ulation process ends if the arrival time of the next incoming request and, therefore, the simulation time
is greater than or equal to the predefined duration of simulation which corresponds to the departure of
the operating carrier’s aircraft. The described simulation course is pictured in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4.
Due to the methodical drawbacks discussed by Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 2.1.1.1, and men-
tioned in Section 2.2.2.3, we apply nested booking limits in the simulation of the booking processes of
the airlines. The partitioned booking limits, calculated in Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, are converted to nested
booking limits according to the revenue order. Thus, the operating carrier’s highest yielding booking
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class has access to the whole capacity of the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier’s most profitable
booking class has access to the capacity the ticketing carrier bought options for. Note that only booking
classes within the different airlines are nested. Since the two carriers do not share information concern-
ing their ticket prices, the booking classes within the alliance cannot be nested (with one exception: the
operating carrier is able to access the seats assigned to the ticketing carrier in class n1 + 1). As described
in Section 2.2.2.3, there are two different control policies adopting nested booking limits: standard and
theft nesting (compare Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b, Section 2.1.1.3). Both control policies can be in-
cluded into the simulation of the booking processes. The performance of the control policies will be
analyzed in the computational study in Section 4.3.2.
The decision process determining whether to accept or to reject a request is equal for all booking classes
of the operating carrier. The same applies to the booking classes of the ticketing carrier, whereas the pro-
cesses of the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier differ. In the following, the decision processes of
the two considered carriers will be described assuming a standard nesting control policy.
The Decision Process of the Operating Carrier
After receiving a request for a certain booking class j, the operating carrier checks if the booking limit
for the booking class is greater than zero and if the available seat capacity is greater than zero (bj1 > 0
and c > 0). If at least one of the two conditions is false, the operating carrier has to reject the request.
Otherwise, the operating carrier checks if the remaining capacity in the aircraft is greater than the num-
ber of unexercised options (op) the ticketing carrier holds (c > op). If yes, the request can be accepted. If
the remaining capacity is less than or equal to the number of options, the operating carrier has to check
if the revenue of the received request is greater than or equal to the sum of transfer prices (vj1 ≥ x + s).
If yes, the request is accepted and the number of unexercised options is decreased by one (the operating
carrier is re-buying the option from the ticketing carrier). If no, the operating carrier rejects the request
because it is expected that higher revenues can be gained by selling the seat to the ticketing carrier. For
every request accepted by the operating carrier, the booking limit for the booking class j the request
occurred in, the booking limits for all higher yielding booking classes (j− 1, j− 2, ..., 1), and the remain-
ing capacity are decreased by one. To guarantee the right accept/reject decision, the booking limits for
the lower yielding booking classes must not be higher than the booking limits for the higher yielding
booking classes (bj1 ≥ bj+1,1, for all j = 1, ..., n1 − 1). To guarantee this condition, the booking limits
for the lower yielding booking classes are set equal to the smaller of the values: the decreased booking
limit for the higher yielding booking class or the unchanged booking limit for the considered lower
yielding booking class (bj+1,1 = min{b11, b21, ..., bj+1,1}). The decision process of the operating carrier is
presented in Figure 4.3.
The Decision Process of the Ticketing Carrier
The decision process of the ticketing carrier differs from the process of the operating carrier. If a request
for a certain booking class j occurs, the ticketing carrier checks if the revenue for accepting this request
is higher than the sum of option price and strike price (vj2 > x + s). If no, the ticketing carrier rejects
the request since the ticketing carrier’s costs are higher than or equal to the revenue the ticketing carrier
gains from selling the ticket in that booking class. If yes, the ticketing carrier checks if the booking
limit for that booking class and the number of unexercised options are greater than zero (bj2 > 0 and
op > 0). If at least one of the conditions is false, the request is rejected. Otherwise, the request is
accepted and the booking limit for the booking class j the request occurred in, the booking limits for all
higher yielding booking classes (j − 1, j − 2, ..., 1), and the number of unexercised options are decreased
by one. To guarantee the right accept/reject decision also for the ticketing carrier, the booking limits
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Figure 4.3: The Simulation Process of the Operating Carrier
for the lower yielding classes must not be higher than the booking limits for the higher yielding classes
(bj2 ≥ bj+1,2, for all j = 1, ..., n2 − 1). To guarantee this condition, the booking limits for the lower
yielding booking classes are set equal to the smaller value of the values: the decreased booking limit
for the higher yielding booking class or the unchanged booking limit for the considered lower yielding
booking class (bj+1,2 = min{b12, b22, ..., bj+1,2}). In Figure 4.4 the decision process of the ticketing carrier
is demonstrated.
As already explained in Section 2.2.2.3, the decision processes of the airlines change with using the theft
nesting control. In that case, after each request acceptance not only the booking limit for the class the
request occurred in and the booking limits for all higher yielding classes are decreased by one but also
the number of booking limits for all lower yielding classes.
To calculate the operating carrier’s expected revenue after the simulation of the booking process, the
operating carrier multiplies the number of requests accepted in the different booking classes of the op-
erating carrier with the flight-ticket revenue for one ticket in the corresponding booking class and adds
up the resulting products. Additionally, the operating carrier gains the transfer payments of the ticket-
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Figure 4.4: The Simulation Process of the Ticketing Carrier
ing carrier, hence, increasing the expected revenue of the operating carrier. The ticketing carrier pays to
the operating carrier the option price multiplied by the number of options the ticketing carrier exercised
during the booking process or still holds after the booking process. This number of options equals to the
number of options the ticketing carrier bought from the operating carrier before the booking process,
subtracted by the number of options the operating carrier bought back from the ticketing carrier during
the booking process. Furthermore, the ticketing carrier pays the strike price multiplied by the number
of accepted requests in all booking classes of the ticketing carrier.
To calculate the ticketing carrier’s expected revenue after the simulation of the booking process, the tick-
eting carrier multiplies the number of requests accepted in the different booking classes of the ticketing
carrier with the flight-ticket revenue for one ticket in the corresponding booking class and adds up the
resulting products. However, the ticketing carrier has to pay the transfer payments to the operating
carrier which decrease the expected revenue of the ticketing carrier. These transfer payments of the
ticketing carrier were already mentioned above in the explanation of the operating carrier’s expected
revenue calculation.
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We will explain the calculation of the expected revenues of the partner airlines within the alliance by
means of the example described in Section 4.2.2: Let the number of requests accepted by the operating
carrier (l = 1) in booking class j be denoted by hj1. According to this, the number of requests accepted
by the ticketing carrier (l = 2) in booking class j are denoted by hj2. The number of options the ticketing
carrier exercised during the booking process (∑n2j=1 hj2) added to the number of options the ticketing
carrier holds at the end of the booking process is denoted by r.
The calculation of the expected revenue of the operating carrier is, therefore, described by:
n1
∑
j=1
vj1 ∗ hj1 + x ∗ r + s ∗ (
n2
∑
j=1
hj2).
And the calculation of the expected revenue of the ticketing carrier is described by:
n2
∑
j=1
vj2 ∗ hj2 − (x ∗ r + s ∗ (
n2
∑
j=1
hj2)).
4.3 Computational Study for the Option-Based Procedures
The proposed option-based procedures with underlying DLPs and underlying EMSR heuristics were
implemented in C++ in order to test the procedures. In the following, the performance of the option-
based approach with underlying DLPs is extensively studied and compared to the results of the EMSR-
a+Options approach and EMSR-b+Options procedure. To simplify the nomenclature, the option-based
procedure with underlying DLPs is referred to as option-based procedure.
In the following subsections, the test bed for the analysis of the option-based procedures will be intro-
duced at first, followed by the demonstration and interpretation of the results gained in the computa-
tional study of the option-based procedures. We will discuss the insights gained about the performance
of our procedures.
4.3.1 Test Bed for Option-Based Procedures Analysis
After solving the optimization models introduced in Section 4.2.2 and the EMSR heuristics described in
Section 4.2.3, the programs pass the calculated booking limits to the simulation. The programs simulate
the booking processes of the two carriers according to the models outlined in Section 4.2.4 to determine
the revenue obtained with the computed booking limits. Since the goal of the option-based mechanisms
is to maximize the combined revenue of the alliance partners, we refer to the alliance revenue in the
computational study, which is the sum of the revenues of the alliance partners.
We used standard nesting control in the simulation to implement the nested booking limits since stan-
dard nesting is the most common method in revenue management practice (compare Talluri and van
Ryzin, 2004b, Section 2.1.1.3). To create pseudo-random numbers for the stochastic request arrivals, we
used the random number generator boost::random::ranlux64_base_01 (compare www.boost.org) in the
programs. Closing with the departure of the airplane, the duration of the simulation accounts for 150
periods and it shows the booking process of the alliance partners. We simulated 5000 booking processes
of the airlines taking the stochastic demand into account. The revenue measurements achieved by the
5000 simulation-replications are averaged, obtaining the result conceived with the inserted booking lim-
its for the considered instance.
In all instances considered in the computational study, the booking limits for the operating carrier were
calculated by means of the procedure described in Section 4.2.2 which assigns the spare seats, the tick-
eting carrier does not buy options for (if they exist), to a class of the operating carrier (Procedure 1).
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We compared the results of the introduced option-based procedure to the results of a FCFS approach
and ex post optimal solutions. In the FCFS approach, the booking requests are accepted in the order
of their appearance at the two airlines as long as they can be served with remaining capacity. The ex
post optimal solution represents the optimal revenue obtained with full information on demand after
the booking process. To generate the ex post optimal solutions, we simulated the booking process of the
operating carrier and the ticketing carrier and counted the total incoming requests depending on their
revenue. We filled the seat capacity of the aircraft, starting with the most profitable requests, continuing
with the second profitable requests, and so on, until there was no remaining seat capacity. The ex post
optimal solution corresponds to the revenue achieved by a central decision maker with full information
and defines an upper bound to the result of the option-based procedures. The computational study was
done on an AMD Athlon(tm) 64X2 Dual Core Processor 4600+ 2.41 GHz PC with 1,96 GB RAM running
Windows XP.
In the computational study of the option-based procedures, the following parameters are systematically
varied: the number of total available seat capacity C, the revenue for the tickets in booking class j of air-
line l, vjl , the option price x and strike price s, and the expected value of demand for tickets in booking
class j of airline l, E[djl ]. We assumed the seat capacity of the operating carrier to be 100, 120, or 150.
Table 4.5 shows the different revenue and price instances underlying the computational study.
Revenue/Price Instance v11 v21 v12 v22 x s
1a 350 100 400 150 20 120
1b 350 100 400 150 30 40
1c 350 100 400 150 50 50
1d 350 100 400 150 20 200
2a 400 150 350 100 10 80
2b 400 150 350 100 50 60
2c 400 150 350 100 75 75
2d 400 150 350 100 100 150
3a 350 100 450 200 30 160
3b 350 100 450 200 30 40
3c 350 100 450 200 50 50
3d 350 100 450 200 110 160
4a 200 100 250 150 20 120
4b 200 100 250 150 30 40
4c 200 100 250 150 50 50
4d 200 100 250 150 20 200
Table 4.5: Revenue and Price Instances
The test bed contains four different revenue instances and, for each of these instances, four different
option price and strike price values. We ensured that it is more profitable for the airlines to sell a ticket in
their first than in their second booking class but changed the gap between the revenues of the different
booking classes of the two airlines. We have chosen the option price and the strike price so that the
sum of the two prices is higher, lower, much higher than, and equal to the lowest revenue value of the
classes. It is possible to determine the optimal option price and strike price for each revenue and demand
instance. Therefore, we could for example systematically change the prices step by step and calculate
the corresponding expected revenue in each step for each instance. We tested this procedure using one
demand and one revenue instance. Starting with an initial value for both prices and increasing the
prices in nine steps to their maximum values, it took nearly two hours to determine the optimal prices.
As presented in Section 4.3.2, the run-time of the proposed option-based procedure for one instance
46
4.3 Computational Study for the Option-Based Procedures
with a fixed option price and strike price is less than a second. Considering the much faster run-time
and the acceptable results, we decided to vary the option price and the strike price systematically in the
computational study rather than step by step for each instance.
We assumed the expected value of total demand for tickets in all booking classes of both airlines to
be 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40% higher than the specified capacity, that means the demand intensity varies
between 1.1 and 1.4. If the capacity is 120, the total demand is 132, 144, 156, and 168. There is no revenue
management problem if the capacity is equal to or higher than the demand (compare Klein, 2005, Section
6.2.2). As one of the main assumptions of the applicability of revenue management instruments, the
assumption of scarce capacity, is not existent in that case. However, in Section 4.3.2 (Table 4.9) we
show the performance of the introduced option-based procedure in a low demand setting, in which the
total demand is 90% of the capacity (demand intensity 0.9), to determine the performance of the option-
based procedure in a setting in which the actual demand is unexpectedly much lower than the predicted
demand.
In each demand scenario, capturing the total demand for all booking classes, we assumed different
demand instances with varying demand for the booking classes of the airlines. Considering the demand
for one airline, the demand for the expensive flight tickets is lower than the demand for the cheaper
tickets in every demand instance. The values underlying the demand instances are presented in Table
A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 in the Appendix A.1.
4.3.2 Evaluation of the Option-Based Procedures
The revenue, generated by the option-based procedure, aggregated over all instances is 5.26% higher
than the revenue generated by the FCFS approach and 16.17% lower than the revenue generated in
the ex post optimal solution. The program achieves the result for one instance in less than a second.
Therefore, we do not specify the program’s run-time for each instance.
The percentage gap (gap1) between the solution of the option-based procedure (OBP) and the FCFS
approach is computed by:
gap1 =
OBP − FCFS
FCFS
∗ 100.
The percentage gap (gap2) between the ex post optimal solution and the solution of the option-based
procedure is computed by:
gap2 =
ex post −OBP
OBP
∗ 100.
Table 4.6 shows the average revenue aggregated over all instances in one capacity scenario gained from
the option-based procedure, the FCFS approach, and the ex post optimal solution as well as the gap
between the results of the option-based procedure and the other approaches. The option-based pro-
cedure leads to better results than the FCFS procedure in all three capacity settings, whereas there is
still the possibility to improve the results towards the ex post optimal solutions. Increasing the capacity
leads to a better performance of the option-based procedure compared to the FCFS approach and also
to results of the option-based approach that are closer to the ex post optimal solutions. The solution
space increases in instances with higher seat capacity which explains the improved performance of the
option-based procedure compared to the FCFS method. In an increased solution space, it is unlikely
that the FCFS procedure accidentally finds a good solution than in a small solution space.
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Capacity gap1 gap2
100 0.86 20.60
120 3.69 17.66
150 6.57 15.40
Table 4.6: OBP – Results Aggregated over Demand, Revenue, and Price Instances
The revenue per seat increases slightly as the number of seats in the aircraft increases. The ratio of
demand and seat capacity remains constant in all tree capacity instances being 110%, 120%, 130%, and
140% of the assumed capacity. The total demand, however, scales up in instances assuming a higher
seat capacity compared to the instances with lower seat capacity. This and the increased seat capacity
cause an expanded solution space which explains the slightly higher revenue per seat in high capacity
settings. Table 4.7 contains the revenue per seat performance.
Capacity gap1/C gap2/C
100 0.01 0.21
120 0.03 0.15
150 0.04 0.10
Table 4.7: OBP – Results Aggregated over Demand, Revenue, and Price Instances Per Seat
In a first observation, we fixed the demand and aggregated the computed results over all revenue and
price instances to evaluate the estimated revenue values.
Table 4.8 contains aggregated results for the assumed capacity of 100, 120, and 150 seats in the aircraft.
Scenario 110 (demand in %), e.g., shows the average revenue achieved by the option-based procedure
aggregated over all demand instances assuming the total demand to be 110% of the capacity. It can
be noticed that the FCFS approach performs better than the option-based procedure in low demand
settings since in this case it is more profitable to accept all incoming requests than reserve seats for
higher yielding requests. Due to the stochastic demand, the possibility of the demand being less than
the capacity is higher in low demand instances than in demand settings with greater total demand. As
soon as the demand intensity is 1.3 or higher, considering an airplane with 100 seats, the option-based
procedure yields higher revenues than the FCFS approach, whereas the results are still lower than the
ex post optimal solutions. If we consider an aircraft with 120 or 150 seats, the option-based procedure
achieves higher results than the FCFS approach for the demand being 120% of the capacity or higher
since the reservation for higher yielding requests pays off.
The ex post optimal solution is higher in instances with a greater total demand since there are more
higher yielding requests in these settings compared to the instances with low total demand.
To show the performance of the option-based procedure in a low demand setting, we calculated the
expected revenue for 13 demand instances assuming the total demand to be 90% of the capacity.
Table 4.9 shows the results for the seat capacity being 100, 120, and 150. The average revenue of the
option-based procedure over all 13 demand instances and 16 revenue and price instances (compare
Table 4.5) is in all capacity instances much lower than the revenue generated by the FCFS approach
and much lower than the ex post optimal solution. This insight supports the argument that there is no
revenue management problem in case of the demand being lower than the capacity. In all instances in
which we assumed the total demand to be 90% of the capacity, it would be the right choice to accept all
requests in a first-come-first-served order to fill the capacity of the airplane rather than reserve seats for
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Capacity Demand in % gap1 gap2
100 110 -9.54 20.14
120 -3.08 19.61
130 4.97 18.96
140 14.27 17.74
120 110 -8.21 17.34
120 1.23 16.07
130 9.56 15.31
140 18.11 15.39
150 110 -4.61 14.12
120 3.30 13.49
130 13.30 12.94
140 21.57 13.57
Table 4.8: OBP – Results Aggregated over Revenue and Price Instances
Capacity Demand in % gap1 gap2
100 90 -16.62 24.91
120 90 -15.52 22.55
150 90 -13.90 18.86
Table 4.9: OBP – Results Aggregated over Revenue and Price Instances in Instances with Demand In-
tensity 0.9
higher yielding booking classes.
We fixed the revenue and aggregated the computed results over all price and demand instances in a
second survey to evaluate the effect of the revenue variation among the tested instances.
Table 4.10 presents the results for capacity 100, 120, and 150. The revenue gained from the option-based
approach is lower than the revenue gained by the FCFS procedure in the fourth revenue instance for all
declared capacities. The fourth revenue instance differs from the other three instances in the interval of
the flight-tickets’ revenues in the first and second booking classes of the two considered airlines. The
option-based approach yields better in revenue instances with a larger gap between the ticket revenue
of the classes since it is more profitable to reserve seats in the aircraft for the higher yielding booking
classes.
Capacity Revenue Instance gap1 gap2
100 1 4.75 17.62
2 9.73 12.60
3 -0.80 24.31
4 -7.07 21.91
120 1 8.52 14.63
2 12.63 10.32
3 3.37 20.40
4 -3.83 18.76
150 1 11.77 12.29
2 15.83 8.42
3 6.80 17.39
4 -0.85 16.03
Table 4.10: OBP – Results Aggregated over Demand and Price Instances
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We fixed the option price and the strike price and aggregated the computed results over all revenue and
demand instances in a third survey to evaluate the effect of price variations.
Table 4.11 shows the results for the seat capacity being 100, 120, and 150. The revenue achieved by the
option-based approach is lower than the revenue gained from the FCFS procedure in price instance d
for the capacity being 100 and 120. In all revenue instances combined with price instance d, the sum
of option price and strike price is much higher than the revenue the ticketing carrier receives for one
sold ticket in the second booking class (x + s > v22). In that case, the ticketing carrier will not buy
any options for the demand of the second booking class, even if this would increase the total alliance
revenue. The option-based approach yields better in price instances in which the sum of option price
and strike price is lower than v22. The performance of the option-based procedure depends on the right
choice of the option price and the strike price. It is noticeable that the revenue gained from the option-
based approach in price instance b is equal to the revenue in price instance c. In price instance b, the
sum of option price and strike price is lower than the revenue achieved by the operating carrier selling
a flight ticket for the lowest yielding booking class (x + s < v21). The sum of option price and strike
price is equal to the revenue gained by selling a flight ticket in the operating carrier’s lowest yielding
class (x + s = v21) in price instance c. During the simulation of the booking process, the remaining seat
capacity can be less than or equal to the number of unused options held by the ticketing carrier. In that
case, the operating carrier checks if the revenue of the received request is greater than or equal to the
sum of option price and strike price. The operating carrier accepts the request in both cases since the
revenue gained from accepting the request is higher than or equal to the revenue the operating carrier
gains if the ticketing carrier executes an option in the uncertain future. This and the fact that the sum of
option price and strike price in both price instances (b and c) is simultaneously lower or higher than the
revenue achieved by selling a flight ticket in the ticketing carrier’s lowest yielding booking class (v22),
depending on the considered revenue instance, explains the equal results for price instance b and c. The
equal results could indicate that the alliance revenue achieved by the option-based procedure changes
only if the sum of option price and strike price differs in certain intervals. This phenomenon will be
further discussed in Section 7.2.2. The results of the FCFS approach and ex post optimal solutions are
constant in all price instances since these methods do not consider our option theory with its option
price and strike price.
Capacity Price Instance gap1 gap2
100 a 10.42 8.41
b 1.97 17.63
c 1.97 17.63
d -7.73 32.79
120 a 13.01 7.10
b 5.30 15.07
c 5.30 15.07
d -2.93 26.87
150 a 15.50 5.89
b 8.33 13.00
c 8.33 13.00
d 1.40 22.33
Table 4.11: OBP – Results Aggregated over Demand and Revenue Instances
As described in Section 4.2.2, there are two possible procedures to determine the booking limits for the
operating carrier. The performance of the option-based method depends on the selected procedure. As
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mentioned before, the procedure, which assigns the spare seats the ticketing carrier does not buy options
for (if they exist) to a class of the operating carrier was considered in the instances of the computational
study (Procedure 1). The revenue gained from Procedure 1, averaged over all instances considering the
capacity to be 120, is 1.43% higher than the revenue gained from Procedure 2, which solves the model of
the operating carrier twice, not considering the additional class of the ticketing carrier in calculating the
booking limits for the operating carrier. The booking limits calculated by Procedure 1, compared to the
ones achieved by Procedure 2, differ in the amount of the operating carrier’s booking limits (b11 and b21).
It can be noticed that the booking limit for the operating carrier’s higher yielding booking class deter-
mined by Procedure 1 almost always corresponds to the one calculated by Procedure 2. This is plausible
since the calculation of the booking limit of the operating carrier’s first booking class only differs be-
tween Procedure 1 and 2 if there is a difference in calculating the booking limits of the operating carrier
for three or two considered booking classes (recall that the demand coming from the ticketing carrier is
not considered in an additional booking class when calculating the booking limits by Procedure 2 for
the two booking classes of the operating carrier). If the sum of option price and strike price is lower
than v11, the position in the nesting order of the highest yielding booking class of the operating carrier
does not change no matter whether the booking limits are calculated for three or two booking classes.
In our test bed, there is only one price and revenue instance which describes the circumstance that the
option price plus the strike price exceeds the revenue gained by selling a flight ticket in the first booking
class of the operating carrier. The booking limits of the second booking class of the operating carrier,
however, often change when comparing Procedure 1 and 2. In most of the incorporated instances, the
demand for the second booking class of the operating carrier is lower than the remaining capacity after
allocating seat capacity to the first booking class of the operating carrier. Therefore, the booking limit
of the operating carrier’s second booking class is not much higher after calculating the booking limit
for two instead of three classes. In the revenue and price instances in which the sum of option price
and strike price is higher than v22, the ticketing carrier will not buy options for the second class and,
therefore, the booking limit of the second class of the operating carrier is increased in Procedure 1. That
causes the booking limit of the operating carrier’s second booking class calculated by means of Proce-
dure 1 to be often higher than the booking limit achieved by Procedure 2 which implies more flexibility
for the operating carrier during the booking process since the operating carrier has the opportunity to
buy-back options if the revenue gained from accepting a request is higher than or equal to the option
price plus the strike price.
We compared the performance of the option-based procedure using standard nesting with the perfor-
mance applying a theft nesting control for capacity instance 120. No global declaration can be made
about the comparative performance of the two nesting controls, but exercising the standard nesting
control in the option-based procedure results in a revenue being 2.27% higher than the results of the
option-based procedure with underlying theft nesting control aggregated over all instances assuming
the capacity to be 120. According to Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 2.1.1.3, theft nesting protects
more capacity for higher yielding classes which seems to be a drawback in our application area.
Furthermore, we compared the performance of the option-based method with buy-back opportunity
of the operating carrier (OBP+BB) to the performance of the method without buy-back opportunity
(OBP-BB). The revenue generated by the OBP+BB approach, averaged over all instances considering
the capacity to be 120, is 0.36% higher than the revenue calculated by the OBP-BB. The reason for the
inferior performance of the option-based procedure without allowing the operating carrier to buy-back
options is, as mentioned in Section 4.2.1, the inflexibility within this procedure. It can be noticed that
the option-based procedure allowing the operating carrier to buy-back options never performs worse
than the option-based method which forbids the buy-back of options. In the revenue and price instance
4d, however, both procedures (OBP+BB and OPB-BB) perform equally in all demand instances. An
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explanation can be found since in the revenue and price instance 4d, the sum of option price and strike
price is higher than the revenue the operating carrier earns by selling a flight ticket in both booking
classes (x + s > v11 and x + s > v21). In that case, the operating carrier would never use the buy-
back possibility since the expected revenue, the operating carrier achieves if the ticketing carrier sells a
flight ticket and, therefore, executes an option, is higher than the revenue the operating carrier earns by
accepting a booking request in both booking classes in all demand instances.
As outlined in Section 4.2.3, the booking limits underlying the option-based procedure can be calculated
by means of EMSR heuristics instead of the deterministic linear programs introduced in Section 4.2.2. In
the following, the performance of the option-based procedure (with underlying DLPs) will be compared
to the EMSR-a+Options approach and the EMSR-b+Options approach, both described in Section 4.2.3.
The real option idea was included in both versions of the EMSR heuristic. We changed the simulation of
the booking process and eliminated the nesting of the booking limits since the booking limits achieved
by the EMSR heuristics are already nested. After averaging the expected revenue of all instances with
seat capacity 120, we gained an expected revenue from the EMSR-a+Options procedure that is slightly
lower than the revenue achieved by the EMSR-b+Options approach. This outcome supports the state-
ment of Belobaba (1992) that EMSR-b provides better revenue performance compared to EMSR-a, which
means that this statement can be transfered to the scenario in which the EMSR heuristics are combined
with our option idea. The result of the option-based method with the underlying deterministic linear
programs is 32.01% higher than the revenue calculated by the EMSR-a+Options approach. A similar
result can be noticed considering the EMSR-b+Options approach. We received an expected revenue
from the DLP underlying option-based method beeing 26.42% higher than the revenue achieved by the
EMSR-b+Options procedure. The EMSR heuristics perform worse in many of the observed instances
but it can be noticed that the option-based procedure with underlying DLP gains inferior results com-
pared to the EMSR heuristics in instances which assume the demand for the ticketing carrier’s first
booking class to be high. The superior expected revenue calculated by the EMSR heuristics compared
to the revenue gained by the DLP underlying option-based procedure can be explained by the booking
limit of the first booking class of the ticketing carrier which is often higher in the results achieved by the
EMSR-heuristics than in the DLP underlying option-based procedure’s results. Since the performance of
the DLP underlaying option-based procedure is better than the results gained by the EMSR-a+Options
approach and the EMSR-b+Options method, the deterministic linear programs with included options
idea will be applied to calculate the initial booking limits for the procedures presented in the following.
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Chapter 5
Booking Limit Improvement
The following chapter will introduce a simulation-based optimization approach to improve the booking
limits calculated by means of the deterministic linear programs introduced in Section 4.2.2. At first, the
basics of simulated-based optimization methods will be shortly discussed (Section 5.1) followed by the
specification of the simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA) approach introduced by
Spall (1992) which will be applied for booking limit improvement in the capacity control mechanisms
for partners within a strategic alliance introduced in this thesis (Section 5.2). In a computational study,
the performance of the procedure with booking limit improvement will be analyzed (Section 5.3). This
chapter is based on Graf and Kimms (2009).
5.1 Simulation-Based Optimization
As already described in Section 4.2.4, simulations can be applied to evaluate the behavior of complex
systems. Beyond that, simulations can help optimization methods to determine optimal values for the
considered decision variables. In revenue management capacity control, the control variables, in our
procedures the booking limits, describe the decision variables which need to be optimized. Carson and
Maria (1997) describe simulation optimization as a process in which an optimization strategy uses the
output of a simulation model as input to evaluate the search for the optimal solution. Whereas the
input for that simulation model is gained by the output of the optimization strategy. As pointed out in
Azadivar (1999), an optimization problem is a simulation optimization problem if the objective function
and/or constraints of the problem can only be evaluated by computer simulation. Azadivar (1999)
compares the stochastic optimization problem with deterministic and stochastic optimization problems
and lists the major differences. There is a large body of literature on simulation-based optimization. A
comprehensive review of simulation optimization literature is provided by Swisher et al. (2000). The
simulation-based optimization topic is extensively described in Gosavi (2003), Law (2007), Chapter 12.5,
and Spall (2003). April et al. (2003) as well as Fu (2002) present some of the most relevant approaches
developed for simulation-based optimization, describe the application of these procedures in practice,
and discuss their implementation in commercial software. The four main methods for simulation-based
optimization are, as identified and described by Fu (2002), stochastic approximation (gradient-based
approaches), (sequential) response surface methodology, random search, and sample path optimization.
The capacity control problem is a restricted, stochastic maximization problem with an objective function
that cannot be described with a formula. Instead, an approximation of the objective function can be
evaluated by simulation. Robinson (1995) introduced the idea of simulation-based optimization in a
revenue management context. Gosavi et al. (2007), Klein (2005), Section 5.1, Müller-Bungart (2006),
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Section 5.1.2, and van Ryzin and Vulcano (2008b) describe simulation-based optimization in the context
of revenue management as well. Bertsimas and de Boer (2005) published an approach which uses a
combination of simulation and optimization to solve the capacity control problem for non-allied carriers.
To improve the calculated booking limits, the authors use a stochastic gradient algorithm. Inspired by
the revenue enhancements gained by the simulation-based booking limit procedure, as presented in the
computational study of Bertsimas and de Boer (2005), we apply a stochastic approximation procedure
to improve the booking limits determined beforehand by the deterministic linear programs.
As pointed out by April et al. (2003), stochastic approximation procedures try to imitate the process
of gradient search methods applied to solve non-linear programming problems. A gradient is a vec-
tor pointing in the direction of the steepest ascent of a function in a maximization problem (compare,
Domschke and Drexl, 2005, Section 8.3.2, and Spall, 2003, Section 1.4.1). Considering a minimization
problem, the gradient points in the direction of the steepest descent of a loss function. The gradient
search procedure (also called hill climbing, steepest ascent, or steepest decent method) proceeds in fol-
lowing the gradient in the direction the gradient points as long as the (loss) function can be improved in
doing so (compare Spall, 2003, Section 1.4.1). Efficient approximations of the gradient need to be devel-
oped to be able to apply stochastic approximation procedures (compare Klein, 2005, Section 5.1.3). The
finite-difference algorithm, discussed in Spall (2003), Chapter 6, is the simplest approach for stochastic
approximation. The decision variables are systematically varied by a fixed amount. The booking limit
for a single product or booking class bj, for all j = 1, ..., n, considered in our procedures, therefore, would
be increased and decreased by a predefined amount ∆i. To determine the approximation of the gradi-
ent g(b) for the decision variables, the problem needs to be simulated first with the increased decision
variable and second with the decreased decision variable, whereas the other decision variables remain
constant: (b1, ..., bj + ∆j, ..., bn) and (b1, ..., bj − ∆j, ..., bn). If V(b) is the result of the simulations for the
solution b, the approximation of the gradient can be determined by:
g(b) =
(V(b1, ..., bj + ∆j, ..., bn)−V(b1, ..., bj − ∆j, ..., bn))
2∆j
.
Compare Klein (2005), Section 5.1.3, and Spall (2003), Section 6.3, for the above described finite-difference
algorithm. A more sophisticated stochastic approximation procedure, introduced by Spall (1992), is the
simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation procedure (SPSA). The SPSA procedure increases
and reduces all considered decision variables simultaneously by a predefined amount (b1 + ∆j, ..., bj +
∆j, ..., bn + ∆j) and (b1 − ∆j, ..., bj − ∆j, ..., bn − ∆j). Thus, the gradient approximation requires only two
measurements of the underlying function which makes the SPSA procedure more efficient than the
finite-difference method, requiring 2n simulation runs for the gradient approximation.
The SPSA procedure is applied in this work to improve the results discussed so far. In the following
section, the problem-specific SPSA approach will be described using an example.
5.2 Booking Limit Improvement by Simultaneous Perturbation Sto-
chastic Approximation
As stated in Spall (1998b), there is a great need for mathematical algorithms that detect the solution iter-
atively since in many real-world optimization problems an analytical (closed-form) solution cannot be
determined. The SPSA procedure can be applied to respond to these requirements. Both, Spall (1998b)
and Spall (2003), Chapter 7, present an overview of the simultaneous perturbation stochastic approxi-
mation procedure for efficient optimization. In Abdulla and Bhatnagar (2006) and Spall (1997), variants
of the SPSA procedure are outlined. The SPSA method can be used in various application areas, (com-
pare Spall, 2003, Section 7.1), including revenue management capacity control problems. Gosavi et al.
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(2007) introduce a simulation-based optimization model for airline capacity control problems consider-
ing cancellations and overbooking. The simulation-based optimization is carried out by means of the
simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation approach.
In the following, the implementation of a problem-specific version of the SPSA principle will be specified
in five steps. Compare Spall (1998a) for a detailed description of a general SPSA algorithm implementa-
tion. The simulation-based optimization improves the booking limits calculated using the deterministic
linear models described in Section 4.2.2 iteratively. Therefore, the booking limits calculated by means of
the DLPs are the initial solution of the problem-specific SPSA approach.
Step 1: Initialization
Let N = {(j, l)|j ∈ {1, ..., n} and l ∈ {1, 2}} denote the set of products. In the first step of the SPSA
method, the iteration counter k is set equal to zero (k = 0) and the booking limits for the products are set
to a feasible initial guess b0. The booking limits b0 can be calculated, for instance, as described in Sec-
tion 4.2.2 and be used as initial booking limit values for the SPSA procedure. To continue the example
from Section 4.2.2, the booking limit vector b0 = ((b011, b
0
21)
T , (b012, b
0
22)
T)T equals to ((30, 20)T , (50, 0)T)T .
According to Spall (1998a), further parameters are necessary to calculate the sequences ak = a(A+k+1)α
and ck = R(k+1)γ , needed in Step 3 and Step 5 of the SPSA algorithm. The parameters are initialized as
follows: α = 0.602, γ = 0.101, a = 0.5, A = 10, and R = 5. In the test bed of the computational study
outlined in Section 5.3.1, the determination of these parameters will be shortly discussed.
Step 2: Generation of Simultaneous Perturbation Vector
A simultaneous perturbation vector ∆k is generated in the second step. As pointed out in Spall (1998a),
for each component (j, l) of the random number ∆kjl , a Bernoulli ±1 distribution with probability of 12
for each ±1 outcome is used (e.g., ∆0= ((1,−1)T , (−1,−1)T)T).
Step 3: Perturbation and Loss Function Evaluation
Based on the simultaneous perturbation around the current booking limit vector, two measurements y
of the loss function are obtained by simulation. Therefore, the current booking limit vector bk is simul-
taneously perturbed in Step 3 by adding and subtracting the perturbation vector ∆k generated in Step 2
as follows: (y(bk + ck∆k) and y(b
k − ck∆k)).
In the example: y(
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
(
30
20
)
(
50
0
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠+ 5
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
(
1
−1
)
( −1
−1
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠) and y(
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
(
30
20
)
(
50
0
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠− 5
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
(
1
−1
)
( −1
−1
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠).
Step 4: Gradient Approximation
A simultaneous perturbation approximation to the unknown gradient gk(bk) is generated in the fourth
step of SPSA as follows:
gk(bk) = y(b
k+ck∆k)−y(bk−ck∆k)
2ck
⎡
⎢⎣
(
∆k1
)−1
(
∆k2
)−1
⎤
⎥⎦, where ∆kl is the component vector of the ∆k vector.
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In the example: g0(b0) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
( −100
100
)
(
100
100
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠.
Note that the numerator of the fraction is equal in all four components of gk which reflects the simul-
taneous perturbation of all components in the booking limit vector in contrast to the component-by-
component perturbations in the standard finite-difference approximation.
Step 5: Updating bkjl Estimate
The booking limit vector bkjl is updated to a new value b
k+1
jl in Step 5 by using the standard stochastic
approximation form:
bk+1 = bk + akgk(b
k).
To determine the booking limit vector of iteration k + 1, the gain sequence ak calculated in Step 1 is
multiplied by the gradient vector gk and added to the booking limit vector of iteration k.
In the example: b1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
(
30
20
)
(
50
0
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠+ 0.118
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
( −100
100
)
(
100
100
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠.
The sum of the booking limits stored in the booking limit vector of the new iteration k + 1 could be un-
equal to the assumed capacity. However, since the booking limits are nested in the simulation, simulat-
ing the booking process with the booking limits received from the simultaneous perturbation stochastic
approximation approach ensures to consider total capacity. Additionally, the nesting control policy in
the simulation ensures not to accept incoming request if there is no capacity available.
Step 6: Iteration or Termination
In the last step of the SPSA method, the algorithm returns to Step 2 with k+ 1 replacing k or is terminated
if there is little change in several successive iterates or the maximum allowable number of iterations is
reached.
Spall (2003), Section 7.3, describes the basic assumptions underlying the SPSA approach and the con-
vergence conditions of the SPSA iterate. The solution of each iteration bk+1 converges to the optimal
solution b∗ as the iteration counter k converges to∞. Compare also Spall (1988, 1992) for a discussion of
convergence conditions. Maryak and Chin (2001) discuss the application of a SPSA procedure for global
optimization if there are multiple local optima. In their publication, Maryak and Chin (2001) inject noise
in the updating step (Step 5) of the basic SPSA approach to convert the SPSA method to a global op-
timizer. Additionally, Maryak and Chin (2001) show that the basic SPSA approach (without injecting
noise in Step 5) can be a global optimizer under certain conditions. According to Spall (2003), this in-
sight can be deduced since the random error in the gradient approximation within the SPSA procedure
acts statistically like injecting noise as described by Maryak and Chin (2001). Besides this argument, the
increasing run-time of the SPSA approach due to noise injection and the good results achieved by the
basic SPSA approach applied to our alliance capacity control problem (compare Section 5.3.2) suggests
to deploy the basic SPSA method to the presented application area.
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5.3 Computational Study for the Option-Based Procedure with Si-
multaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation
We implemented the simulation-based optimization procedure in C++. Since the introduced SPSA
approach takes the booking limits calculated in the option-based procedure as input, we refer to the
simulation-based optimization procedure as OBP&SPSA in the following.
5.3.1 Test Bed for OBP&SPSA Procedure Analysis
To compare the OBP&SPSA algorithm with the option-based approach studied in Chapter 4, the same
test bed is taken as basis in the computational study of the OBP&SPSA procedure as defined in Section
4.3.1 for the computational study of the option-based approach. To terminate the OBP&SPSA proce-
dure, we set the maximum allowable number of iterations to 300. In each iteration of the OBP&SPSA
approach, 5000 booking processes of the airlines were simulated. We conducted the computational
study on an AMD Athlon(tm) 64X2 Dual Core Processor 4600+ 2.41 GHz PC with 1,96 GB RAM run-
ning Windows XP.
The performance of the OBP&SPSA algorithm depends on the right choice of the parameters needed
to calculate the sequences, which were described in Step 1 of the simulation-based procedure. Since
Spall (1998a) gives an interval in which the parameters can be defined, we have chosen the parameters
in a way that improved the results of the OBP&SPSA approach. Parameter a, which influences the step
size of the change of booking limits from iteration to iteration in the OBP&SPSA procedure, cannot be
set higher than 0.9 due to the fact that the OBP&SPSA algorithm converges to a low revenue value in
the early iterations otherwise. The parameter A also affects the step size of the OBP&SPSA method.
Defining parameter A lower than four leads to the same effect. In setting a equal to 0.5 and A equal
to 10, the OBP&SPSA procedure gains the best results. To influence the magnitude of the booking limit
perturbation in Step 3, parameter R has to be defined. Setting R higher than 70 generates poor results. In
that case, the OBP&SPSA approach does not converge to one value since the gap between the iteratively
produced results is too large. Setting R equal to five gains the best results applying the OBP&SPSA
procedure.
As we will see in the evaluation of the OBP&SPSA procedure in the following section, the performance
of the OBP&SPSA approach depends on the proper choice of the strike price and option price as well
as the results of the option-based procedure. Again, due to good results achieved by the OBP&SPSA
procedure and due to the computational time, which is only up to four minutes to solve one instance,
we pass on systematically changing the prices step by step. The optimization of the option price and
strike price will be further discussed in Section 7.
5.3.2 Evaluation of the OBP&SPSA Procedure
The revenue generated by the OBP&SPSA approach over all instances is 5.38% higher than the rev-
enue calculated by the option-based procedure, 10.88% higher than the revenue achieved by the FCFS
approach, and 10.46% lower than the revenue generated in the ex post optimal solution.
The result of the option-based procedure is the initial solution of the OBP&SPSA algorithm. From this it
follows that the solution of the option-based procedure is a lower bound for the OBP&SPSA result. An
upper bound for the OBP&SPSA result is the ex post optimal solution.
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The run-time of the OBP&SPSA procedure depends on the assumed demand and the defined capacity.
To achieve the result for one instance, the OBP&SPSA algorithm needs about two minutes in low de-
mand settings considering the seat capacity to be 100 and up to four minutes in instances with a higher
seat capacity and higher total demand.
The percentage gap (gap3) between the solution of the OBP&SPSA and the OBP approach is computed
by:
gap3 =
OBP&SPSA −OBP
OBP
∗ 100.
The percentage gap (gap4) between the solution of the OBP&SPSA and the FCFS approach is computed
by:
gap4 =
OBP&SPSA − FCFS
FCFS
∗ 100.
The percentage gap (gap5) between the ex post optimal solution and the solution of the OBP&SPSA is
computed by:
gap5 =
ex post −OBP&SPSA
OBP&SPSA
∗ 100.
Table 5.1 shows the achieved results aggregated over all instances in one capacity instance. The
OBP&SPSA procedure determines better results in all three capacity settings than both the option-based
procedure and the FCFS approach. The gap between the OBP&SPSA results and the ex post optimal
solutions, however, can still be reduced. It can be noticed that gap3 decreases as the capacity scales up
although the performance of the OBP&SPSA procedure improves as the capacity increases compared to
the FCFS solutions. As the capacity grows, the results of the option-based method increase faster than
the results of the OBP&SPSA procedure, which explains the shrinking of gap3.
Table 5.2 presents the revenue per seat in the capacity instances. Studying the revenue per seat cal-
culated by the OBP&SPSA approach, we identify the same outcome as we identified while analyzing
the results of the option-based procedure: The OBP&SPSA approach performs better in instances with
higher capacity since the solution space expands when considering a higher seat capacity.
Capacity gap3 gap4 gap5
100 6.04 8.20 12.60
120 5.31 10.74 10.40
150 4.81 13.59 8.47
Table 5.1: OBP&SPSA – Results Aggregated over Demand, Revenue, and Price Instances
Capacity gap3/C gap4/C gap5/C
100 0.06 0.08 0.13
120 0.04 0.09 0.09
150 0.03 0.09 0.06
Table 5.2: OBP&SPSA – Results Aggregated over Demand, Revenue, and Price Instances Per Seat
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We fixed the demand and aggregated the computed results over all revenue and price instances in a first
observation in order to evaluate the estimated revenue values according to the demand variations.
Table 5.3 shows the aggregated results for the assumed capacity of 100, 120, and 150. The OBP&SPSA
method improves the results of the option-based procedure in all demand settings and performs better
than the FCFS approach in the instances with the demand being 120%, 130%, and 140% of the capac-
ity. In low demand settings, the same effect as in the analysis of the option-based procedure appears:
The revenue generated by the FCFS method is higher than the revenue achieved by the OBP&SPSA ap-
proach, although the gap between the OBP&SPSA method and the FCFS procedure decreased compared
to the gap between the option-based method and the FCFS approach. The results of the OBP&SPSA
procedure increase as the total demand scales up. Hence, in these cases (identical to the analysis of the
option-based approach) the solution space increases and it is advantageous to reserve seat capacity for
higher yielding classes through booking limits.
Capacity Demand in % gap3 gap4 gap5
100 110 3.49 -6.31 16.29
120 5.21 1.95 13.98
130 7.13 12.13 11.36
140 7.94 22.78 9.33
120 110 3.29 -5.10 13.80
120 4.85 6.12 10.91
130 5.87 15.78 9.10
140 7.23 26.17 7.81
150 110 2.93 -1.78 10.96
120 4.24 7.66 8.99
130 5.35 19.17 7.34
140 6.71 29.30 6.58
Table 5.3: OBP&SPSA – Results Aggregated over Revenue and Price Instances
To show the performance of the OBP&SPSA procedure in a low demand setting, we calculated the
expected revenue for 13 demand instances assuming the total demand to be 90% of the capacity.
Capacity Demand in % gap3 gap4 gap5
100 90 5.17 -12.12 19.40
120 90 5.00 -11.01 17.27
150 90 4.64 -9.85 14.02
Table 5.4: OBP&SPSA – Results Aggregated over Revenue and Price Instances in Instances with Demand
Intensity 0.9
Table 5.4 shows the results for the seat capacity being 100, 120, and 150. The average revenue of the
OBP&SPSA approach over all demand, revenue, and price instances is much lower than the revenue
generated by the FCFS approach and much lower than the ex post optimal solution. Although, the
OBP&SPSA approach performs better than the option-based method in all revenue and price instances
in which the demand is lower than the capacity, the results of the OBP&SPSA procedure are lower
than the results of the FCFS approach in all these settings. The same effect could already be seen when
comparing the results of the option-based procedure to the FCFS approach. Mentionable is the fact
that the performance of the OBP&SPSA procedure is particularly bad in price instance d in which the
sum of option price plus strike price is higher than the revenue achieved by selling a flight ticket in
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the lower yielding booking classes of the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier (x + s > v21 and
x + s > v22). In price instance d, the ticketing carrier only operates requests for the higher yielding
booking class and the operating carrier rejects all requests for the second booking class as soon as the
remaining capacity is equal to the number of options the ticketing carrier owns. If this point is reached in
the booking process, the only booking classes in which requests are accepted are the operating carrier’s
and ticketing carrier’s highest booking yielding class. And since the demand is low, especially for the
higher yielding booking classes, most of the flight tickets for seats in the aircraft remain unsold which
causes the poor performance of the OBP&SPSA procedure in price instance d.
In a second survey, we fixed the revenue and aggregated the computed results over all price and demand
instances in order to evaluate the effect of revenue variation among the tested instances.
Table 5.5 contains the results for capacity 100, 120 and 150. The revenue gained from the OBP&SPSA
approach is higher than the results gained from the option-based approach and the FCFS procedure in
all capacity settings and revenue instances. The performance of the OBP&SPSA approach in the revenue
instances 1, 2, and 3 is much better compared to the FCFS method. In the fourth revenue instance, the
difference between the revenue gained by selling a flight ticket for the carriers’ higher yielding booking
class and the revenue that the carriers achieve by selling a flight ticket for the lower yielding booking
class is lower than in the other revenue settings. The conclusion is that the OBP&SPSA procedure is also
most applicable if the protection of seats for higher yielding booking classes from the access of lower
yielding booking classes achieves more revenue since the revenue for one sold flight ticket in the higher
yielding booking class is remarkably higher than the revenue for one sold ticket in the lower yielding
booking class.
Capacity Revenue Instance gap3 gap4 gap5
100 1 5.67 10.80 11.54
2 1.60 11.49 10.84
3 8.51 7.78 15.16
4 7.98 0.48 13.43
120 1 5.03 14.10 9.30
2 1.32 14.13 8.89
3 7.97 11.77 11.96
4 6.92 2.96 11.47
150 1 4.47 16.89 7.58
2 1.33 17.37 6.99
3 7.38 14.84 9.63
4 6.05 5.25 9.67
Table 5.5: OBP&SPSA – Results Aggregated over Demand and Price Instances
We fixed the option price and the strike price and aggregated the computed results over all revenue and
demand instances in a third survey in order to evaluate the effect of the price variation among the tested
instances.
In Table 5.6, the results for capacity 100, 120, and 150 are presented. The OBP&SPSA procedure accom-
plished higher revenue results than the option-based approach in all price instances and higher revenue
results than the FCFS procedure in the price instances a, b, and c. Similar to the performance of the
option-based procedure, the OBP&SPSA approach obtains poor results especially in the price instance
d although gap4 being not as small as in the option-based procedure analysis since the OBP&SPSA ap-
proach enhances the results calculated by the option-based procedure.
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Capacity Price Instance gap3 gap4 gap5
100 a 2.67 13.30 5.61
b 9.78 11.79 7.31
c 9.78 11.79 7.31
d 1.55 -6.33 30.74
120 a 2.53 15.82 4.46
b 8.72 14.43 5.94
c 8.72 14.43 5.94
d 1.26 -1.72 25.27
150 a 2.13 17.95 3.69
b 7.86 16.82 4.83
c 7.86 16.82 4.83
d 1.39 2.76 20.54
Table 5.6: OBP&SPSA – Results Aggregated over Demand and Revenue Instances
Procedure 1, which assigns the spare seats the ticketing carrier does not buy options for (if they exist) to
a class of the operating carrier (described in Section 4.2.2), was also considered in the instances solved by
the OBP&SPSA procedure. However, the result of the OBP&SPSA approach considering Procedure 1,
averaged over all instances with seat capacity 120, is equal to the revenue gained from using Procedure
2, which solves the model of the operating carrier twice, not considering the additional class of the tick-
eting carrier in calculating the booking limits for the operating carrier. The simultaneous perturbation
stochastic approximation approach compensates in its 300 iterations lasting run the marginal differences
in the initial values being the booking limits calculated by the two different procedures mentioned in
Section 4.2.2.
We compared the performance of the OBP&SPSA procedure using standard nesting with the perfor-
mance applying a theft nesting control for the seat capacity being 120. Exercising the two nesting con-
trols results in two similar revenue outcomes aggregated over all instances (standard nesting performs
0.03% better than theft nesting). However, no declaration can be made about the comparative perfor-
mance of the two nesting controls in general.
The performance of the simulation-based optimization procedure with buy-back opportunity of the
operating carrier (OBP&SPSA+BB) is compared to the performance of the same procedure without buy-
back option (OBP&SPSA-BB). Compare Section 4.2.1 for the description of the operating carrier’s buy-
back opportunity. The revenue generated by the OBP&SPSA+BB approach, averaged over all instances
considering the capacity to be 120, is 2.04% higher than the revenue calculated by the OBP&SPSA-BB.
Similar to the performance of the option-based method with buy-back opportunity, the OBP&SPSA+BB
procedure gains exactly the same revenue as the OBP&SPSA-BB approach in the revenue and price set-
ting 4d. Only in 13 of the 832 instances studied, OBP&SPSA-BB performs barely better than
OBP&SPSA+BB. This phenomenon occurs most likely in instances of revenue and price scenario 3a,
combined with instances which describe a very low demand for the highest yielding booking class and
a very high demand for the lowest yielding booking class of the operating carrier. The demand for the
ticketing carrier’s booking classes is high in these instances. In revenue and price scenario 3a, the return
for one sold flight ticket in one of the ticketing carrier’s booking classes is much higher than in one of the
operating carrier’s booking classes and the option price plus the strike price is higher than the revenues
gained by selling a flight ticket in the operating carrier’s lower yielding booking class. The high demand
for the operating carrier’s second booking class causes that the state in the booking process is reached
very fast in which the remaining seat capacity will be equal to the number of options the ticketing carrier
holds. Henceforth, the operating carrier buys back options from the ticketing carrier if a request for the
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first booking class of the operating carrier occurs. Since the total demand for the first booking class of
the operating carrier is very small and since the ticketing carrier cannot fill the capacity the operating
carrier took from the ticketing by buying back the options, a part of the capacity remains unsold. In this
case, it is possible that the operating carrier buys back the options although the ticketing carrier could
most likely sell the tickets and for a much higher price, which explains the inferior performance.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of the OBP&SPSA approach applied with the initial booking limit
values coming from the EMSR-a+Options and EMSR-b+Options calculations introduced in Section 4.2.3
(which are referred to as OBP&SPSA+EMSR-a+Options method and OBP&SPSA+EMSR-b+Options
procedure). We averaged the expected revenue of all instances with seat capacity 120 and gained an
expected revenue from the OBP&SPSA+EMSR-b+Options procedure that is slightly higher than the
revenue achieved by the OBP&SPSA+EMSR-a+Options approach. This outcome corresponds to the in-
sight we gained comparing the procedures EMSR-a+Options and EMSR-b+Options not considering the
simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation. The results of the OBP&SPSA+EMSR-a+Options
approach is 5.86% lower than the revenue calculated by the OBP&SPSA method with underlying DLP.
Considering the OBP&SPSA+EMSR-b+Options approach, we receive an expected revenue that is 4.29%
lower than the revenue achieved by the DLP underlying OBP&SPSA method observing all instances of
the 120 seat capacity scenario.
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Chapter 6
Heuristic Calculation of Booking Limits
In this chapter, we investigate two versions of a genetic algorithm which can be applied to determine
booking limits for the partners within a strategic alliance. In Section 6.1, we will begin with a basic
description of genetic algorithms in general followed by the illustration of the specific implementation
of the genetic algorithm versions applied in this thesis. The chapter will be concluded by a survey of the
performance of the genetic algorithm versions using a computational study (Section 6.2).
6.1 Determination of Booking Limits with Genetic Algorithm
April et al. (2003) state that the application of metaheuristics in simulation-based optimization becomes
more and more popular especially in commercial simulation software. Thereby, mainly evolution-
ary approaches such as genetic algorithms are applied. Evolutionary algorithms are more capable in
simulation-based optimization than approaches that start with a single solution and search for better
solutions within a defined neighborhood like simulated annealing. The dominance of evolutionary ap-
proaches can be explained since they need fewer evaluations of the objective function to investigate
a larger area of the solution space (compare April et al., 2003). Evolutionary algorithms separate the
search for new solutions from the evaluation of the solutions which implies that they do not need to
be adjusted for being applied in simulation-based optimization, as pointed out by Klein (2005), Section
5.1.3. Spall (2003), Chapter 9, refers to evolutionary algorithms as stochastic search and optimization
methods which are based on a mathematical imitation of natural evolution. In this chapter of his mono-
graph, Spall (2003) characterizes genetic algorithms which are, as he points out in Section 9.1, the most
popular approaches in evolutionary computation. This statement is also supported by Ashlock (2006),
Section 1.2. Genetic algorithms have been developed by Holland (1975). Many papers and books have
been written on genetic algorithms since the topic was introduced. Compare Reeves and Rowe (2002),
Section 1.1, for a historical background of genetic algorithm theory. Basic principles as well as specific
implementation concepts for genetic algorithms can also be found in their monograph. Genetic algo-
rithms generate a population of possible solutions to the considered problem and move this population
iteratively towards a global optimum which shows the difference between genetic algorithms and the
stochastic approximation methods described in Chapter 5. The SPSA approach, as described before,
calculates one solution candidate and updates this possible solution towards the optimal solution (com-
pare Spall, 2003, Section 9.1). As pointed out by Falkenauer (1998), Section 2.3.2, getting stuck in a local
optimum is less probable for genetic algorithms since these procedures search for the optimal solution
by searching through a population and, therefore, several points in the search space. Genetic algorithms
are iterative algorithms since the optimization process within the genetic algorithm can be iteratively
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repeated as stated in Falkenauer (1998), Section 2.3.2. According to Spall (2003), Section 9.1, an iteration,
which is also called generation, describes the transformation of a solution population to another pop-
ulation of possible solutions. After some iterations, this transformation moves the population towards
the optimum if the genetic algorithm runs successfully. The general procedure of a genetic algorithm
as well as the terminology around genetic algorithms will be described in the following section when
introducing the implementation of the genetic algorithm for our application area. A genetic algorithm
is classified as metaheuristic which implies a broad range of application. There are only few publica-
tions considering genetic algorithms to solve revenue management capacity control problems for single
corporations or airlines, compare, e.g., Pulugurtha and Nambisan (2003).
The implementation of the genetic algorithm applied for determining advanced booking limits to con-
trol the capacity within the strategic alliance will be outlined in the following. Following the definitions
by Falkenauer (1998), Section 2.3.1 as well as Section 2.3.2, some basic genetic algorithm terms will be
clarified prior to the description of the procedure.
As described before, the genetic algorithm iteratively modifies the population of solutions. An individ-
ual describes a member of the population and this member defines a possible solution to the problem.
However, the term solution needs to be examined more precisely. The actual solution of the problem is
called phenotype, following the biological terminology. In our application area, the phenotype of the
genetic algorithm displays the nested booking limits which are passed to the simulation to evaluate the
solution. A genetic algorithm, however, works with representations of solutions. Such a representation
is called genotype in genetic algorithm terminology. A genotype represents a chromosome (also called
string) that in turn stands for a point in the solution space. The decision variables of a solution within
a chromosome or string are called genes (compare Falkenauer, 1998, Section 2.3.1). By encoding a phe-
notype, a genotype can be identified. A phenotype, on the other hand, can be clearly determined by
decoding the genotype. The term fitness describes the value and, therefore, the quality of a solution. It
refers to the objective function of the considered problem. Since an analytical objective function is not
available in our setting, the fitness value of an individual is approximated by means of simulation. The
simulation of the booking processes, described in Section 4.2.4, is applied to determine the fitness values
of the individuals. In comparing the fitness values of the individuals to each other, it can be determined
which individual is closer to the optimal solution. In our alliance revenue maximization problem, the
individual with the highest fitness represents the solution with the highest alliance revenue and, there-
fore, the best solution of the problem found so far. For each individual within a population, the fitness
value is calculated by simulating the booking processes of the alliance partners applying the determined
nested booking limits (which represent the phenotype of the genetic algorithm).
There are several types of representations and encoding mechanisms described in genetic algorithm lit-
erature, compare, e.g., Falkenauer (1998), Section 2.3.3, Rothlauf (2006), Section 2.1.3, and Talbi (2009),
Section 1.4.1. Ashlock (2006), Section 1.2.1, states that there is no globally adequate representation for
all genetic algorithm applications. We adopt two different genetic algorithm versions which are distin-
guishable by different problem-specific genotypes. Both versions will be described in the following.
Genetic Algorithm 1
In a first genotype version, a chromosome is implemented as a string of booking limits bjl (compare
Figure 6.1 for illustration). The number of genes within the chromosome corresponds to the number n
of products offered within the alliance. The booking limits in the chromosome are neither partitioned
nor nested since it is not assured within the procedure of the genetic algorithm that the sum of booking
limits is equal to the total capacity as it is the case with partitioned booking limits. In addition, it is
not guaranteed that the highest booking limit is equal to the total capacity and that the booking limit
of a higher yielding booking class is higher than the booking limit of a lower yielding booking class
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which specifies nested booking limits. A repair mechanism could be implemented within the genetic
algorithm that converts the booking limits with the above mentioned characteristics into partitioned
or nested booking limits. Repair mechanisms are generally applied to repair infeasible solutions that
are permitted within the procedure of metaheuristics are described by Reeves and Rowe (2002), Section
2.5.2. We tested the performance of the genetic algorithm including a repair approach with the results
of the genetic algorithm without repair mechanism using one revenue and one option price and strike
price example. The results of the genetic algorithm including the repair mechanism did not exceed the
results of the genetic algorithm without repair procedure but the run-time of the genetic algorithm in-
creases when the booking limits are repaired. An explanation for the similar outcome of the analyzed
procedures can be found in the phenotype of the genetic algorithm. In the decoding of the chromo-
somes, the booking limits stored in the chromosomes’ genes are converted to nested booking limits.
Therefore, the decoding serves as repair mechanism which ensures the feasibility of the booking limits
passed to the simulation. In addition to the decoding, the simulation makes sure that the total capacity
is not exceeded. Consider the example introduced in Section 4.2.2 in which the operating carrier and
the ticketing carrier offer flight tickets in two booking classes (n1 = 2, n2 = 2, and, therefore, n = 4) for
a flight with seat capacity C = 100. In Figure 6.1, a possible string of Genetic Algorithm 1 is displayed
considering the setting from the example described.
37 52 14 89
Figure 6.1: Genotype Genetic Algorithm 1
Genetic Algorithm 2
The chromosome in a second encoding version of the genetic algorithm is implemented as a string of
capacity units. In the example of an airline alliance controlling seat capacity on a single flight leg, the
number of genes within the chromosome is equal to the total seat capacity in the considered aircraft. To
indicate the different products offered by the partners within the alliance, the products are numbered
and each gene within the chromosome uses a product number. Recall the example mentioned in the
description of Genetic Algorithm 1 in which both of the alliance partners offer two booking classes and
the total seat capacity is set to C = 100. Considering this setting, a possible string of Genetic Algorithm
2 is shown in Figure 6.2.
…
1 2 3 4 5 6
3 2 4 1 4 2
98 99 100
1 3 2 3 4 1
979695…#?of?Seat/Gene
#?of?Product
Figure 6.2: Genotype Genetic Algorithm 2
In the decoding of the chromosomes, the booking limits stored in the strings of the two different genetic
algorithm versions are converted to nested booking limits. Therefore, the booking limit of the operating
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carriers’ highest yielding booking class is set equal to the total capacity (b11 = C) and the booking
limits of all other booking classes offered by the operating carrier are set equal to the booking limit
of the considered booking class plus the booking limits of all lower yielding booking classes. This
converting mechanism is equal to the procedure of converting partitioned booking limits into nested
booking limits described in Section 2.2.2.3. The booking limits of the ticketing carrier are nested by
defining the booking limit for the ticketing carrier’s highest yielding booking class equal to the number
of options the ticketing carrier buys from the operating carrier. This number of options is the sum of
all booking limits determined for the ticketing carrier’s booking classes. The booking limits for the
ticketing carrier’s other booking classes are calculated by adding to the considered booking class the
booking limits of all lower yielding booking classes of the ticketing carrier.
Before the decoding of the chromosomes deployed by Genetic Algorithm 2 can be applied, the numbers
of the products stored in a chromosome need to be counted to achieve booking limits. If, e.g., there are
43 genes using the number 3, the booking limit for the class corresponding to the number 3 is 43.
The procedure of the genetic algorithms established in this work is introduced in five steps, following
the descriptions of genetic algorithm components by Talbi (2009), Section 3.3:
Step 1: Initialization
An iteration counter k is set equal to zero. Depending on the chosen genotype, the initial population,
represent the population size of our genetic algorithm versions, is generated in the first step of the de-
scribed genetic algorithms. As pointed out by Falkenauer (1998), Section 2.3.2, the initial population is
usually randomly selected. The generation of initial populations is discussed by Talbi (2009) in Section
3.1.1. Initial populations of any metaheuristic need to be diversified in order to secure that a premature
convergence towards a local optimum does not occur. In Section 3.1.1.1, Talbi (2009) describes the gener-
ation of an initial population that is randomly generated by means of a uniform distribution. We follow
the descriptions of Talbi (2009), Section 3.1.1.1, and generate the elements within the chromosomes of
our initial population randomly in a given range uniformly distributed.
In Genetic Algorithm 1, the booking limit values stored in the genes of the chromosomes are uniformly
distributed between zero and the total capacity (U[0,C]), prohibiting that an initial booking limit exceeds
the total available capacity.
In Genetic Algorithm 2, the values stored in the genes of the chromosomes representing the number
of a product are also selected randomly by means of a uniform distribution. In the example described
above, there are four products offered by the alliance partners which leads to the numbers 1, 2, 3, and
4 in numbering the products. Therefore, the numbers within the initial population are uniformly dis-
tributed between 1 and 4 (U[1, 4]) and converted to discrete values such that all integer values have
equal probability.
Step 2: Fitness Evaluation
In the second step of the genetic algorithms, the fitness values for all individuals in the considered pop-
ulation are evaluated. As described above, simulating the booking processes of the alliance partners
determines the fitness values of the chromosomes within the population in our application area. In
most metaheuristics, the fitness evaluation is the part that needs the most run-time, as pointed out by
Talbi (2009), Section 1.4.2.6. To compare the run-time of the genetic algorithms with the run-time of the
option-based procedure introduced in Chapter 4 and the OBP&SPSA approach’s run-time discussed in
Chapter 5, the fitness evaluation of one individual needs 5000 simulation iterations to account for the
stochastic demand. An increasing run-time of the genetic algorithm with an increasing population size
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can be explained by extensive simulation runs necessary for each additional individual.
Step 3: Selection
In the selection step of the genetic algorithms, a promising set of chromosomes in the actual popula-
tion candidates is selected which is considered for reproduction. The term reproduction subsumes the
following steps: recombination and mutation. There are several selection methods that can be applied,
compare, e.g., Talbi (2009), Section 3.3.1. A widespread method is to select the individuals with better
fitness values with higher probability. We tested several selection methods and compared the resulting
performance and the run-time of the genetic algorithms with diverse selection methods. The results of
our genetic algorithm implementations improve with the number of individuals being selected. There-
fore, we decided to select all chromosomes for reproduction.
Step 4: Recombination
Several recombination methods can be adopted in the fourth step of the genetic algorithms in which the
individuals selected in Step 3 are considered. According to Falkenauer (1998), Section 2.3.4.1, recombi-
nation operators consider different chromosomes in the current population (parents) and join together
parts of these strings to create new chromosomes (offspring). Recombination operators are also called
crossover operators. In Talbi (2009), Section 3.3.2.2, various crossover operators are described in detail
by means of examples. According to Leguizamón et al. (2007), the two-point crossover operator is the
most common form of a recombination operator. We apply a two-point crossover for reproduction in
both genetic algorithm variants using a uniform distribution to select the two crossover positions ran-
domly according to the descriptions made by Talbi (2009), Section 3.3.2.2. In Figure 6.3, two strings of
booking limits representing the parent chromosomes of Genetic Algorithm 1 are presented. If, e.g., the
randomly chosen crossover positions are between the first and the second as well as between the third
and fourth gene, the resulting pieces laying in the center piece of the parent chromosomes are swaped
and joint together with the first and third part of the respective other parent chromosome, forming two
new chromosomes (the offspring). The two-point crossover operator applied in Genetic Algorithm 2
is implemented in the same way. We tested crossover operators in the Genetic Algorithm 2 with more
than two crossover positions. However, even if there are more genes in the string resulting in more pos-
sibilities to choose and implement crossover positions in Genetic Algorithm 2 (compared to the short
strings implemented in Genetic Algorithm 1), the performance of Genetic Algorithm 2 is inferior when
implementing crossover operators with more than two crossover points.
Step 5: Mutation
As pointed out by Talbi (2009), Section 3.3.2.1, mutation operators are so called unary operators since
they consider and change only single individuals. Contrary to crossover operators which act on multiple
chromosomes to generate new individuals, the mutation operators perform small changes within one
considered chromosome of the population to create a new individual. The mutation operator sometimes
even mutates only one gene of the chromosome. Mutation operators are adopted to overcome the disad-
vantage which could be carried out by crossover operators. Falkenauer (1998), Section 2.3.4.3, points out
that new chromosomes generated by crossover operators and representing the offspring never contain
new values stored in the genes within the chromosomes since the crossover operators only combine the
genes already present in the parent chromosomes. If the optimal solution of the considered problem
contains a value that is not present in the chromosomes within the population, finding this optimal so-
lution by means of crossover operators is impossible (compare Spall, 2004, Section 6.4.5). However, the
random modifications carried out on a chromosome by the mutation operator should be used only with
small probability, as pointed out by Falkenauer (1998), Section 2.3.4.3, as well as Talbi (2009), Section
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37 52 14 89
5 76 21 44
37 76 21 89
5 52 14 44
Parents
Offspring
Two?Point?Crossover
Swap Swap
Figure 6.3: Example Two-Point Crossover Genetic Algorithm 1
3.3.2.1. If the mutation operator is applied to too many chromosomes within the population, the posi-
tive effects of the crossover operators (converging the solutions towards the optimal solution) could be
ruined. Therefore, the mutation operator is applied on maximal one chromosome in each generation of
our genetic algorithm versions. The mutated chromosome is chosen randomly by means of a uniform
distribution. Additionally, the amount of the random modification of the genes within the selected chro-
mosome is chosen uniformly.
Step 6: Replacement
In the replacement step of the genetic algorithms the individuals compete against each other for getting
into the next generation. Individuals need to be eliminated due to a constant population size (compare
Talbi, 2009, Section 3.3.2). Many replacing strategies are imaginable, compare Mitchell (1999), Section
5.4. We apply a replacement strategy mentioned in Talbi (2009), Section 3.3.3, and select the individuals
holding the best fitness values (in our setting the individuals with the highest fitness values) from the
parent and offspring population in the amount of the population size. According to Talbi (2009), Section
3.3.3, a sampling error can be avoided by replacing some individuals with good fitness by individuals
holding a poor fitness value. Therefore, some of the individuals holding the worst fitness values are
randomly chosen and assigned to the next generation by means of a uniform distribution in our genetic
algorithm variants.
Step 7: Iteration or Termination
In the seventh step of the genetic algorithms, the methods return to Step 2 with iteration counter k+ 1 or
are terminated if a predefined stopping criterion is reached. Compare Reeves (2003) for a description of
possible termination criteria. The genetic algorithms described in this chapter terminate if a maximum
allowable number of iterations has been reached.
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During the procedure of the Genetic Algorithm 2, there can be different strings that describe an identical
set of booking limits which leads to high redundancy. We allow this redundancy since different strings
can emerge from these strings after the recombination which in turn can lead to a broader search through
the solution space and to enhanced results.
As stated by Jong (2007), parameter setting in genetic algorithms can be challenging. All decisions
concerning the design of the genetic algorithm versions and parameter settings described above are
based on the descriptions of the respective topics in literature and/or according to several tested possible
characteristics of the genetic algorithms.
6.2 Computational Study for the Genetic Algorithms
The following section provides insights gained by the application of the introduced genetic algorithm
versions to the alliance capacity control problem. In the first subsection (Section 6.2.1), the test bed un-
derlying the analysis of the two genetic algorithm variants will be outlined, followed by the evaluation
of the proposed procedures in Section 6.2.2.
6.2.1 Test Bed for Genetic Algorithm Analysis
The genetic algorithm variants described in Section 6.1 were implemented in C++. In both genetic
algorithm versions, 50 individuals are randomly created. According to Ahn (2006), Section 2.3, it is
generally difficult to choose a population size that is adequate for the considered problem. There is a
trade-off between a small population size which leads to a fast run-time of the genetic algorithm but
lower possibility of finding high quality solutions and a large population size with a longer run-time of
the genetic algorithm but higher possibility of finding good solutions. After trading off these arguments,
we decided to choose the population size of 50 individuals. Talbi (2009), Section 3.3.3, states that the
population size in practice usually lies between 20 and 100 individuals. The amount of the random
modification of the genes within the selected chromosome is chosen uniformly distributed between
-0.6% and 0.6% since these values lead to a good performance of the established genetic algorithms.
Due to an increased run-time of the genetic algorithms compared to the run-time of the previously
discussed approaches (namely option-based procedure and OBP&SPSA method), both versions of the
genetic algorithm terminate after 15 iterations. In the following section, we will analyze the run-time of
the genetic algorithms and the achieved results in more detail.
In the computational study, the performance of the genetic algorithm variants are compared to each
other, to the ex post optimal solutions, the first-come-first-served approach performance, and to the
results gained by applying the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach. To ensure com-
parability, the test bed used in the previous computational studies of the option-based approach and the
OBP&SPSA method (in Section 4.3.2 respectively Section 5.3.2) is re-used in the survey discussed in the
present section. The revenue of the flight tickets for the partner airlines’ booking classes as well as the
option price and strike price instances are presented in Table 4.5 in Section 4.3.1. Moreover, the demand
instances presented in Table A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 in the Appendix A.1 are implied to test the genetic
algorithms. The simulation conditions outlined in Section 4.3.1 are adopted in the simulation processes
within the genetic algorithms. Since the results of the procedures discussed in the previous sections are
better when the simulation is applied with standard nesting control policy and buy-back possibility of
the operating carrier, we set the simulations of the booking processes to determine the fitness values in
the genetic algorithm variants according to these assumptions.
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To create pseudo-random numbers for the uniformly distributed random processes within the genetic
algorithm versions, we used the random number generator boost::random::lagged_fibonacci9689 (com-
pare www.boost.org) in the programs. The tests were done on an AMD Athlon(tm) 64X2 Dual Core
Processor 4600+ 2.41 GHz PC with 1,96 GB RAM running Windows XP.
To monitor the performance of both genetic algorithm versions in parameter settings that differ from the
instances assumed in the present computational study, we calculated the results of the genetic algorithm
versions varying three of the given parameters: the number of iterations, the population size, and the
crossover version. Table 6.1 shows the different parameter modifications. In each instance modification
only one of the given parameters is changed. Therefore, 2+2+3 different modification combinations are
considered.
ParameterComputationalStudy ParameterChanged
Number of Iterations 15 30 60
Population Size 50 20 100
Crossover Version 2-point 1-point 9-point 15-point
Table 6.1: GA – Parameter Modifications
The results of both genetic algorithm versions assuming the parameters to be as described before (Param-
eterComputationalStudy) are compared to the results of both genetic algorithm versions with a changed
parameter (ParameterChanged). The improvement of the parameter modification is calculated by means
of 6.1.
improvement =
result(ParameterComputationalStudy)− result(ParameterChanged)
result(ParameterChanged)
∗ 100. (6.1)
Since the results of the instances behave similarly in all considered instances when changing one of the
described parameters, we show the results of capacity instance 100 with demand intensity 1.1, demand
instance 6, and revenue/price instance 1a in the following tables.
Table 6.2 presents the results of Genetic Algorithm 1 and Genetic Algorithm 2 with different numbers of
iterations compared to the results of GA1 and GA2 with 15 iterations.
Iterations 1 5 10 30 60
GA1 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
GA2 5.34 1.03 0.35 -0.02 -0.03
Table 6.2: GA – Results of GA1 and GA2 with Different Numbers of Iterations
The results of both genetic algorithm versions are considerably improved in the first iterations of the
genetic algorithms. After the fifth iteration, the results only improve marginally. The result of GA1 does
not change if there are more than 10 iterations (we tested instances with up to 60 iterations). The GA2
result improves marginally if there are more than 15 iterations. The run-time of GA2, however, increases
from 3.5 minutes in the instance with 15 iterations up to 7.2 minutes in the instance with 60 iterations.
For that reason, we decided to set the number of iterations to 15 in the computational study of GA1 and
GA2.
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Population Size 20 100
GA1 0.06 0.00
GA2 1.88 -0.01
Table 6.3: GA – Results of GA1 and GA2 with Different Population Sizes
In Table 6.3, the results of GA1 and GA2 with different population sizes compared to the result of GA1
and GA2 with population size 50 are shown.
The results of both genetic algorithm versions in instances with an assumed population size of 20 are
inferior to the results with a population of 50 chromosomes. If we assume the population size to be 100
only the result of GA2 marginally improves compared to the result achieved with a population of 50
chromosomes.
Table 6.4 shows the results of GA1 and GA2 with different crossover versions compared to the results of
GA1 and GA2 with a two-point crossover. The 9-point crossover and 15-point crossover could only be
adopted in Genetic Algorithm 2 since the string implementation in Genetic Algorithm 1 is too short to
adopt a crossover with more than two crossover positions.
Crossover Version 1-point 9-point 15-point
GA1 0.00
GA2 0.02 23.65 24.70
Table 6.4: GA – Results of GA1 and GA2 with Different Crossover Versions
The result of GA1 does not change if a one-point crossover is applied compared to the result of GA1
with the application of a two-point crossover. The result of GA2 with one-point crossover is marginally
inferior to the result with two-point crossover. However, the result of GA2 is considerable inferior if
more than two crossover positions are applied.
6.2.2 Evaluation of the Genetic Algorithms
The results of the different procedures are compared by computing the percentage gap between the
optimal values (optVal) of Genetic Algorithm 1 (GA1) and Genetic Algorithm 2 (GA2), the option-based
procedure (OBP), the OBP&SPSA method, the first-come-first-served approach (FCFS), and the ex post
optimal solution (ex post). The percentage gaps are determined by:
gap =
optVal(Procedure1)− optVal(Procedure2)
optVal(Procedure2)
∗ 100. (6.2)
Table 6.5 shows the procedures which are compared in the computational study of the genetic algo-
rithms and the respective gap assignment.
Depending on the considered instance, the run-time of Genetic Algorithm 1 ranges from two minutes in
low capacity and low total demand instances up to 9.2 minutes in high capacity and high total demand
instances. Similar to the run-time of Genetic Algorithm 1, to achieve the result for one instance, Genetic
Algorithm 2 takes 1.8 minutes in low capacity and low demand settings and up to 8.4 minutes in high
capacity and high demand instances. The increased run-time of the genetic algorithm versions, needed
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gap Procedure1 Procedure2
gap6 GA1 GA2
gap7 GA1 OBP&SPSA
gap8 GA1 OBP
gap9 GA1 FCFS
gap10 ex post GA1
gap11 GA2 OBP&SPSA
gap12 GA2 OBP
gap13 GA2 FCFS
gap14 ex post GA2
Table 6.5: Compared Procedures in Computational Study Genetic Algorithm 1 and 2
to achieve a result for one instance, compared to the elapsed time of the option-based procedure (being
less than a second) and the OBP&SPSA approach (ranging from two minutes up to four minutes), shows
the disadvantage of the genetic algorithm versions.
Averaging the results over all considered instances (capacity, demand, revenue, and price instances),
the revenue generated by Genetic Algorithm 1 is 2.26% higher than the revenue achieved by Genetic
Algorithm 2. The genotype version holding booking limits (Genetic Algorithm 1) instead of product
numbers (Genetic Algorithm 2) performs better considering all established instances.
Table 6.6 presents the gaps between the average revenue of the procedures aggregated over all instances.
The Genetic Algorithm 1 performs better than the option-based procedure but the results are inferior to
the performance of the OBP&SPSA approach. Similar to the results of the Genetic Algorithm 1, the re-
sults of the Genetic Algorithm 2 are superior to the option-based procedure’s results but inferior to the
performance of the OBP&SPSA approach. Similar results are also noticed by Maryak and Chin (2001).
The authors found in their computational study that the results of the SPSA method as a global opti-
mizer are superior to the performance of the genetic algorithm approaches. Both, Genetic Algorithm 1
and Genetic Algorithm 2 outperform the FCFS approach over all instances, but the results of the genetic
algorithm versions can still be improved.
gap6 gap7 gap8 gap9 gap10 gap11 gap12 gap13 gap14
all instances 2.26 -0.16 5.21 10.69 10.67 -0.95 4.18 9.15 12.41
Table 6.6: GA – Results Aggregated over Capacity, Demand, Revenue, and Price Instances
In Table 6.7, the results of the procedures aggregated over all demand, revenue, and price instances
are presented. In all capacity instances, the performance of Genetic Algorithm 1 as well as the perfor-
mance of Genetic Algorithm 2 exceed the results the option-based procedure achieves. Only in capacity
instance 100, the Genetic Algorithm 1 performs slightly better than the OBP&SPSA approach. The Ge-
netic Algorithm 2 results are inferior to the results of the OBP&SPSA method in all capacity instances.
The genetic algorithm versions overcome the inferior performance of the option-based procedure espe-
cially in instances with lower capacity. The results of both genetic algorithm versions approach towards
the ex post optimal solution as the capacity in the considered instances increases.
Comparing the results of the procedures aggregated over all revenue and price instances (Table 6.8) re-
veals that in all capacity instances considering the demand to be 110% of the capacity the results of both
genetic algorithm versions are inferior to the FCFS method’s results. The same effect could already be
observed in the previous computational studies (Section 4.3.2 and Section 5.3.2) analyzing the results
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Capacity gap6 gap7 gap8 gap9 gap10 gap11 gap12 gap13 gap14
100 2.94 0.07 6.10 8.26 12.56 -0.96 4.76 6.30 14.85
120 2.49 -0.18 5.12 10.54 10.63 -1.16 3.91 8.77 12.63
150 1.37 -0.37 4.43 13.18 8.90 -0.74 3.90 12.25 9.85
Table 6.7: GA – Results Aggregated over Demand, Revenue, and Price Instances
of the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach. Again, the reservation of seat capacity
for higher yielding booking classes through booking limits is inferior in low demand instances. In all
capacity and demand instances, the genetic algorithm approaches outperform the results of the option-
based procedure. However, the results of the Genetic Algorithm 1 exceed the OBP&SPSA procedure’s
results only slightly in the low demand instances assuming the capacity to be 100 and 120. The results of
both genetic algorithm versions improve as the demand increases which confirms the assumption that
the reservation of capacity for higher yielding classes is more profitable in instances with higher total
demand. Genetic Algorithm 1 performs better than Genetic Algorithm 2 in all demand instances and all
capacity scenarios even though the gap between the results of the genetic algorithm approaches (gap6)
decreases as the total capacity and total demand increase.
Capacity Demand in % gap6 gap7 gap8 gap9 gap10 gap11 gap12 gap13 gap14
100 110 4.40 0.63 4.14 -5.68 15.64 -0.57 2.71 -8.25 18.81
120 3.61 0.08 5.28 2.05 13.94 -1.21 3.67 -0.28 16.81
130 2.49 -0.07 7.04 12.06 11.48 -1.12 5.61 10.24 13.55
140 1.48 -0.28 7.65 22.47 9.67 -0.87 6.73 21.26 10.84
120 110 3.68 0.07 3.36 -5.02 13.73 -0.89 2.22 -7.10 16.45
120 2.60 -0.19 4.66 5.93 11.13 -1.23 3.39 4.13 13.28
130 2.05 -0.30 5.57 15.46 9.47 -1.31 4.30 13.80 11.22
140 1.63 -0.31 6.91 25.80 8.18 -1.21 5.72 24.27 9.57
150 110 2.26 -0.14 2.78 -1.91 11.14 -0.63 2.21 -3.21 12.69
120 1.44 -0.33 3.91 7.33 9.38 -0.71 3.39 6.39 10.39
130 0.97 -0.47 4.87 18.64 7.90 -0.79 4.38 17.89 8.57
140 0.78 -0.53 6.17 28.65 7.19 -0.85 5.64 27.92 7.74
Table 6.8: GA – Results Aggregated over Revenue and Price Instances
The next step analyzes the performance of the genetic algorithm versions in scenarios with very low
demand. Therefore, instances in which the demand intensity is 0.9 are considered. Table 6.9 shows that
both genetic algorithm versions perform worse than the OBP&SPSA approach in all capacity instances
assuming the demand to be 90% of the capacity. The results of the option-based procedure, however,
can be enhanced in all capacity settings. The same effect can be noticed in the study of the OBP&SPSA
procedure’s results in Section 5.3.2. Another fact similar to the one identified in Section 4.3.2 and Sec-
tion 5.3.2 is that the first-come-first-served approach outperforms the results of both genetic algorithm
methods since the best strategy in instances with very low demand is to accept all incoming requests in
order of occurrence.
In a second survey, we aggregated the averaged revenue results of the procedures over all demand and
price instances (Table 6.10). In both genetic algorithm approaches, the performance of the FCFS proce-
dure can be only slightly enhanced in revenue instance 4. Genetic Algorithm 2 performs even worse
than the FCFS approach in the fourth price instance assuming the capacity to be 100. In revenue in-
stance 4, the flight ticket revenue of the first booking class is close to the one of the second booking
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Capacity Demand in % gap6 gap7 gap8 gap9 gap10 gap11 gap12 gap13 gap14
100 90 8.71 -0.20 4.95 -12.34 19.59 -1.94 2.73 -15.92 25.38
120 90 7.35 -0.10 4.89 -11.11 17.38 -1.20 3.39 -14.74 22.16
150 90 4.62 -0.02 6.34 -9.87 14.04 -0.40 4.89 -10.99 16.73
Table 6.9: GA – Results Aggregated over Revenue and Price Instances in Instances with Demand Inten-
sity 0.9
class in the flight ticket revenue structures of both considered carriers. The statement that it is more
profitable to reserve seat capacity for higher yielding customer segments if the gap between the flight
ticket revenues of the airlines’ booking classes is high can be confirmed in this study as well. The per-
formance of the option-based procedure is worse compared to the results of Genetic Algorithm 1 in all
revenue instances. Genetic Algorithm 2 performs better than the option-based procedure in all revenue
instances apart from revenue instance 2. Revenue instance 2 differs from the other revenue instances
since the flight ticket revenues of the ticketing carrier’s booking classes are assumed to be lower than
the ones in the booking classes of the operating carrier. The results of the option-based procedure and
the OBP&SPSA approach (described in Section 4.3.2 and Section 5.3.2) are also better in revenue in-
stances 1, 3, and 4 compared to revenue instance 2.
Capacity Revenue Instance gap6 gap7 gap8 gap9 gap10 gap11 gap12 gap13 gap14
100 1 2.38 0.02 5.68 10.80 11.53 0.21 5.52 9.78 12.80
2 4.79 -0.13 1.47 11.34 10.98 -4.43 -2.91 6.59 16.17
3 1.07 0.76 9.29 8.56 14.39 -0.28 8.19 7.57 15.70
4 3.73 -0.30 7.67 0.20 13.83 0.72 7.92 -0.96 15.35
120 1 1.54 -0.26 4.76 13.80 9.59 0.06 4.83 13.23 10.33
2 4.93 -0.15 1.17 13.95 9.05 -4.67 -3.41 8.85 14.35
3 0.68 0.03 7.99 11.80 11.96 -0.62 7.31 11.15 12.81
4 2.80 -0.35 6.57 2.62 11.90 -0.58 6.90 1.87 13.02
150 1 0.76 -0.38 4.08 16.45 8.01 0.04 4.34 16.30 8.20
2 2.96 -0.28 1.05 17.02 7.29 -3.03 -1.74 13.85 10.42
3 0.29 -0.28 7.09 14.53 9.97 -0.56 6.79 14.22 10.31
4 1.45 -0.53 5.51 4.72 10.33 0.59 6.23 4.63 10.47
Table 6.10: GA – Results Aggregated over Demand and Price Instances
Table 6.11 shows the averaged results of the procedures aggregated over all demand and revenue in-
stances. The results of the genetic algorithm versions depend on the chosen price instance similar to the
price instance dependent results of the option-based procedure and OBP&SPSA approach. In price in-
stances d, the gap between the results of Genetic Algorithm 1 and the ex post optimal solutions (gap10)
is much higher compared to the gap in the other price instances. The gap between Genetic Algorithm 2
and the ex post optimal solutions (gap14) is high in price instances c and d. The FCFS approach performs
better than Genetic Algorithm 1 in price instance d in capacity instances 100 and 120. In price instance
d, the sum of option price and strike price is higher than the flight ticket revenue the operating carrier
and the ticketing carrier gain by selling a flight ticket in the second booking class. The results of the
option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach are also worse in price instance d compared to
the performance of the procedures in the other price instances (compare Section 4.3.2 and Section 5.3.2).
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Capacity Price Instance gap6 gap7 gap8 gap9 gap10 gap11 gap12 gap13 gap14
100 a 3.22 0.34 3.00 13.65 5.25 -2.52 0.07 10.54 8.64
b 1.40 0.53 10.72 14.31 7.08 -0.81 9.31 12.87 8.59
c 16.46 0.29 10.07 12.07 7.00 -11.99 -3.49 -1.26 24.32
d -9.22 -0.58 0.96 -6.91 31.48 11.89 13.61 3.17 18.40
120 a 2.44 -0.07 2.46 15.73 4.54 -2.25 0.24 13.29 7.09
b 1.13 0.09 9.32 16.85 5.94 -0.98 8.22 15.63 7.16
c 14.38 0.02 8.74 14.44 5.92 -11.13 -3.41 2.08 20.97
d -8.02 -0.69 0.56 -2.44 26.13 9.82 11.20 6.53 15.28
150 a 1.68 -0.20 1.92 17.70 3.90 -1.74 0.37 15.94 5.65
b 0.65 -0.08 8.32 19.22 4.90 -0.69 7.68 18.49 5.59
c 10.86 -0.09 7.76 16.71 4.92 -8.91 -1.76 6.77 16.21
d -7.72 -1.10 0.27 1.60 21.88 8.39 9.89 10.30 11.94
Table 6.11: GA – Results Aggregated over Demand and Revenue Instances
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Chapter 7
Capacity Control with Real Options
and Transfer Price Optimization
In the approaches and surveys introduced and discussed in the previous chapters, the option price and
strike price were treated as given parameters. However, the surveys outlined in the previous compu-
tational studies revealed that the results of the option-based procedure, the OBP&SPSA method, and
the genetic algorithm versions depend on the choice of option price and strike price. As mentioned in
Section 4.3.1, the optimal option price and strike price can be determined by systematically searching
through the entire solution space. Since this approach is very run-time-intensive, a method to incorpo-
rate the optimal option price and strike price in an efficient way as an extension to the previous studies
will be introduced in this chapter. At first, the transfer price theory in strategic alliances will be outlined
(Section 7.1) before, at second, the booking limit improvement by means of transfer price optimization
will be introduced (Section 7.2). At third, in a computational study, the performance of the new proce-
dures including transfer price optimization will be analyzed (Section 7.3). This chapter is based on Graf
and Kimms (2010).
7.1 Transfer Prices in Strategic Alliances
The option price and strike price can be subsumed under the generic term transfer price. There are many
publications dealing with transfer prices in the field of accounting (compare, e.g., Bierman, 1959; Cook,
1955; Dean, 1955; Eccles, 1985; Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998, Chapter 9; Stone, 1956; Tang, 1993; Verlage,
1975). The main subject in these publications is the description of how to use decentralization as an
instrument to control large firms. Dean (1955) defines decentralization as the formation of more or less
autonomous divisions within a corporation. Discussing decentralization often brings up the problem
of intracompany pricing (compare, e.g., Bierman, 1959; Dean, 1955; Stone, 1956; Verlage, 1975, Section
1.2). For a broad overview, including among other things fundamentals, application requirements, ap-
plication areas, and classifications of transfer price methods combined with empirical surveys about
the implementation of the transfer price methods in companies, consider especially the monographs of
Eccles (1985) and Tang (1993).
An early publication which discusses transfer-price policies as instruments for intracompany pricing
in the field of accounting was introduced by Hirshleifer (1956). He defines a transfer price to be the
price of a good or service that is exchanged between separate autonomous operating divisions within
a corporation. According to Tang (1993), Chapter 5, a transfer price is the cost for the division which
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buys and also the revenue the selling division generates. Establishing a connection between strategic
alliances and this definition, an alliance is regarded as a corporation with separate autonomous operat-
ing divisions representing the stand-alone partner airlines integrated in the alliance. The option price
represents a payment that the ticketing carrier conveys to the operating carrier in exchange for a service,
the reservation of seat capacity in the operating carrier’s aircraft by means of real options. By paying
the strike price to the operating carrier, the ticketing carrier obtains the right to sell a ticket for a seat
in the operating carrier’s aircraft. The operating carrier can pay back the option price to the ticketing
carrier in exchange for an option that the ticketing carrier bought from the operating carrier beforehand.
So, as described in our application area, the option price and the strike price are payments that are only
authorized among the partners within the alliance. The end customer, which is the airline passenger in
our application area, does not pay or even notice these payments.
In a publication which also addresses the transfer price topic, Bierman (1959) discusses the need for
transfer prices as an intracompany pricing method to maximize the profits of a decentralized corpora-
tion. According to Bierman (1959), the transfer price does not affect the profits of a decentralized corpo-
ration as a whole directly. However, Bierman (1959) argues that the profits of the firm as a whole may be
affected indirectly since the separate divisions of the corporation make decisions by using the account-
ing information incorporating the transfer prices. The same effect can be noticed observing strategic
alliances. The transfer pricing does not directly influence the expected revenue gained by the strategic
alliance as a whole. Nevertheless, the decisions made by the partners within the alliance are affected by
the transfer pricing. These changed decision making processes of the partners within the alliance in turn
modify the expected revenue of the partners and, therefore, the revenue gained by the strategic alliance.
Hirshleifer (1956) raises the question of how the transfer prices should be set in order to incentivize each
autonomous division to make their decisions so as to maximize the profit of the corporation as a whole.
This corresponds to the question discussed in this chapter: How should the option price and strike price
be arranged to induce the partner airlines to maximize the expected revenue of the alliance?
The transfer pricing literature quotes several transfer pricing mechanisms which are sometimes referred
to as policies or methods. In the survey by Tang (1979), Chapter 5, the transfer pricing policies are classi-
fied into two broad categories, cost-based methods and non-cost-based methods. Cook (1955) discusses
five of the most common transfer price policies: cost-based prices, cost-plus return on investment, com-
bination systems, market-based prices, and free negotiation.
In the cost-based method, the transfer prices are calculated on the basis of the costs of the goods or ser-
vices which should be transferred between the autonomous divisions. The costs of the goods or services
are apparent from the cost accounting records of the company (compare Eccles, 1985, Chapter 2). Bier-
man (1959) subdivided the cost-based method in transfer prices that are established by marginal costs,
variable costs, or full costs. In the transfer pricing mechanism applied in the context of capacity control
within strategic alliances in the airline industry, the transfer prices cannot be determined by means of
the costs apparent from the cost accounting records of the company because of three reasons: First, the
marginal costs are very low considering the whole capacity since in the revenue management context
it is assumed that there is a lacking operational flexibility of the capacity (compare Klein, 2005, Section
2.1.2.3). In our application area, the operating carrier utilizes an airplane with fixed seat capacity to
operate the flight. Second, there are no variable costs implied in our application due to the assump-
tions made in the revenue management context (compare Section 2.2.1). Third, the considered aircraft
is employed by the operating carrier whether or not the ticketing carrier sells tickets for the flight and,
therefore, the fixed costs of the flight can be neglected.
The cost-plus return on investment approach introduced by Cook (1955) describes a method to measure
the profitability of an investment by means of transfer prices rather than an approach to determine the
transfer prices. Since there is no need to valuate the profitability of an investment in our application
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area, the cost-plus return on investment approach cannot be adopted to calculate the transfer prices in
our transfer pricing method.
In the combination systems policy described by Cook (1955), the separated divisions use cost-based
transfer prices to charge the transferred goods or services. In contrast to the cost-based method, the
combination system policy, however, credits the divisions that sold the transferred goods or services
with a portion of the net profit that another division or the firm gains from any further processing and
the final sale of the transferred goods or services. This policy could be used in the capacity control
for strategic alliances if additional to the assignment of the capacity to the partners in the alliance the
allocation of the revenue among the alliance partners should be considered (compare Sections 3.2.1 and
7.2.2). In this scenario, the capacity of the operating carrier could be allocated by means of the transfer
prices defined by the operating carrier. A portion of the revenue gained by the ticketing carrier could
be payed to the operating carrier to incentivize the operating carrier to set the transfer prices so that the
revenue of the alliance will be maximized. Since revenue allocation is a broad topic on its own, it is not
considered in this thesis. Therefore, the combination systems policy is not covering the determination
of the transfer prices in our application area.
The external market price for a good or service can be used as transfer price if the transferred product
can be sold in existing competitive and stable external markets (compare Baldenius et al., 1999). In his
early publication, Bierman (1959) describes that the market price could be determined by printed price
lists, invoices, or other evidence. According to Bierman (1959), determining the market price could
be a problem for the firm especially if the market price is different to the price on the price list, e.g.,
when purchasing an automobile. In some fields, there could be no market price after all. Consider our
application area, the capacity control for strategic alliances in the airline industry: Adopting the rev-
enue management instrument capacity control implies that there are several prices for the same product
charged on the market. Since each of the partner airlines (the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier)
offers tickets in two different booking classes to sell the seats that are available on the flight operated
by the operating carrier, in our example there are four different prices charged on the market by the
partner airlines. This raises the question: Which of the market prices should be employed to describe
the transfer prices? Since this question cannot be answered easily, there is no possibility to use market-
based transfer prices in our application area. However, the combined prices charged by the partners in
the strategic alliance give some information which can be used in our transfer price mechanism. This
will be described in detail in Section 7.2.
When transfer prices are determined through negotiations, literature refers to the pricing mechanism
as negotiated transfer pricing (compare Baldenius et al., 1999). Bierman (1959) suggests to use negoti-
ated transfer prices or a combination of market-based and negotiated transfer prices if the market-based
transfer price cannot be easily determined. There are other authors recommending negotiations to de-
termine transfer prices that maximize the revenue of the firm, compare Chalos and Haka (1990), Dean
(1955), Haake and Martini (2008), and Kaplan and Atkinson (1998), Chapter 9. However, a negotiation
process implicates some disadvantages which is why negotiations cannot be applied in any situation.
Cook (1955), e.g., points out that negotiations can be very time-consuming. Eccles (1985), Chapter 2,
supports this statement and adds that transfer price negotiations in corporations can be costly if the
negotiations take long. There are different reasons why negotiations can be time-consuming. If, for
instance, there is a huge amount of different goods or services for which transfer prices should be ne-
gotiated, the negotiation process would take too long to be applicable (compare Stone (1956)). Another
phenomenon can occur if the transfer prices often need to be revised: Since the transfer prices often have
to be modified after a revision, the negotiations could be an endless task (compare Stone, 1956). Consid-
ering strategic alliances, the partners within an alliance could negotiate the transfer prices to sell their
products to each other in order to maximize the expected revenue of the whole alliance. In our appli-
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cation area, the operating carrier and ticketing carrier could determine the option price and strike price
through negotiations. However, the transfer prices need to be revised whenever the parameters, the
demand forecasts for the flight and the prices of the tickets in the different booking classes, change. This
would often require new negotiations between the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier. Another
problem can occur since the number of products could get very large in terms of strategic alliances. If
the alliance in the airline industry operates flights on multiple flight legs and the partners within the al-
liance have to negotiate over all these flights, the negotiation process could take very long, even if there
are no flight networks (origin-destination pairs) considered. However, flights with similar parameters
(demand and ticket prices) can be pooled and jointly considered in the negotiation process which could
speed up the negotiations. Stone (1956) adds that the products for which the transfer prices have to be
negotiated can be grouped to overcome the disadvantage in the existence of a large amount of products.
If there is still a huge amount of flights or many revisions, negotiations without any other transfer price
mechanism that accelerates the negotiation process are not applicable in a strategic alliance, due to the
time consumption problem.
Early publications list negotiations to determine transfer prices as a method that is autonomous from
the other transfer price mechanisms (compare, e.g., Cook, 1955; Dean, 1955; Hirshleifer, 1956). Cook
(1955) assumes that the divisions can negotiate on transfer prices in the absence of any real market
conditions and, therefore, in the absence of a market price. However, the absence of any real market
conditions is not a necessary requirement to apply negotiations for the determination of the transfer
prices. This permits the combination of the negotiation process with other transfer price approaches.
Not only Bierman (1959), but also Eccles (1985), Chapter 2, argues that the negotiation mechanism can
be combined with a range of other basic transfer price methods. Since, in our application area, the
market prices charged by the partner airlines for a ticket in the different booking classes give some
evidence about the determination of the transfer prices, we decided to choose a method for determining
the optimal transfer prices that is a combination of market-based transfer prices and negotiated transfer
prices. This combined mechanism will be described in detail in Section 7.2.
There is another field of research that uses transfer payments: supply chain contracts. As we discussed
in Section 3.1, the capacity control problem in strategic alliances can be compared to the coordination
in a physical supply chain (compare Shumsky, 2006). As stated by Cachon (2003), the performance
of a supply chain depends on actions of the members in the supply chain. Since the supply chain
members primary interest is to reach their own objectives, this rational strategy often implicates a poor
performance of the overall supply chain. The same effect can be noticed analyzing decisions made by
partners within an alliance. For instance, if each partner airline within an alliance tries to maximize their
own expected revenue, the optimal alliance performance can suffer from this procedure. The partners
within the alliance need to be incentivized to make their decisions in order to optimize the objectives of
the whole alliance. An improved alliance performance benefits the alliance partners since the objectives
of the alliance partners are enhanced, respectively not declined, after revenue sharing. In the context of
supply chain management, the incentives for the partners in the supply chain to support the objectives
of the whole alliance can be defined in supply chain contracts. These incentives can be existent, e.g., in
terms of transfer payments. Cachon (2003) discusses, among other things, the supply chain coordination
on basis of the newsvendor model. In this model, there is one supplier and one retailer. One selling
season is considered in which the demand is stochastic. Before the selling period starts, the retailer can
only once order inventory from the supplier (compare Silver et al., 1998, Section 10.2, for a discussion of
the newsvendor model). If we transfer this newsvendor setting to our alliance example, the operating
carrier relates to the supplier and the ticketing carrier to the retailer. We observe a single flight with
stochastic demand and the ticketing carrier can only once purchase options for seats before the booking
process begins. Cachon (2003) lists several different types of contracts to coordinate the inventory in
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the newsvendor problem and to divide the profit of the supply chain arbitrarily: buy-back contracts
(compare Pasternack, 1985), revenue-sharing contracts (compare Cachon and Lariviere, 2005), quantity-
flexibility contracts (compare Tsay, 1999), sales-rebate contracts (compare Taylor, 2002), and quantity-
discount contracts (compare Dolan, 1987).
As pointed out in Cachon (2003), the members in the supply chain follow a sequence of steps in a ne-
gotiation process in order to draw up the contract: Firstly, the supplier offers a contract to the retailer.
Secondly, the retailer decides whether to accept or to reject the contract. If the retailer accepts the con-
tract, the retailer hands the supplier an order quantity. Thirdly, before the selling season begins, the
supplier produces the order quantity and delivers it to the retailer. After the selling season, when the
season demand occurred, the fourth step takes place: Based upon the agreements as stipulated in the
contract, transfer payments are accomplished between the supplier and the retailer. However, if the
contract is rejected by the retailer in the second step, the negotiation process ends and each corporation
earns a default payoff.
Although the coordination of supply chains for physical goods by means of contracts shows similar-
ities to the capacity control within a strategic alliance, the determination of order quantities and the
transfer price calculations cannot be transferred to our application area. First of all, all contract concepts
mentioned above assume that all corporations combined in a supply chain possess the same information
when making their decisions. That means, the contract concepts assume full and symmetric information.
In his publication, Cachon (2003) mentions the problem of asymmetric information since corporations
with full information are rare in practice. To overcome this problem, he demonstrates, in addition to the
coordination of the actions of the corporations within the supply chain by means of contracts, how the
necessary information can be shared. This procedure, however, is not adaptable to our application area.
The assumption of asymmetric information still needs to be sustained. The partners within a strategic
alliance cannot share their information, for instance, concerning the demand forecasts and flight ticket
prices of the airlines, due to antitrust law regulations (compare Section 3.1). According to Shumsky
(2006), the idea of supply chain contracts to coordinate the seat capacity within an airline alliance is
applicable if the information exchange is technically possible and legal under antitrust law. Since this
cannot be ensured in our application area, the seat capacity is controlled without supply chain contracts.
7.2 Determination of Optimal Transfer Prices
In this section, the interaction between the alliance partners to determine the optimal transfer prices
(option price and strike price) will be described. As mentioned before, the interaction of the partners
within an alliance can be considered as a negotiation process. This negotiation process will be explained
using our example from Section 4.2.2. We will consider an alliance with two airlines: one operating
carrier and one ticketing carrier.
7.2.1 Interaction Before, During, and After the Booking Process
The interaction between the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier can be divided into the interaction
before, during, and after the booking process. The interaction between the two airlines before and
during the booking processes does not change compared to the procedures introduced in the previous
chapters. However, the airlines start a negotiation process after the simulation of the booking process
concerning the option price and the strike price, since these prices are no longer assumed to be given
parameters. The negotiation process itself will be described in detail in Section 7.2.2.
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Figure 7.1: Interaction between OC and TC before, during, and after the booking process
Figure 7.1 shows the interaction between the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier.
The interaction before and during the booking process is equal to the interaction of the partner airlines
described in Section 4.2.1. To show the whole interaction process, we shortly repeat the interaction
between the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier before and during the booking process prior to
the detailed discussion of the carriers’ interaction after the simulation of the booking processes.
Before the booking process starts for a particular flight operated by the operating carrier, the operating
carrier calculates the booking limits for the operating carrier’s booking classes according to the deter-
ministic linear model (DLP) described in Section 4.2.2 with arbitrary transfer prices. The operating
carrier furthermore decides how many options to sell to the ticketing carrier. After the calculations, the
operating carrier communicates the number of options that is available for sale, the option price, and the
strike price to the ticketing carrier. Thereafter, the ticketing carrier determines how many options to buy
from the operating carrier by means of the deterministic model described in Section 4.2.2. The number of
options the ticketing carrier buys ranges from zero to the number of options the operating carrier offers
to the ticketing carrier. We decided to calculate the booking limits by means of the DLP models instead of
the EMSR heuristics since the performance of the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach
is superior when the booking limits are determined using the DLP models (compare Section 4.3.2 and
Section 5.3.2). To consider the total capacity, the calculated booking limits are updated by means of
Procedure 1 (compare Section 4.2.2) since the results of the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA
approach improve using Procedure 1 instead of Procedure 2 (compare Section 4.3.2 and Section 5.3.2).
Before the booking process, the ticketing carrier pays the option price per seat to the operating carrier to
reserve the seats by using real options. During the booking process, the ticketing carrier can sell a ticket
for a seat in the aircraft of the operating carrier by exercising an option and paying the strike price to
the operating carrier. If the demand for tickets within one of the ticketing carrier’s classes is less than
assumed, some of the options the ticketing carrier purchased from the operating carrier before the book-
ing process remain unexercised. To provide a form of re-optimization, the operating carrier has the right
to buy back options from the ticketing carrier during the booking process. By paying back the option
price to the ticketing carrier, the operating carrier can access the seats reserved for the ticketing carrier.
The operating carrier, however, only accesses seats reserved for the ticketing carrier if the revenue that
the operating carrier gains for accepting a seat request is greater than or equal to the strike price plus
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the option price. If the described procedure would not allow the buy-back possibility for the operating
carrier, the introduced method would be similar to a blocked seat allotment which holds the drawback
of being inflexible. We studied the performance of the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA
with and without buy-back opportunity in Section 4.3.2 and Section 5.3.2. Since the performance of the
procedures with buy-back opportunity was superior to the performance without the operating carrier’s
opportunity to buy back options, we include the buy-back possibility of the operating carrier during
the booking process in the procedures introduced in this chapter. After the booking process, the partner
airlines start their negotiation process to determine the optimal transfer prices. Therefore, the operating
carrier specifies varying transfer prices and communicates them to the ticketing carrier. Both airlines
determine their expected revenues according to the set transfer prices. The highest expected revenue of
the alliance specifies the optimal transfer prices. After the optimal transfer prices are determined, the
two airlines calculate their booking limits with the optimal transfer prices detected in the negotiation
process. The interaction process between the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier then restarts and
passes through the same steps as described before until a fixed number of iterations is reached.
To include the search for optimal transfer prices in the booking limit calculations introduced in the
previous chapters, the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach are expanded. We refer to
the option-based procedure with transfer price determination as option-based+prices approach and to
the OBP&SPSA method with transfer price optimization as OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure.
7.2.2 Negotiation Process
In this section, the negotiation process of the partner airlines within the alliance is described. Another
term for negotiation which is often used in literature is bargaining. Nieuwmeijer (1992), Chapter 2,
presents the difference in meaning between the two concepts, following the negotiation literature, al-
though many references use the terms as synonym: Negotiation is often described as the complete
negotiation process, beginning with the parties’ decision to negotiate and ending when the negotia-
tion outcome is implemented. Bargaining, however, is often characterized as the pure communication
process taking place within the negotiation process. The negotiation process for transfer price determi-
nation, described in this section, covers not only the communication process of the alliance partners,
but rather explains the entire negotiation process including the necessary preparations of the operat-
ing carrier prior to the communication process. Therefore, the transfer price determination process is
referred to as a negotiation process in the following. Beersma and De Dreu (2002) mention the two pri-
mary kinds of negotiation distinguished in negotiation theory: distributive negotiations and integrative
negotiations. In a distributive negotiation, the parties involved in a negotiation process compete over
the allocation of a fixed value. Since the value is fixed, the gain of an additional amount of value made
by one of the parties is made at the expense of at least one other party. In an integrative negotiation,
the parties seek to achieve maximum joint outcomes by integrative behaviors. These integrative behav-
iors include the exchange of information about the parties’ priorities and preferences and the creation
of value by different possible cooperation specifications. Integrative behavior is possible if the gain of
one party does not equal the losings of the other parties. The alliance partners do not compete over a
fixed revenue rather than negotiate over transfer prices to generate additional revenues for the alliance
which classifies the transfer price determination process in our application area as integrative negoti-
ation. For a broader overview of literature on negotiation theory we refer to Lewicki et al. (1999) and
Luecke (2003).
The game theory approach is one of the most important theoretical methods applied in negotiation re-
search (compare Nieuwmeijer, 1992, Chapter 3). Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Section 10.1, describe a
bargaining situation as follows: in order to achieve gainings, players must reach an agreement. The
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problem of how to share a fixed value (often referred to as cake of size 1) describes the standard exam-
ple of bargaining situations. Popular references describing this allocation problem in game theoretical
bargaining theory are Nash (1950), Nash (1953), and Rubinstein (1982). Nash (1950, 1953) describes a
combination of cooperative and non-cooperative approach on bargaining. In the bargaining model es-
tablished by Rubinstein (1982), offers and counteroffers are involved reflecting the dynamic process in
bargaining situations. However, as mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the revenue allocation problem is not
part of this research. By making use of cooperative game theory, the problem of how partners within
a strategic alliance share the alliance revenue realized after the booking process, can be faced. Çetiner
and Kimms (2009) present a mechanism which is based on the nucleolus solution concept from cooper-
ative game theory to find fair revenue proportions for airlines in strategic alliances with multiple flight
legs. As mentioned before, Wright et al. (2010) concentrate on price and revenue sharing mechanisms
to master revenue management decisions across airline alliances operating a flight network. Revenue
sharing rules are usually based on negotiated special prorate agreements (SPAs) in this application area
as pointed out by Wright et al. (2010). These SPAs involve fixed proration rates or transfer prices for
particular ODF combinations which are used to allocate the revenue of a flight to the airlines. By means
of the Nash equilibrium, the airline’s behavior under different prorate schemes is demonstrated. Non-
cooperative game theory tools are applied to satisfy the practical condition that airlines within an al-
liance cannot jointly coordinate their revenue management systems due to legal and technical reasons.
The authors assume that the airlines share full information. Wright et al. (2010) state that the revenue
management decisions made by the airlines within an alliance not only depend on the flight ticket price
paid by the passenger to the airlines but also depend on transfer prices paid by the alliance partners
among each other. The computational studies discussed before show that the results of the option-
based procedure, the OBP&SPSA method, and the genetic algorithm approaches depend on the defined
transfer prices.
Consider the calculation of the booking limits in the option-based approach and the OBP&SPSA proce-
dure: The booking limits of the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier, calculated by means of the
DLPs described in Section 4.2.2, differ depending on the choice of the transfer prices. Since the operat-
ing carrier considers the requests coming from the ticketing carrier as an additional booking class with
its own revenue, which is equal to the sum of option price and strike price, the order of the revenues
gained for a sold ticket in the booking classes of the operating carrier changes depending on the sum
of the transfer prices and, therefore, the nesting order of the booking classes of the operating carrier
differs. The ticketing carrier decides whether to offer tickets for a booking class or not depending on the
sum of the transfer prices. If the sum of the option price and strike price is higher than or equal to the
revenue the ticketing carrier gains by selling a ticket in a particular booking class, the ticketing carrier
is not selling tickets for that booking class. In that case, the ticketing carrier’s costs are higher than the
revenue the ticketing carrier gains for one sold ticket. Not only the calculated booking limits depend
on the definition of the transfer prices, but also some of the decisions made by the operating carrier and
the ticketing carrier during the booking processes. As described in Section 4.2.4, the operating carrier
checks if the remaining capacity in the aircraft is greater than the number of unused options the ticket-
ing carrier holds. If the remaining capacity is less than or equal to the number of options, the operating
carrier accepts the request if the revenue of the received request is greater than or equal to the option
price plus the strike price. The ticketing carrier only accepts requests during the booking process if the
revenue the ticketing carrier gains by accepting the request in the booking class is higher than the sum
of option price and strike price. Therefore, the decisions of the carriers whether to accept or to reject a
request in a particular booking class depend on the transfer prices.
It can be noticed that the revenue of the alliance calculated by means of the option-based procedure and
the OBP&SPSA approach does not change if the sum of option price and strike price is assumed to be
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within a certain interval. The transfer price intervals in which the calculated alliance revenue does not
change correspond to the intervals between the different flight ticket revenues of the considered booking
classes of the alliance partners.
We explain this statement by means of the following example considering that both carriers offer two
booking classes: Assume the revenue for one sold ticket in the operating carrier’s highest yielding book-
ing class (v11) to be 350e and the revenue for a ticket in the operating carrier’s second booking class (v21)
to be 100e. The ticketing carrier’s revenue for a sold ticket in the first booking class (v12) is 400e and for
the ticketing carrier’s lowest yielding booking class (v22) 150e. So, the flight ticket revenue sequence of
the booking classes of the partner airlines is: v12 > v11 > v22 > v21.
In this example, the changing booking limit calculations and decision making in the booking processes
of the two partner airlines within the alliance can be divided into five cases. Figure 7.2 shows the dif-
ferent transfer price scenarios and the corresponding nesting order of the booking classes of the partner
airlines in the example with four booking classes and five transfer price cases.
case
0
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 7.2: Case Differentiation with Four Booking Classes
Consider, for instance, the second case: The operating carrier’s nesting order for calculating the booking
limits is defined by: x + s > v11 > v21, i. e. bn+1,1 ≥ b11 ≥ b21. The operating carrier stops selling tickets
for both booking classes once the remaining capacity is equal to or smaller than the number of options
the ticketing carrier holds since the revenue the operating carrier gains if the ticketing carrier accepts
a request and exercises an option is higher than the flight ticket revenues of the operating carrier’s
booking classes. The ticketing carrier sells tickets for the higher, but not for the lower yielding booking
class since the sum of the transfer prices is lower than the revenue for an accepted request in the higher
yielding booking classes but higher than the flight ticket revenue in the lower yielding booking class of
the ticketing carrier (v22 < x + s < v12). This affects the calculation of the booking limits of the ticketing
carrier and the decisions made by the ticketing carrier during the booking process. In this case, the
booking limit of the first and the second booking class of the ticketing carrier is zero and the ticketing
carrier does not accept incoming requests for both booking classes during the booking process.
In our approach, the operating carrier needs to identify the intervals of the flight ticket revenues of the
partner airlines within the alliance: First, the flight ticket revenue of the booking classes of the partner
airlines is sorted in descending order, in our example: v12 > v11 > v22 > v21. And second, the following
intervals are arranged:
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Interval 1: ]v12,∞[
Interval 2: ]v11, v12[
Interval 3: ]v22, v11[
Interval 4: ]v21, v22[
Interval 5: ]v21, 0]
The endpoints of the intervals are, except for the right endpoint of Interval 5, excluded from the respec-
tive sets. The transfer price cases in which the sum of option price and strike price is defined to be equal
to one of the flight ticket revenues of the booking classes of the airlines do not have to be considered in
addition to the other transfer price cases. This is valid since the booking limit calculations and decision
making of the partner airlines corresponding to these transfer price cases are already considered in the
other intervals. However, the endpoints need to be excluded since additional cases in the transfer price
differentiation would have to be considered if the sum of option price and strike price could be defined
equal to the flight ticket revenues of the booking classes of the airlines. The additional cases are nec-
essary since the nesting orders of the booking classes and the decisions made by the alliance partners,
which correspond to the transfer price scenario in the interval in which the endpoint is defined equal
to the sum of the transfer prices, are not considered otherwise. If this happens, the optimality of the
determined transfer prices cannot be assured.
As long as the sum of option price and strike price is within one of the described intervals, neither the
nesting order of the booking classes of the airlines and, therefore, the calculated booking limits, nor
the decisions during the booking processes made by both of the carriers change. Consequently, the
alliance revenue calculated by means of the option-based+prices approach and the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure does not change.
The insight that the alliance revenue remains constant as long as the sum of the transfer prices is defined
within a certain flight ticket revenue interval helps to determine the optimal transfer prices in an effi-
cient way. The partners within the alliance do not have to check their expected revenues and the alliance
revenue according to all possible transfer price settings. This means, we do not have to search through
the entire solution space to determine the optimal transfer prices. Instead, the partner airlines can cal-
culate their expected revenue step by step each time assuming the sum of the transfer prices within
one of the different flight ticket revenue intervals. This procedure requires revenue calculations of the
airlines for each revenue interval. After the revenue calculations of the alliance partners, the results can
be compared to the determined highest alliance revenue and to the underlying transfer prices.
If the order of the flight ticket revenues of the booking classes of the alliance partners differs from the
one illustrated in the example, the described cases in the case differentiation change because the nesting
orders of the booking classes and the decisions made in the booking processes of the partner airlines
differ from the one discussed above. However, the number of intervals which have to be arranged stays
constant even if the flight ticket revenue structure of the booking classes changes. Generally, there are
n + 1 intervals if the alliance partners offer n booking classes with different flight ticket revenues. If
the different partner airlines offer booking classes with identical flight ticket revenues, the number of
intervals decreases by the number of booking classes with identical flight ticket revenues plus one.
After the operating carrier identified and declared the intervals for the transfer price scenarios, the
partner airlines start their negotiation process. In Figure 7.3 the negotiation process of the alliance part-
ners is displayed considering two airlines within the alliance. In the following, z denotes a transfer
price scenario in the case differentiation and n + 1 refers to the total number of transfer price scenarios
(z = 1, ..., n + 1).
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The negotiation process of the partner airlines can be implemented as an iterative process since the
operating carrier needs to set the sum of the transfer prices step by step according to all transfer price
scenarios. The operating carrier communicates n + 1 different option prices and strike prices to the
ticketing carrier and the partner airlines need to calculate and communicate their expected revenue in
all transfer price scenarios. Since the iterations correspond to the transfer price scenarios, we refer to the
iteration index as z just as to the transfer price scenarios.
OC?sets
transfer prices
TC?simulates
booking process
OC?simulates
booking process
option price
and strike price
sum of revenues calculated by the airlines
=?alliance revenue
alliance
revenue in????
greater than alliance
revenue in
save?alliance
revenue
YES
NO
YES
NO
STOP
Start
?
?
Figure 7.3: Negotiation Process of the Operating Carrier and the Ticketing Carrier
In the first iteration, in the beginning of the negotiation process, the operating carrier sets the transfer
prices so that the sum of the transfer prices lies in the interval of transfer price case scenario 1 (displayed
in Figure 7.3 as z = 1). After the operating carrier sets the transfer prices, they are communicated to
the ticketing carrier. The ticketing carrier and the operating carrier simulate their booking process as
described in Section 4.2.4 and calculate their respective expected revenue according to the fixed booking
limits (calculated before the negotiation process) and to the transfer prices set by the operating carrier.
After the ticketing carrier calculated the expected revenue, the ticketing carrier communicates to the
operating carrier the revenue that the ticketing carrier expects in this setting. The operating carrier
calculates the expected alliance revenue by accumulating the operating carrier’s and ticketing carrier’s
expected revenues. If the expected revenue of the alliance is greater than the expected revenue of the
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alliance in the previous iteration, the alliance revenue and the corresponding transfer prices are stored.
Since there is no previous iteration in the first iteration (z = 1) of the negotiation process, the expected
alliance revenue is compared to the expected alliance revenue that was calculated with arbitrary transfer
prices in the first step of the option-based+prices approach respectively the OBP&SPSA+Prices proce-
dure while determining the booking limits (compare Figure 7.4 respectively Figure 7.5). If the expected
alliance revenue is less than the expected alliance revenue in the previous iteration, the alliance revenue
of the present iteration is not considered any more. After the results of the iterations are compared, the
operating carrier checks if the current iteration index is equal to the total number of iterations (z = n+ 1).
If yes, the negotiation process stops since all transfer price sections are considered. If no, the operating
carrier sets the transfer prices so that the sum of the transfer prices lies in the interval of transfer price
scenario z + 1. After the negotiation process, when the operating carrier sets the sum of the transfer
prices according to all transfer price scenarios, the optimal transfer prices which maximize the expected
revenue of the alliance are determined. The partner airlines within the alliance recalculate their booking
limits with the optimal transfer prices as parameters after the negotiation process.
In a competitive world, the alliance partners normally do not share the information concerning their
prices of the tickets in the different booking classes. But, one can argue that the operating carrier can
monitor the flight ticket prices that the ticketing carrier requires on the market. Wright et al. (2010) state
that the Internet helps the airlines to monitor flight ticket fares offered by their competitors. Moreover,
the operating carrier does not have to know the exact flight ticket prices of the ticketing carrier. The
operating carrier needs to set the transfer prices so that their sum lies somewhere in the interval between
the different revenues for a sold ticket in the different booking classes since the alliance revenue does
not change as long as the sum of the transfer prices lies inside the considered interval. There is still an
improvement of the expected alliance revenue compared to the results of the option-based procedure
and the OBP&SPSA approach even if the operating carrier misses one of the intervals. However, the
optimality of the transfer prices can only be guaranteed if the expected alliance revenue is calculated for
all transfer price case scenarios.
To include the search for optimal transfer prices in the booking limit calculations, the option-based
procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach are expanded. Figure 7.4 shows the control flow of the option-
based+prices procedure. Firstly, the booking limits are calculated with arbitrary transfer prices by means
of the DLPs introduced in Section 4.2.2. Secondly, the calculated booking limits are fixed and the optimal
transfer prices are determined in the negotiation process (compare Figure 7.3). Thirdly, after the transfer
price optimization, the booking limits are recalculated using the DLPs with fixed transfer prices. The
second and third step are repeated until a predefined number of iterations is reached.
In the first step of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach, the booking limits of the two alliance partners
are calculated with arbitrary transfer prices using the DLP models introduced in Section 4.2.2. In the
second step, the determined booking limits are improved by means of the Simultaneous Perturbation
Stochastic Approximation method described in Section 5.2. After the booking limits are calculated and
improved, the airlines start the transfer price negotiation process. Once the optimal transfer prices are
determined, the booking limits are recalculated with the optimal transfer prices as parameters which
were determined in the negotiation process. This iterative process stops after a predefined number of
iterations. Figure 7.5 presents the control flow of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach.
It is adequate to consider the sum of the transfer prices in the negotiation process instead of considering
the option price and strike price separately since the revenue of the alliance is maximized. There is no
difference in the expected revenue of the alliance if the sum of the transfer prices is constant even if
the single prices change. This effect occurs since the option price and strike price are payments that
are only conducted between partners within the strategic alliance. Every payment between the partner
airlines increases the expected revenue of one of the partners but simultaneously decreases the expected
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Figure 7.4: Option-Based+Prices Procedure
revenue of another partner airline by the same amount. Therefore, the expected revenue of the alliance
is not affected.
Consideration of two prices, the option price and the strike price, is necessary in practice, because the
expected revenue of the alliance partners change if the option price and strike price differ although
the sum of the transfer prices stays constant. Consider a scenario in which the actual demand of both
carriers is much lower compared to the forecasted demand. In this scenario, the operating carrier and
the ticketing carrier both hold unsold tickets after the booking process. The ticketing carrier cannot re-
turn options to the operating carrier if the seats the ticketing carrier bought options for remain unsold.
Therefore, the option price payments of the ticketing carrier before the booking process actually increase
the expected revenue of the operating carrier as long as the operating carrier does not buy back the op-
tions during the booking process. In a scenario with very low demand a buy back, however, is unlikely.
Therefore, the expected demand of the operating carrier is higher if the option price increases compared
to a scenario in which the option price is lower, even if the sum of the transfer prices is constant. The
transfer prices influence the risk sharing of the alliance partners since the ticketing carrier bears a por-
tion of the risk for unsold tickets for seats in the operating carrier’s airplane by paying the option price
before the booking process. Due to the option price payments, the loss of profit in case of unsold seats
the ticketing carrier bought options for is divided among the alliance partners. So, if the option price is
high and the strike price is low, the ticketing carrier bears more risk for unsold seats the ticketing carrier
bought options for than in a setting in which the option price is low and the strike price is high. How-
ever, the ticketing carrier incorporates the option price and the strike price in the objective function of
the DLP to calculate the booking limits by subtracting the sum of the transfer prices from the expected
revenue of the ticketing carrier (compare Section 4.2.2). Therefore, the ticketing carrier determines the
same booking limits calculated with different option prices and strike prices as long as the sum of both
remains constant. This prevents that the ticketing carrier buys more options for seats than the forecasted
demand in a low option price setting.
As discussed in this section, the interaction between the partners within an alliance to determine the
optimal transfer prices can be considered as negotiation process. Since the operating carrier sets the
sum of the transfer prices within the intervals between the respective market prices, the transfer price
determination within a strategic alliance can be compared to the determination of negotiated marked-
based transfer prices.
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Figure 7.5: OBP&SPSA+Prices Procedure
7.3 Computational Study for the Option-Based Procedures with Trans-
fer Price Optimization
In the previous section, we described the control flow of the option-based+prices approach and the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure. We implemented both procedures in C++ and compared the results of
both approaches in a computational study.
Since the option-based+prices approach and the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure are extensions of the
option-based method and the OBP&SPSA approach introduced in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the basic
elements, calculating the booking limits and the simulation of the booking process, are identical. The
option-based+prices procedure and OBP&SPSA+Prices approach are implemented as follows (compare
Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5): First, the deterministic linear models introduced in Section 4.2.2 are solved in
both procedures to calculate the booking limits of the airline partners assuming an arbitrary option price
and strike price. We define the option price and the strike price to be 100 in the first iteration of both
procedures. The choice of the arbitrary transfer prices in the first iteration of the option-based+prices
procedure and OBP&SPSA+Prices approach is not critical to the revenue outcome of the procedures
since the booking limits first calculated with arbitrary transfer prices will be improved in the following
iterations. However, if the booking limits calculated in the first iteration are good, due to a proper choice
of the transfer prices, the iteration, in which the option-based+prices procedure and OBP&SPSA+Prices
method generate the highest revenue, is most likely lower than in a setting with poorly chosen transfer
prices. The results of our computational study show that the optimal transfer prices are quite low in
most of the considered instances. Since we have chosen the transfer prices to be rather high in the first
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iteration, the promising results of the procedures do not depend on a clever choice of the arbitrary trans-
fer prices. After the calculation of the booking limits, the programs pass the achieved booking limits to
the simulation. To determine the revenue obtained with the computed booking limits, the programs
simulate the booking processes of the two carriers according to the models outlined in Section 4.2.4. The
Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation principle discussed in Section 5.2 is implemented
in the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach to improve the calculated booking limits. The number of iterations
of the SPSA procedure is 100. This implies that the SPSA procedure tries to improve the booking lim-
its 100 times in the OBP&SPSA+Prices method. To determine the best transfer prices corresponding to
the best booking limits determined by the option-based+prices approach and the OBP&SPSA+Prices
method so far, the programs pass this booking limits to the method which describes the negotiation
process of the airline partners (compare Figure 7.3). Before the negotiation process starts, the operating
carrier sorts the flight ticket revenues of the booking classes offered by the alliance and determines the
revenue intervals as described in Section 7.2.2. In the negotiation process, also described in Section 7.2.2,
the partner airlines check their expected revenue in different transfer price scenarios and determine the
best transfer prices which are passed to the optimization models introduced in Section 4.2.2. A new
iteration starts and the DLPs use the determined transfer prices as parameters to calculate improved
booking limits according to the new transfer prices. To terminate the option-based+prices method and
the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure, we set the maximum allowable number of iterations to ten.
The following assumptions were already made in the previous computational studies. They remain con-
stant in the computational study of the option-based+prices approach and the OBP&SPSA+Prices pro-
cedure: In the optimization part, the booking limits for the operating carrier were calculated by means
of Procedure 1, which assigns the spare seats the ticketing carrier does not buy options for (if they exist)
to a class of the operating carrier. Procedure 1 was explicitly described in Section 4.2.2. We have chosen
Procedure 1 to calculate the booking limits of the operating carrier since the results of the option-based
approach and the OBP&SPSA procedure in the computational studies in Section 4.3.2 and Section 5.3.2
show that Procedure 1 generates the best results. Additionally, we need to make sure that the results of
the option-based+prices method and the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure are comparable to the results of
the option-based approach and the OBP&SPSA method. In the simulation part, the booking processes
of the airlines were simulated 5000 times in each iteration of the option-based+prices procedure and the
OBP&SPSA+Prices approach, taking the stochastic demand into account. The revenue measurements
achieved by the 5000 simulation replications are averaged. To approximate a non-stationary Poisson
process, the booking process of the alliance partners are divided in three time intervals with different
request arrival rates that are constant within a particular time interval. We used the random number
generator boost::random::ranlux64_base_01 (compare www.boost.org) to create random numbers for
the stochastic request arrivals. In the simulation, we used standard nesting to implement the nested
booking limits. The duration of the simulation accounts for 150 periods closing with the departure of
the airplane. We conducted the tests on an AMD Athlon(tm) 64X2 Dual Core Processor 4600+ 2.41 GHz
PC with 1,96 GB RAM running Windows XP.
As mentioned before, we refer to the alliance revenue in the computational study which is the sum of
the revenues of the two airlines since the goal of the introduced procedures is to maximize the combined
revenue of the alliance partners.
It can be noticed that the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure improved the results of the option-
based+prices approach in every considered instance. This effect already occurred in the comparison
of the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach in the computational study in Section
5.3.2. To show this effect, the results of the option-based+prices approach are compared to the re-
sults of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure in the following section. The performance of the introduced
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure is additionally compared to the results of a first-come-first-served ap-
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proach and the ex post optimal solutions (compare Section 4.3.1 for a description of the implementation
of the methods). Moreover, the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure are compared to the results
of the option-based method, the OBP&SPSA approach, a blocked seat allotment method, and a random
procedure. The implementation of the blocked seat allotment procedure and the random approach will
be described in the following.
Blocked Seat Allotment (BSA)
Boyd (1998) and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 3.7, describe the blocked seat allotment as a pro-
cedure in which the seat capacity on a considered flight is partitioned among the partner airlines within
the alliance. After partitioning the seat capacity, each partner airline is allowed to control the seats which
have been assigned to the airline individually. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004b), Section 3.7, state that in
a blocked seat allotment procedure the control of the seat capacity for two airlines on the considered
flight can be seen as if there were two fictional flights each holding one portion of the partitioned seat
capacity. The seat capacity of the different flights is individually controlled by the respective alliance
partner. According to Boyd (1998), different variations of blocked seat allotment procedures are con-
ceivable ranging from hard blocks to soft blocks. Considering hard blocks, the seat capacity allocated to
the partner airlines persists and does not change once the seat capacity is partitioned. In a blocked seat
allotment procedure with soft blocks, the partitioned seat capacity can be updated periodically in the
booking process.
We compare the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure with a blocked seat allotment method that
is conceived as follows: The operating carrier forecasts the expected demand for the operating carrier’s
booking classes. Depending on the sum, the operating carrier decides how many seats will be available
to the ticketing carrier. For example, if the expected demand for the operating carrier’s first booking
class (E[d11]) is 20 and the expected number of requests for the operating carrier’s second class (E[d21])
is 50, the operating carrier reserves a total of 70 (E[d11] + E[d21]) seats in the aircraft for the assumed
incoming demand for the operating carrier’s booking classes. Assuming the total seat capacity in the
operating carrier’s aircraft (C) to be 100, the operating carrier would make 30 (C − (E[d11] + E[d21]))
seats available for the ticketing carrier. The ticketing carrier on the other hand forecasts the expected de-
mand for the ticketing carrier’s booking classes. According to this forecast, the ticketing carrier decides
how many seats to access in the operating carrier’s aircraft. If the sum of the expected demand for the
ticketing carrier’s booking classes is equal to or higher than the seat capacity the operating carrier makes
available to the ticketing carrier (E[d12] + E[d22] ≥ C − (E[d11] + E[d21])), the ticketing carrier can only
access the seat capacity the operating carrier allocates to the ticketing carrier (C − (E[d11] + E[d21])). If
the sum of the expected demand for the ticketing carrier’s booking classes is lower than the seat ca-
pacity the operating carrier allocates to the ticketing carrier (E[d12] + E[d22] < C − (E[d11] + E[d21])),
this difference of seat capacity is not offered. After the seat capacity is partitioned and allocated to the
carriers, each partner airline individually determines its booking limits by means of the deterministic
linear model introduced, for instance, by Williamson (1992), Section 4.1, without underlying real options
according to the flight ticket revenues and the expected demand for the booking classes of the airlines.
During the booking process, the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier do not transfer seat capacity.
The decision whether or not to accept an incoming request is made independently by the considered
airlines according to booking limits and remaining seat capacity. The booking processes of the operat-
ing carrier and the ticketing carrier are simulated. An incoming request for a flight ticket in a booking
class of the airlines is accepted if the respective booking limit and the remaining seat capacity is greater
than zero. The remaining capacity and the booking limit of the booking class for which the request
occurred is decremented by one after accepting the request. The assumptions behind the simulations in
the blocked seat allotment procedure are the same that we defined above for the option-based+prices
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approach and the OBP&SPSA+Prices method.
Random Approach
To test if an approach, in which the booking limits are chosen randomly, achieves a similar perfor-
mance as the OBP&SPSA+Prices method, we implemented the random approach as described in the
following and compared the performance with the results of the booking limit calculations underlying
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure.
In the random approach, we choose the booking limits of the two airline partners randomly from a
defined interval. The booking limits in our random approach are uniformly distributed and can take a
random value from zero to the assumed total capacity in the aircraft of the operating carrier depending
on which capacity instance is assumed (U[0,C]). We simulate the booking process of the two airlines
to receive the revenue for the two airlines and the total revenue of the alliance according to randomly
chosen booking limits. In the simulations of the booking processes, a request for a flight ticket in a
booking class of the airlines is accepted if the respective booking limit and the remaining seat capacity
is greater than zero. After accepting the request, the booking limit of the booking class for which the
request occurred and the remaining capacity are decremented by one. The assumptions underlying the
simulations in the random approach are also the same that we defined above for the option-based+prices
approach and the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure.
The result of the option-based approach is the initial solution of the option-based+prices algorithm and
the result of the OBP&SPSA procedure is the initial solution of the OBP&SPSA+Prices algorithm. Con-
sequently, the solution of the option-based approach and the OBP&SPSA procedure is a lower bound
for the option-based+prices result and the OBP&SPSA+Prices result, respectively. An upper bound for
the option-based+prices algorithm and the OBP&SPSA+Prices result is the ex post optimal solution.
The run-time of the option-based+prices procedure to solve one of the considered instances is very
low, ranging from seven to 14 seconds. The OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure’s run-time depends on the
assumed demand and the defined capacity. To achieve the result for one instance, the OBP&SPSA+Prices
algorithm needs about 6.5 minutes in low demand settings considering the seat capacity to be 100 and
up to 13 minutes in instances with a higher seat capacity and higher total demand. Since the run-time
of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure is not critical regardless of which instance is considered, we do
not specify the run-time of the OBP&SPSA+Prices method for each single instance in the computational
study.
7.3.1 Test Bed for the Analysis of Option-Based Procedures with Transfer Price Op-
timization
Similar to the computational studies in the previous sections, we systematically varied the parameters
to monitor the performance of the option-based+prices approach and the OBP&SPSA+Prices method in
different instances. We assumed the total seat capacity C of the operating carrier to be 100, 120, or 150.
Table 7.1 shows the different revenue instances (revenue vjl for one ticket in booking class j of airline l)
underlying the computational study. As a third variation, the expected value of demand for tickets in
booking class j of airline l E[djl ] are varied in the different instances (compare Table A.1, Table A.2, Table
A.3, and Table A.4 in the Appendix A.1).
The test bed contains eight different revenue instances. Since the option-based+prices approach and
the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure determine the best option price and strike price for each instance,
the computational study no longer contains instances in which the option price and the strike price are
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Revenue Instance v11 v21 v12 v22
1 350 100 400 150
2 400 150 350 100
3 350 100 450 200
4 200 100 250 150
5 500 200 550 250
6 550 250 500 200
7 500 400 200 100
8 200 100 500 400
Table 7.1: Revenue Instances
parameters. The revenue instances still ensure that it is more profitable for the airlines to sell a ticket in
their first than in the second class although the gap between the revenues of the different classes of the
two airlines changes.
Once more, we assumed the expected value of total demand for flight tickets in all booking classes of
both airlines to be 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40% higher than the specified capacity, that means the demand
intensity varies between 1.1 and 1.4. In each demand scenario, capturing the total demand for all book-
ing classes, we assumed different demand instances varying in the demand for the booking classes of
the airlines. Considering the demand for one airline, the demand for the expensive tickets is lower than
the demand for the cheaper ones in every demand instance. We still assumed that there is no revenue
management problem if the capacity is equal to or higher than the demand (compare Klein, 2005, Sec-
tion 6.2.2). However, to test the performance of the introduced option-based+prices procedure and the
OBP&SPSA+Prices method in a low demand setting, we analyzed the performence of the approaches in
demand instances in which the total demand is 90% of the capacity in Section 7.3.2.1 (Table 7.6).
To compare the results of the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach with the introduced
OBP&SPSA+Prices method, only the revenue instances 1, 2, 3, and 4 can be considered. In the computa-
tional studies analyzing the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach, the instances in the
test bed contain the four revenue instances 1, 2, 3, and 4 and each of the revenue instances is varied by
means of four price instances since the transfer prices are treated as parameters in both procedures. In
the first section of the current computational study (Section 7.3.2.1), the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure in the different capacity, demand, and revenue instances are compared to the results of the
option-based method and the OBP&SPSA approach in the different capacity, demand, and revenue in-
stances aggregated over the price instances. E.g., if the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure in
the instance with seat capacity 100, revenue instance 1, and demand scenario 110 is compared to the
results achieved by the option-based method and the OBP&SPSA approach, the solutions of these two
approaches in the instance with 100 considered seats, revenue instance 1, and demand scenario 110 have
to be aggregated over all price instances (a, b, c, and d).
7.3.2 Evaluation of the Option-Based Procedures with Transfer Price Optimization
In the following analysis of the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices method, the computational study is
split in tree sections: In Section 7.3.2.1, revenue instances 1 through 4 are considered (compare Table
7.1) to be able to analyze the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach compared to the results of the
option-based method and the OBP&SPSA approach. Section 7.3.2.2 considers all revenue instances 1
through 8 (compare Table 7.1) to offer a broader test bed for the computational study of the option-
based+prices approach and the OBP&SPSA+Prices method. In Section 7.3.2.3, the transfer price opti-
mization is combined with the genetic algorithm versions introduced in Chapter 6. The performance of
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the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach is compared to the performance of the genetic algorithms approaches
also considering transfer price optimization.
The percentage gaps between the optimal values of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure and the option-
based+prices approach (OBP+Prices), the OBP&SPSA method, the option-based procedure (OBP), the
first-come-first-served approach (FCFS), the ex post optimal solution (ex post), the blocked seat allot-
ment procedure (BSA), and the random approach (random) are computed by means of formula 6.2 to
compare the different procedures with each other in Section 7.3.2.1 and Section 7.3.2.2.
Table 7.2 shows the procedures which are compared in the following two sections and the respective
gap assignment.
gap Procedure1 Procedure2
gap15 OBP&SPSA+Prices OBP+Prices
gap16 OBP&SPSA+Prices OBP&SPSA
gap17 OBP&SPSA+Prices OBP
gap18 OBP&SPSA+Prices FCFS
gap19 ex post OBP&SPSA+Prices
gap20 OBP&SPSA+Prices BSA
gap21 OBP&SPSA+Prices Random
Table 7.2: Compared Procedures in Computational Survey Section 7.3.2.1 and Section 7.3.2.2
7.3.2.1 Comparison of Procedures (Revenue Instances 1–4)
Recall that we only consider revenue instances 1 through 4 in this section. If results based on all instances
are mentioned in this section, the results are aggregated over all capacity and demand instances and the
revenue instances 1 through 4.
The revenue generated by the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach over all capacity, demand, and revenue
instances is 5.71 % higher than the results gained by the OBP+Prices method, 4.71% higher than the
revenue calculated by the OBP&SPSA procedure, and 10.27% higher than the revenue achieved by the
option-based procedure in the considered price instances (compare Table 4.5). The improvement com-
pared to the first-come-first-served method is even more significant: The OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure
achieves an expected revenue that is 16.13% higher than the revenue generated by the FCFS approach
over all instances. Considering the ex post optimal solution, the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices ap-
proach are closer to the ex post optimal solutions than the results of the option-based procedure or
the OBP&SPSA approach. The ex post optimal solution is only 4.33% higher than the result of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices approach, aggregated over all capacity, demand, and revenue instances. Over all
instances, the expected revenue generated by the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure is 8.12% higher than the
results achieved by means of the blocked seat allotment method and 16.02% higher than the results of
the random approach.
Table 7.3 shows the results aggregated over all demand and revenue instances in one capacity instance.
The OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure determines better results than the OBP+Prices approach and the
OBP&SPSA method in all three capacity settings. The results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure ex-
ceed the results of the option-based procedure and the results of the FCFS approach even more in all of
the capacity settings. The gap between the ex post optimal solutions and the OBP&SPSA+Prices results
(gap19) is small, although the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure still do not reach the ex post
optimal solutions. It can be noticed that gap16 and gap17 decrease as the capacity scales up, although
the performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure improves as the capacity increases compared to
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the FCFS solutions. The results of the OBP&SPSA procedure and the option-based method increase
faster than the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure as the capacity grows which explains the
shrinking of gap16 and gap17. We identify the same outcome, studying the revenue calculated by the
OBP&SPSA+Prices approach, as we recognized while analyzing the results of the OBP&SPSA proce-
dure: Compared to the FCFS method, the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach performs better in instances
with higher capacity since the solution space expands if a higher seat capacity is considered.
Comparing the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure with the results of the blocked seat allotment
method shows that the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure performs considerably better than the blocked
seat allotment method in all capacity instances. The same outcome can be noticed in the comparison
of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure with the random approach. The results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure exceed the results of the random approach even more. In Section 7.3.2.2, the results of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure will be compared to the results of the blocked seat allotment procedure
and the random approach again with additional underlying revenue instances. This comparison shows
that the blocked seat allotment procedure and the random approach perform even worse if other ticket
revenues are tested. So, the inferior performance of the blocked seat allotment method and the random
approach in the observation in this section is not up to the selection of the revenue instances.
Capacity gap15 gap16 gap17 gap18 gap19 gap20 gap21
100 6.08 5.65 11.91 14.38 5.03 9.36 17.40
120 4.17 4.68 10.19 15.97 4.32 8.17 15.29
150 6.90 3.84 8.78 17.96 3.67 6.88 15.43
Table 7.3: OBP&SPSA+Prices – Results Aggregated over Demand and Revenue Instances
Table 7.4 presents the revenue per seat in the capacity instances. The OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure out-
performs the other approaches especially in instances in which the seat capacity is assumed to be low
(except for the OBP+Prices approach and the FCFS procedure). The revenue per seat results also show
this effect even for the FCFS algorithm (compare Table 7.4).
Capacity gap15/C gap16/C gap17/C gap18/C gap19/C gap20/C gap21/C
100 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.17
120 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.13
150 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.10
Table 7.4: OBP&SPSA+Prices – Results Aggregated over Demand and Revenue Instances Per Seat
To evaluate the estimated revenue according to the demand variations, we fixed the capacity and the
demand scenarios and aggregated the computed results over all revenue instances in a first observation.
Table 7.5 lists the aggregated results for the seat capacity which is assumed to be 100, 120, and 150.
Scenario 110 (demand in %), for instance, shows the average revenue aggregated over the demand
instances assuming the total demand to be 110% of the capacity in the considered capacity settings.
The OBP&SPSA+Prices method improves the results of the OBP+Prices approach, the OBP&SPSA pro-
cedure, and the option-based approach in all demand settings. Especially in low demand settings, the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure enhances the results of the OBP&SPSA method and even more the results
of the option-based approach. In instances with low demand, the assignment of poor transfer prices
causes that the capacity control with booking limits in the OBP&SPSA method and the option-based
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Capacity Demand in % gap15 gap16 gap17 gap18 gap19 gap20 gap21
100 110 5.13 9.60 13.37 2.66 4.10 4.85 22.45
120 6.81 6.66 12.12 8.83 5.26 7.63 12.56
130 8.79 4.61 11.70 17.37 5.45 10.78 15.42
140 6.54 3.29 10.97 26.85 5.17 13.51 19.94
120 110 4.74 8.07 11.65 2.55 3.71 4.33 16.50
120 4.43 5.08 10.10 11.55 4.61 6.51 9.46
130 5.22 3.57 9.41 19.97 4.68 9.21 15.18
140 4.72 2.85 9.88 29.80 4.30 12.63 20.02
150 110 3.02 6.19 9.31 4.34 3.39 2.84 10.04
120 5.90 4.28 8.67 12.33 3.82 5.41 12.73
130 8.15 2.94 8.26 22.72 3.80 7.97 17.94
140 10.75 2.42 8.95 32.46 3.68 11.29 21.00
Table 7.5: OBP&SPSA+Prices – Results Aggregated over Revenue Instances
approach is sometimes inferior to an uncontrolled booking process, e.g., in a first-come-first-served
manner. Due to the stochastic demand, the possibility of the demand being less than the capacity is
higher in low total demand instances than in demand settings with greater total demand which makes
it more profitable to accept all incoming requests than reserve seats for higher yielding requests. Deter-
mining the optimal transfer prices in the OBP&SPSA+Prices induces the calculation of superior booking
limits which reduces the drawback of the capacity control with booking limits in low demand settings.
This effect can also be seen in the comparison of the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure with
the results of the FCFS approach. The OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure performs better than the FCFS
approach in all capacity and demand instances even in settings with low total demand. Especially in in-
stances with high demand, the superior performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure compared to
the FCFS approach is noticeable. Due to the inferior performance of the OBP&SPSA approach and par-
ticularly the option-based method in the low total demand settings, the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure exceed the results of the two procedures especially in the instances with the underlying as-
sumption of low total demand. The gap between the ex post optimal solutions and the results of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure (gap19) is small ranging from 3.39% to 5.45%.
The performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure is also superior to the performance of the blocked
seat allotment method and the random approach in all capacity and demand instances. Gap18 and gap20
increase as the total demand scales up. In these cases (identical to the analysis of the OBP&SPSA method
and the option-based approach), the solution space increases and it is advantageous to reserve seat ca-
pacity for higher yielding booking classes through booking limits. The results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure compared to the random approach vary. Only in capacity instance 150, gap21 scales up as the
demand increases. In the other capacity instances, the results do not follow a pattern. The reason is the
random specification of the booking limits in the random approach.
Although the performance of the OBP+Prices method and especially the performance of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices approach is satisfying even in instances with low total demand, we want to show
the performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure in a demand setting in which the total demand
is 90% of the capacity. We calculated the expected revenue for the 13 demand instances, introduced in
Table A.4 in the Appendix A.1.
Table 7.6 shows the results for the seat capacity being 100, 120, and 150. The average revenue of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices approach over all 13 demand instances and four revenue instances (compare Table
7.1) is equal to the revenue generated by the FCFS approach in almost all capacity instances. Only in the
instances with seat capacity 100, the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure are slightly inferior to
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Capacity Demand in % gap15 gap16 gap17 gap18 gap19 gap20 gap21
100 90 6.94 13.46 19.74 -0.01 0.41 5.12 26.82
120 90 6.72 12.20 18.14 0.00 0.23 4.54 16.03
150 90 6.22 10.87 16.28 0.00 0.14 3.60 13.94
Table 7.6: OBP&SPSA+Prices – Results Aggregated over Revenue Instances in Instances with Demand
Intensity 0.9
the FCFS solutions. The gap between the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach and the ex post opti-
mal solutions (gap19) is now very small. Since the solution space of the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
method expands as the considered capacity increases, the solutions of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure
and the ex post optimal solutions come close together as the capacity increases. The performance of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure is superior to the performance of the OBP+Prices method, the OBP&SPSA
procedure, the option-based approach, the blocked seat allotment method, the random approach and
nearly equal to the FCFS procedure in all capacity settings. The gaps between the aggregated expected
revenue achieved by the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach and the solutions of the other procedures (ex-
cept for the FCFS approach), however, are higher in the low capacity settings compared to the instances
with a higher capacity. This can be reduced to the fact that the performance of the procedures which
are compared to the OBP&SPSA+Prices method increases in instances with a higher capacity due to an
expanded solution space.
In the results of all capacity, demand, and revenue instances, considered in the instances with the de-
mand being 90% of the capacity, the optimal determined sum of option price and strike price is smaller
than the lowest price for a flight ticket charged by the airlines in the considered booking classes. In
this computational study, the lowest ticket price is equal to 100 in all revenue instances, only differing
whether the operating carrier charges the lowest price in the second booking class or the ticketing car-
rier charges the lowest price of the alliance in the second booking class. Due to the determined optimal
transfer prices, the OBP&SPSA+Prices method proceeds almost like a FCFS procedure in the instances
in which we assumed the total demand to be 90% of the capacity. Because of the low expected demand,
the alliance partners define the sum of the transfer prices so that as many as possible requests can be
accepted. By setting the sum of the transfer prices lower than the smallest price for a flight ticket in the
considered booking classes, the ticketing carrier accepts all incoming requests, as long as the booking
limit of the respective booking class and the remaining seat capacity is greater than zero. The ticketing
carrier does not reject incoming requests because the sum of the transfer prices, the costs of the ticketing
carrier, does not exceed the revenue the ticketing carrier gains in selling tickets in a booking class. The
same counts for the operating carrier: Since the sum of the transfer prices is lower than the smallest
ticket price charged by the operating carrier, the operating carrier accepts all incoming requests, as long
as the booking limit and the remaining seat capacity is greater than zero. The operating carrier buys back
options from the ticketing carrier once the remaining seat capacity is equal to the number of options the
ticketing carrier holds if the operating carrier can sell tickets in either of the booking classes. Differences
to the proceeding of the FCFS approach can occur in the OBP&SPSA+Prices method if the booking
limit of at least one of the considered booking classes is zero during the booking process and, therefore,
incoming requests are declined by the alliance partners. However, the booking limits determined by
means of the OBP&SPSA+Prices method are not causing a poor performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure. The results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure aggregated over all demand and revenue
instances are almost equal to the results determined by means of the FCFS approach which was iden-
tified in the previous computational studies as the best approach to control the capacity in demand
settings with the demand being 90% of the capacity. Comparing the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
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method to the results of the blocked seat allotment approach and the ones determined by the random
approach shows that the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach performs better than the blocked seat allotment
and much better than the random method in all capacity settings. Although we assume that capacity
control methods are generally applied in scenarios in which the demand exceeds the capacity, the in-
sight of the results achieved by the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure in the instances in which the demand
is only 90% of the capacity shows that the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure is also applicable if the demand
is unexpectedly low.
Figure 7.6 presents the performance of the control procedures evaluated relative to the ex post optimal
solution in the different demand scenarios assuming the seat capacity to be 100. The revenues generated
by the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure are almost equal to the ex post optimal solutions if the demand in-
tensity is 0.9 and near the ex post optimal solutions (approximately 95%) in the other demand scenarios.
The OBP&SPSA+Prices method constantly produces the highest revenue compared to the other proce-
dures (except for the equal performance compared to the FCFS approach if the demand intensity is 0.9)
and outperforms the FCFS method even in instances with demand intensity 1.1. This is a significant
enhancement compared to the other methods which trail behind the FCFS approach in low demand
instances. The revenues produced by the FCFS method decrease considerably as the demand intensity
increases. Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 in the Appendix A.2 show similar revenue outcomes of the proce-
dures if the seat capacity is assumed to be 100 and 150, respectively.
Figure 7.6: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-4) – Performance of Procedures Relative to Ex Post Optimal Solutions,
C=120, Demand Scenarios
We fixed the capacity and revenue settings and aggregated the computed results over all demand in-
stances in a second survey to evaluate the effect of the revenue variation among the tested instances.
Table 7.7 presents the results for capacity 100, 120, and 150. The expected revenue gained from the
OBP&SPSA+Prices method is higher than the results of the OBP+Prices method, the OBP&SPSA pro-
cedure, the option-based approach, the FCFS procedure, the blocked seat allotment method, and the
random approach in all considered revenue instances. It is noticeable that especially in the third and in
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the fourth revenue scenario the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach improved the results of the option-based
approach, the OBP&SPSA procedure and the blocked seat allotment method.
The OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure performs much better than the random approach in all revenue in-
stances and capacity scenarios. Compared to the ex post optimal solutions, the OBP&SPSA+Prices
method achieves results that are only marginal inferior.
Capacity Revenue Instance gap15 gap16 gap17 gap18 gap19 gap20 gap21
100 1 5.35 4.68 10.77 16.69 5.23 8.62 18.09
2 1.94 4.29 5.95 17.19 5.23 1.22 20.40
3 7.14 7.35 16.79 16.43 4.97 14.99 15.54
4 13.13 6.33 15.05 7.21 4.67 12.62 15.57
120 1 2.69 3.81 9.13 18.49 4.45 7.49 14.49
2 1.36 3.67 5.04 18.36 4.42 1.00 15.45
3 4.17 5.84 14.42 18.34 4.25 13.13 17.80
4 10.89 5.53 12.97 8.68 4.18 11.05 13.41
150 1 7.00 3.17 7.85 20.60 3.74 6.28 15.48
2 1.04 2.78 4.15 20.62 3.70 0.53 14.57
3 11.99 4.82 12.64 20.38 3.56 11.39 17.73
4 7.79 4.75 11.17 10.25 3.68 9.30 13.92
Table 7.7: OBP&SPSA+Prices – Results Aggregated over Demand Instances
In revenue instance 4, the gap between the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure and the FCFS
approach (gap18) is smaller than the gap between the two procedures in the other three revenue in-
stances. This effect can be noticed in all capacity scenarios. The fourth revenue instance differs from the
other three instances in the interval of the flight ticket revenues in the first and second booking classes
of the two considered airlines. The difference of the revenue in the carriers first and second booking
class is equal to 100 (v11 − v21, respectively v12 − v22). In the other revenue instances, this difference is
250. The OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure yields better in revenue instances with a larger gap between the
flight ticket revenue of the booking classes since it is more profitable to reserve seats in the aircraft for
the higher yielding booking classes.
In revenue instance 2, the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure in all capacity instances are sim-
ilar to the solutions of the blocked seat allotment approach compared to the other revenue instances.
Revenue instance 2 is, compared to the other three revenue scenarios, the only one in which the rev-
enue for one sold flight ticket in the operating carrier’s first booking class is higher than the revenue for
one sold flight ticket in the ticketing carrier’s first booking class (v11 > v12). The same applies for the
revenue for one sold flight ticket in the airlines second booking classes (v21 > v22). The examination of
the optimal transfer prices determined by the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure shows that the sum of the
transfer prices is lower than the smallest revenue charged by the ticketing carrier for a flight ticket in the
second booking class in all considered demand instances (x + s < v22). This means that the operating
carrier allows the ticketing carrier to access only the capacity the operating carrier does not need to fulfill
the operating carrier’s demand. In other words, the operating carrier does not reserve capacity for the
ticketing carrier except for the capacity the operating carrier has to spare which is also not necessary in
this revenue instance for maximizing the revenue of the alliance since the operating carrier earns more
for a sold ticket in the booking classes compared to the ticketing carrier. Therefore, the booking limits
determined by the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure are similar to the ones calculated by the blocked seat
allotment which explains the similar performance of the two procedures. In the revenue instances in
which the revenues for the flight tickets in the operating carrier’s booking classes are lower than the
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ones achieved by the ticketing carrier (v11 < v12 and v21 < v22), the negotiations of the alliance partners
lead to a sum of the transfer prices which is at least higher than the revenue the operating carrier gains
in the second booking class in most of the demand and capacity instances. This choice of the transfer
prices affects the calculation of the booking limits. Since the operating carrier receives the sum of the
transfer prices from the ticketing carrier which is often higher than at least one of the operating carrier’s
booking class revenues, the operating carrier does now reserve seat capacity for the ticketing carrier’s
demand beyond the capacity the operating carrier has to spare. This reservation of seat capacity is
advantageous to the blocked seat allotment method in which the operating carrier has no incentive to
reserve capacity for the ticketing carrier beyond the capacity the operating carrier has to spare even if
this increases the revenue of the alliance. Of course, in this discussion the expected demand also plays
a role. If the demand for the ticketing carrier’s booking classes is very low, the ticketing carrier does not
ask for many seat capacity of the operating carrier which is why the sum of the transfer prices is less than
the operating carrier’s flight ticket revenue in the second booking class in these instances. In the compu-
tational study of revenue instances 1 through 8 (compare Section 7.3.2.2), we will see that a different gap
between the revenue charged by the operating carrier and the revenue charged by the ticketing carrier
does not strongly affect the outcome of the blocked seat allotment approach and the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure in the revenue instances in which the operating carrier gains more than the ticketing carrier
for a sold flight ticket in the booking classes of the operating carrier. Although the performance of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure compared to the blocked seat allotment method depends on the revenue
instance, it can be noticed that the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure are always higher than
the results of the blocked seat allotment method in all considered instances. The superior performance
of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure even in revenue instance 2 can be explained due to the fact that
the booking limits are always filled up to the seat capacity. That means that the sum of the partitioned
booking limits calculated for the partner airlines is not unequal to the total seat capacity. In the blocked
seat allotment procedure, however, the sum of the calculated booking limits of the alliance partners
can be less than the seat capacity which generates a lower alliance revenue due to unused seat capac-
ity in the aircraft after the booking process. Moreover, the buy back possibility is advantageous in the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure compared to the static blocked seat allotment method.
In Figure 7.7, the performance of the control procedures evaluated relative to the ex post optimal solu-
tion in the different revenue scenarios assuming the seat capacity to be 120 is presented. The revenues
achieved by the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure and the OBP&SPSA method are less sensitive to the dif-
ferent revenue scenarios than the other procedures. In all revenue instances, the OBP&SPSA+Prices
approach produces the highest revenue compared to the other methods. Figure A.3 and Figure A.4 in
the Appendix A.2 show similar revenue outcomes of the procedures with seat capacity assumed to be
100 and 150, respectively.
In an additional study, we analyze in which transfer price instance (a, b, c, or d) the solutions of
the option-based method and the OBP&SPSA approach differ most and least from the results of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure in the different capacity, demand, revenue, and price instances. As men-
tioned before, the results of the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach discussed in the
study presented in this section are aggregated over all transfer price scenarios. The above-mentioned
analysis of the results verifies that the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure improved the aggregated results
of the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach in all capacity, demand, and revenue
instances. Comparing the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure in one capacity, demand, and
revenue instance with the results of the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach in one
capacity, demand, revenue, and a particular transfer price instance shows that the gaps between the
results of the procedures are very different in the single transfer price instances which are considered
(compare Table 7.8). Observe, e.g., the results in capacity instance 100, revenue instance 3, and de-
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Figure 7.7: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-4) – Performance of Procedures Relative to Ex Post Optimal Solutions,
C=120, Revenue Scenarios
mand instance 110: In transfer price scenario a, the gap between the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach and
the OBP&SPSA procedure (gap16) is 2.33% whereas gap16 is 46.72% in transfer price scenario d. In
revenue instance 3 and price instance a, the sum of the transfer prices equals 190. So, the sum of the
transfer prices lies within the interval between the flight ticket revenue of the ticketing carrier’s second
booking class and the revenue for one sold flight ticket in the operating carrier’s second booking class
(v22 > x + s > v21). The OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure determined the optimal sum of the transfer
prices to lie in the interval between the flight ticket revenue of the operating carrier’s second booking
class and zero (v21 > x + s > 0) or in the interval between the revenue for one flight ticket in the tick-
eting carrier’s second booking class and the flight ticket revenue in the lowest yielding booking class
of the operating carrier (v22 > x + s > v21), depending on the respective demand instance in revenue
scenario 3 and demand scenario 110. In most instances, the sum of the transfer prices is equal to 199
which is in the same interval (v22 > 199 > v21) as the sum of the transfer prices in price instance a.
This explains that the compared procedures perform similarly in capacity instance 100, demand sce-
nario 110, revenue instance 3, and price instance a. The exceptions in which the optimal sum of transfer
prices is between v21 and zero in the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure in revenue scenario 3 and demand
scenario 110 explain why the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure are not equal to the results of
the OBP&SPSA approach. In revenue instance 3, the sum of the transfer prices is equal to 270 in price
scenario d. This means that the sum of the transfer prices lies in the interval between the revenue of one
flight ticket in the operating carrier’s highest yielding booking class and the flight ticket revenue in the
ticketing carrier’s second booking class (v11 > 270 > v22). In this case, the ticketing carrier rejects all
requests for flight tickets in the second booking class. This seems to be inferior in capacity instance 100,
revenue instance 3, and demand instance 110 which explains the inferior performance of the procedures
without transfer price optimization in price instance d compared to price instance a. The comparison of
the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach results with the results of the option-based procedure (gap17) shows
that gap17 is higher than gap16 in all price instances since the results of the option-based procedure
102
7.3 Computational Study for the Option-Based Procedures with Transfer Price Optimization
are inferior to the results of the option-based procedure with booking limit improvement by means of
SPSA. In price instance d, gap17 is very high compared to the other price instances. This supports the
argumentation mentioned already in the consideration of gap16: In capacity instance 100, revenue in-
stance 3, and demand scenario 110, the results of the option-based procedure and OBP&SPSA approach
in price instance a, b, and c are inferior to the performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach, however,
the results are not that poor compared to the results of the procedures in price instance d.
In other settings, compare, e.g., capacity instance 120, revenue instance 2, and demand scenario 110,
gap16 and gap17 are high in three of four price instances. This means that there is only a small possibility
that the airlines within the alliance choose transfer prices which improve the performance of the option-
based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach without transfer price optimization. In capacity instance
120, revenue instance 2, demand scenario 110, and price instance a, the performance of the OBP&SPSA
approach is equivalent to the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure. In revenue instance 2 and
price instance a, the sum of the transfer prices is 90. The OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure determined the
optimal sum of the transfer prices in this setting to lie in the interval between the flight ticket revenue
of the ticketing carriers’s second booking class and zero (v22 > x + s > 0) in all demand instances.
Therefore, the results of the two procedures are identical.
Table A.5, Table A.6, and Table A.7 in the Appendix A.2 show the performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
approach compared to the results of the option-based procedure and OBP&SPSA approach in all capac-
ity, revenue, demand, and price instances.
Capacity Revenue Demand Price gap16 gap17
100 3 110 a 2.33 4.38
b 3.06 8.07
c 3.06 8.07
d 46.72 50.16
120 2 110 a 0.00 1.66
b 13.22 14.42
c 13.22 14.42
d 13.23 14.42
Table 7.8: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-4) – Results in Specific Price Scenario Compared to Results with Transfer
Price Optimization
In the following section, the performance of the option-based+prices approach and the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure considering all revenue instances (1 through 8) introduced in Section 7.3.1
will be analyzed.
7.3.2.2 Comparison of Procedures (Revenue Instances 1–8)
In this section, we consider revenue instances 1 through 8 to analyze the outcome of the
option-based+prices approach and the performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure in a broader
way. The results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach are now compared to the results of the option-
based+prices method (gap15), the FCFS algorithm (gap18), the ex post optimal solutions (gap19), the
blocked seat allotment method (gap20), and the random approach (gap21). Recall that the performance
of the option-based+prices approach and the OBP&SPSA+Prices method is not compared to the results
of the option-based procedure and the OBP&SPSA approach since revenue instances 5 through 8 are
considered which are not included in the computational study of the option-based procedure and the
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OBP&SPSA approach. If we mention in this section that the results are based on all instances, the results
are aggregated over all capacity and demand instances and all revenue instances (1 through 8).
The revenue generated by the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach over all capacity, demand, and revenue
instances is 7.28% higher than the performance of the option-based+prices procedure, 14.45% higher
than the revenue calculated by the FCFS procedure and only 4.03% lower than outcome achieved by the
ex post optimal solutions. Over all instances, the expected revenue according to the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure is 10.16% higher than the results achieved by means of the blocked seat allotment method.
The improvement according to the random approach is even more significant: The OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure achieves an expected revenue that is 18.27% higher than the revenue generated by the random
approach over all instances.
Table 7.9 shows the achieved results aggregated over all demand and revenue instances for each capacity
instance. The results determined by the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure are higher than the results of the
option-based+prices approach, the FCFS method, the blocked seat allotment procedure, and the random
approach in all capacity settings if all revenue instances (1 through 8) are considered. This shows that
the good performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure discussed in the previous section (Section
7.3.2.1) is not an output of cleverly chosen revenue instances. The performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure is also good if other revenue instances are considered as it is the case in the computational
study discussed in this section.
The gap between the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure and the FCFS approach (gap18) is still very high, but
not as high as if only revenue instances 1 through 4 are considered (compare Table 7.3) like in the anal-
ysis shown in the previous section (compare Section 7.3.2.1). In the computational study in the present
section, the same effect can be identified, studying the revenue calculated by the OBP&SPSA+Prices
approach, as we noticed while discussing the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure in revenue
instances 1 through 4: Since the solution space expands if a higher seat capacity is considered, the gap
between the results of the ex post optimal solutions and the performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices ap-
proach (gap19) decreases with higher total capacity. The aggregated revenue in the ex post optimal
solutions is only slightly superior to the aggregated expected revenue gained by the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure in all capacity instances.
Capacity gap15 gap18 gap19 gap20 gap21
100 8.34 12.92 4.64 11.62 20.38
120 5.04 14.27 4.01 10.21 17.57
150 8.50 16.10 3.47 8.70 16.96
Table 7.9: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-8) – Results Aggregated over Demand and Revenue Instances
Table 7.10 presents the revenue per seat aggregated over all demand and revenue instances for each
capacity instance. The revenue per seat of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure is, compared to the other
approaches, higher in instances in which the seat capacity is assumed to be low, except for the revenue
comparison of the option-based+price approach with the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure (gap15).
In a first observation, we fixed the demand and aggregated the computed results over all revenue in-
stances to see how the estimated revenue values behave according to demand variations. Table 7.11
shows the results aggregated over all revenue instances for the seat capacity assumed to be 100, 120,
and 150.
Considering all revenue instances, the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure still performs better than the FCFS
approach in all demand and capacity instances even in the low demand settings. The superior per-
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Capacity gap15/C gap18/C gap19/C gap20/C gap21/C
100 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.12 0.20
120 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.15
150 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.11
Table 7.10: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-8) – Results Aggregated over Demand and Revenue Instances Per Seat
formance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure compared to the FCFS approach, especially in instances
with high demand, is noticeable. However, the gap between the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure and
the FCFS approach (gap18) is slightly smaller than gap18 calculated in the previous section. In some
of the revenue instances that are additionally considered in this section (revenue instances 5 through
8), the FCFS method performance is superior to the performance of the FCFS approach in revenue in-
stances 1 through 4. Nevertheless, considering only revenue instances 5 through 8, the results of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure still exceed the FCFS results (gap18=12.78%) over all capacity and de-
mand instances. The gap between the ex post optimal solutions and the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure (gap19) is smaller than in the analysis of revenue instances 1 through 4, ranging from 3.31 to
5.05.
The performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure is superior to the results of the blocked seat al-
lotment method and the random approach in all capacity and demand settings considering revenue
instances 1 through 8 in contrast to the analysis of revenue settings 1 through 4. Since the solution space
increases as the total demand scales up, it is advantageous to reserve seat capacity for higher yielding
booking classes through booking limits especially in the high total demand settings. The increase of
gap18 and gap20 supports this insight. There is no trend of the performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure compared to the random approach (gap21) while the considered demand increases recogniz-
able. Due to the random specification of the booking limits in the random approach, the results do not
follow a pattern.
Capacity Demand in % gap15 gap18 gap19 gap20 gap21
100 110 5.70 2.36 3.80 5.62 24.48
120 8.52 7.89 4.89 9.17 16.57
130 11.34 15.59 5.05 13.45 23.31
140 7.40 24.20 4.69 17.31 17.79
120 110 5.43 2.19 3.46 5.09 17.21
120 5.18 10.29 4.34 8.06 13.25
130 5.55 17.82 4.37 11.68 17.42
140 3.99 26.78 3.88 16.02 22.37
150 110 3.34 3.74 3.36 3.43 11.00
120 6.73 11.12 3.63 6.77 15.37
130 10.29 20.45 3.56 10.25 18.37
140 13.64 29.11 3.31 14.35 23.09
Table 7.11: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-8) – Results Aggregated over Revenue Instances
The performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach is additionally analyzed in a demand setting in
which the total demand is 90% of the capacity. Therefore, we calculated the expected revenue for the
demand instances, introduced in Table A.4 in the Appendix A.1, for each capacity and revenue scenario.
Table 7.12 shows the results for the seat capacity being 100, 120, and 150. In all capacity instances, the
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Capacity Demand in % gap15 gap18 gap19 gap20 gap21
100 90 6.77 0.00 0.37 5.37 24.49
120 90 6.58 0.00 0.21 4.80 19.14
150 90 6.16 0.00 0.13 3.86 19.15
Table 7.12: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-8) – Results Aggregated over Revenue Instances in Instances with
Demand Intensity 0.9
average revenue of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach over all demand and revenue instances is equal to
the revenue generated by the FCFS approach. The results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach and the ex
post optimal results are close to each other in all capacity instances. Similar to the results of the analysis
of revenue instances 1 through 4, the performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure is superior to the
performance of the option-based+prices approach, the blocked seat allotment method, and the random
approach in all capacity settings.
Also in the evaluation of revenue instances 1 through 8, considering instances with the demand being
90% of the capacity, the optimal determined sum of option price and strike price is smaller than the low-
est price for a flight ticket charged by the airlines in the considered booking classes. Since the expected
total demand is very low, the alliance partners define the sum of the transfer prices so that as many
requests as possible can be accepted. In instances in which the total demand is assumed to be 90% of
the capacity, the OBP&SPSA+Prices method proceeds similarly to a FCFS procedure, due to the deter-
mined optimal transfer prices. This effect could already be noticed in the analysis of revenue instances
1 through 4. Compare Section 7.3.2.1 for a detailed survey discussing this effect.
The performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure, the option-based+prices approach, the FCFS al-
gorithm, the blocked seat allotment method, and the random approach is evaluated relatively to the
ex post optimal solution. Figure 7.8 shows the performance of the control procedures in the different
demand scenarios assuming the seat capacity to be 120. The revenue results of the different proce-
dures are similar to the ones discussed in the previous section even though more revenue instances are
considered. The revenue achieved by the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach is almost equal to the ex post
optimal solution if the demand intensity is 0.9. In the other demand scenarios, the performance of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure is near the ex post optimal solutions. Even in the present study in with
revenue instances 5 through 8 are additionally considered, the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure achieves
the highest revenue in all demand instances compared to the other procedures. We present Figure A.5
and Figure A.6 in the Appendix A.2 which show that the performance of the approaches in capacity
settings 100 and 150 is similar to the one presented in Figure 7.8, except for the results of the random
approach.
To evaluate the effect of the revenue variation among the tested instances, we fixed the revenue and
aggregated the computed results over all demand instances in a second survey. In Table 7.13, the results
for the capacity being 100, 120, and 150 are presented. The results of the procedures in revenue instances
1 through 4 are equal to the results in the previous computational study and were already presented in
Section 7.3.2.1. However, we quote them again to compare and discuss the different results belonging
to all considered revenue instances. The expected revenue gained from the OBP&SPSA+Prices method
is higher than the results of the option-based+prices algorithm, the blocked seat allotment method, the
random approach, and the FCFS procedure in all considered revenue instances.
Considering all eight revenue instances, revenue instance 4 in all capacity scenarios is still the revenue
instance in which the gap between the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure and the FCFS ap-
proach (gap18) is smaller than the gap between the two procedures in all other revenue instances. In
revenue instance 4, 7, and 8, the interval of the flight ticket revenues in the first and second booking
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Figure 7.8: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-8) – Performance of Procedures Relative to Ex Post Optimal Solutions,
C=120, Demand Scenarios
classes of the two considered airlines is equal to 100 (v11 − v21, respectively v12 − v22). In the other rev-
enue instances, this difference is 250 or 300. The good performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure
compared to the FCFS approach in revenue instances with a larger gap between the ticket revenue of the
classes is explainable since in these instances it is more profitable to reserve seats in the aircraft for the
higher yielding booking classes. However, the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure compared to
the FCFS approach performance in revenue instances 7 and 8 show that the interval of the flight ticket
revenues in the first and second booking classes of the two considered airlines is not the only effect that
affects the outcome of the methods. As mentioned before, the difference of the flight ticket revenues
in the first and second booking classes of the operating carrier and the ticketing carrier is equal to 100,
identical to the difference in revenue instance 4. The gap between the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
procedure compared to the FCFS approach results, however, is in revenue instances 7 and 8 not notice-
ably smaller than in the other revenue instances. An explanation is that in revenue instances 7 and 8 the
gap between the flight ticket revenues in the booking classes of the operating carrier and the booking
classes of the ticketing carrier (v11 − v12, respectively v21 − v22) are very high compared to the gap in
revenue instance 4. Although the difference of the flight ticket revenues in the first and second book-
ing classes of the airlines is small, the reservation of seat capacity by means of booking limits in the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure pays off compared to the control without control variables in the FCFS
method since the flight ticket revenues of the airlines lie far apart.
It is noticeable that especially in revenue scenarios 3 and 4, the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach improved
the results of the blocked seat allotment method. Only in revenue instance 8, the gap between the results
of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure and the results of the blocked seat allotment approach (gap20) is
even higher. This is, however, significant in all capacity instances. In revenue instance 8, the flight ticket
revenues of the ticketing carrier’s booking classes are much higher than the revenues of the booking
classes of the operating carrier. In this case, the booking limits calculated by the blocked seat allotment
procedure are inferior compared to the ones calculated by the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure since the
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Capacity Revenue Instance gap15 gap18 gap19 gap20 gap21
100 1 5.35 16.69 5.23 8.62 18.09
2 1.94 17.19 5.23 1.22 20.40
3 7.14 16.43 4.97 14.99 15.54
4 13.13 7.21 4.69 12.62 15.57
5 6.25 10.35 5.06 6.93 12.02
6 2.92 10.72 5.13 2.21 12.08
7 2.69 13.95 3.20 2.57 41.51
8 27.32 10.80 3.60 43.78 27.83
120 1 2.69 18.49 4.45 7.49 14.49
2 1.36 18.36 4.42 1.00 15.45
3 4.17 18.34 4.25 13.13 17.80
4 10.89 8.68 4.18 11.05 13.41
5 4.17 11.93 4.43 5.89 10.94
6 2.10 11.99 4.43 1.73 15.28
7 2.23 13.71 2.67 2.20 32.56
8 12.68 12.66 3.28 39.19 20.60
150 1 7.00 20.60 3.74 6.28 15.48
2 1.04 20.62 3.70 0.53 14.57
3 11.99 20.38 3.56 11.39 17.73
4 7.79 10.25 3.68 9.30 13.92
5 3.19 13.86 3.80 4.65 9.88
6 1.54 13.95 3.80 0.90 17.80
7 1.70 15.31 2.33 1.67 24.75
8 32.23 13.87 3.11 34.87 21.51
Table 7.13: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-8) – Results Aggregated over Demand Instances
blocked seat allotment procedure does not take the much higher revenue the ticketing carrier gains by
selling a flight ticket in one of the ticketing carrier’s booking classes into account. In revenue scenarios
2, 6, and 7, the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure are superior to the results of the blocked
seat allotment procedure but similar to the solutions of the blocked seat allotment approach compared
to the other revenue instances. This applies for all capacity instances. Compared to the other revenue
scenarios, revenue scenarios 2, 6, and 7 are the revenue settings in which the flight ticket revenue for
one sold ticket in the operating carrier’s first booking class is higher than the revenue for one sold ticket
in the ticketing carrier’s first booking class (v11 > v12). The same applies for the revenue for one sold
flight ticket in the alliance partner airline’s second booking classes (v21 > v22).
The analysis of the optimal transfer prices determined by the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure shows that
apart from a few exceptions, the optimal option prices and strike prices remain constant in revenue in-
stances 2, 6, and 7 in all capacity and demand instances while in revenue instances 1, 3, 4, 5, and 8, the
optimal option prices and strike prices differ depending on the capacity and demand setting. In rev-
enue instances 2, 6, and 7, the sum of the transfer prices is lower than the smallest revenue charged by
the partner airlines for a flight ticket in all considered capacity and demand instances, apart from very
few exceptions. Therefore, the operating carrier does not reserve capacity for the ticketing carrier in the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure except for the capacity the operating carrier has to spare. For maximizing
the revenue of the alliance this is not necessary in revenue instance 2, 6, and 7 since the operating carrier
earns more from a sold ticket in one of the booking classes compared to the ticketing carrier. Due to this
effect, the booking limits determined by the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure are similar to the ones cal-
culated by the blocked seat allotment which explains the similar performance of the two procedures in
revenue instances 2, 6, and 7. The superior performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure compared
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to the results of the blocked seat allotment approach in revenue instances in which the revenues for the
flight tickets in the operating carrier’s booking classes are lower than the ones achieved by the ticketing
carrier (v11 < v12 and v21 < v22) can be explained as follows: The negotiations of the alliance partners
concerning the definition of the optimal transfer prices lead to a sum of transfer prices which is at least
higher than the revenue the operating carrier gains in the second booking class in most of the demand
and capacity instances. The operating carrier, therefore, reserves seat capacity for the ticketing carrier’s
demand beyond the capacity the operating carrier has to spare since the operating carrier receives the
sum of the transfer prices from the ticketing carrier which is often higher than at least one of the oper-
ating carrier’s booking class revenues. This reservation of seat capacity is advantageous to the blocked
seat allotment method in the respective revenue instances.
The gap between the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure and the results of the blocked seat al-
lotment approach is only slightly higher in revenue instance 7 than in revenue instances 2 and 6. This
leads to the conjecture that the gap between the flight ticket revenue charged by the operating carrier
and the flight ticket revenue charged by the ticketing carrier only marginally affects the outcome of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure compared to the blocked seat allotment method. In revenue instance 7,
the gap between the flight ticket revenue charged by the operating carrier and the flight ticket revenue
gained by the ticketing carrier for a sold ticket in the booking classes is higher than in revenue instances
2 and 6. Concluding this discussion, it can be observed that the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices proce-
dure are always higher than the results of the blocked seat allotment method even in revenue instances 2,
6, and 7. The booking limits are always filled up to the seat capacity in the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure
which explains the superior performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach compared to the blocked
seat allotment method. In the blocked seat allotment procedure, the sum of the calculated booking limits
of the alliance partners can be less than the seat capacity. This generates a lower alliance revenue due to
unused seat capacity in the aircraft after the booking process. Moreover, compared to the static blocked
seat allotment method, the buy back possibility is advantageous in the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure.
In all revenue instances and capacity scenarios, the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure performs a lot better
than the random approach. The OBP&SPSA+Prices method achieves results that are only marginally
inferior compared to the ex post optimal solutions. Due to an expanded solution space, the results
of the OBP&SPSA+Prices method approach towards the ex post optimal solutions as the seat capacity
increases. This effect was already recognizable in the previous computational studies.
Figure 7.9 shows the control procedures and their performance evaluated relatively to the ex post op-
timal solution in the different revenue scenarios in seat capacity instance 120. The performance of
the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure is less sensitive to the different revenue scenarios and is superior
to the performance of the other procedures in all eight revenue instances. Especially the outcome of
the blocked seat allotment approach which is extremely sensitive according to the respective revenue
instance can be noticed in Figure 7.9. In the Appendix A.2, Figure A.7 and Figure A.8 show the revenue
outcome of the procedures in seat capacity instances 100 and 150 which are similar to the ones shown in
Figure 7.9. As the considered seat capacity increases, the performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices proce-
dure and the blocked seat allotment method improve slightly towards the ex post optimal solutions.
7.3.2.3 Comparison of Procedures to Genetic Algorithm Procedures (Revenue Instances 1–8)
The genetic algorithm versions, introduced in Section 6.1, are enlarged by the transfer price optimization
presented in Section 7.2 to compare the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach to an heuristic ap-
proach combined with transfer price optimization. In the following, we refer to Genetic Algorithm 1 and
Genetic Algorithm 2 with included transfer price optimization as GA1+Prices approach and GA2+Prices
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Figure 7.9: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-8) – Performance of Procedures Relative to Ex Post Optimal Solutions,
C=120, Revenue Scenarios
procedure, respectively. The procedure of GA1+Prices and GA2+Prices only differs in the varying geno-
types. Compare Section 6.1 for a description of these genotypes. In the first step of the GA1+Prices
method and the GA2+Prices procedure, the genetic algorithm approaches determine the best booking
limit set with arbitrary transfer prices according to the procedure outlined in Section 6.1. In the sec-
ond step, the best determined booking limits are fixed and the optimal transfer prices are calculated
by means of the procedure shown in Figure 7.3. In the third step, the optimal transfer prices are fixed
and the booking limits are calculated with the fixed transfer prices by means of the procedure of Ge-
netic Algorithm 1 and Genetic Algorithm 2 described in Section 6.1. This process is iteratively repeated
until a predefined number of iterations is reached. With regard to the run-time of the procedures, the
GA1+Prices method and the GA2+Prices approach terminate after ten transfer price optimization itera-
tions. The number of iterations applied for the booking limit improvement within the genetic algorithm
part of the procedure are 15 iterations and, therefore, remains the same as described in Section 6.2.1.
In the present section, the percentage gap between the optimal values of the GA1+Prices procedure
and the GA2+Prices approach, the option-based+prices procedure (OBP+Prices), the OBP&SPSA+Prices
method, the first-come-first-served approach (FCFS), and the ex post optimal solution (ex post) is com-
puted by Formula 6.2. Table 7.14 shows the procedures which are compared in the computational study
of the genetic algorithms with transfer price optimization and the respective gap assignment.
In the computational study presented in this section, the revenue results of the considered procedures
are calculated for all revenue instances (1-8), introduced in Section 7.3.1. The run-times of the ge-
netic algorithm approaches with transfer price optimization are high compared to the run-time of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices approach. To calculate the best solution for a specific instance, the GA1+Prices pro-
cedure needs 17.6 minutes in low capacity/low demand instances and up to 37.4 minutes in high capac-
ity/high demand scenarios. Similar to this, the run-time of the GA2+Prices method ranges from 17.7
minutes to 49.2 minutes for solving a considered instance. The GA2+Prices approach needs to handle
strings that are larger compared to the strings in the GA1+Prices approach. This different definition
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gap Procedure1 Procedure2
gap22 GA1+Prices GA2+Prices
gap23 GA1+Prices OBP&SPSA+Prices
gap24 GA1+Prices OBP+Prices
gap25 GA1+Prices FCFS
gap26 ex post GA1+Prices
gap27 GA1+Prices BSA
gap28 GA1+Prices Random
gap29 GA2+Prices OBP&SPSA+Prices
gap30 GA2+Prices OBP+Prices
gap31 GA2+Prices FCFS
gap32 ex post GA2+Prices
gap33 GA2+Prices BSA
gap34 GA2+Prices Random
Table 7.14: Compared Procedures in Computational Study GA1+Prices and GA2+Prices
of the individuals in the genetic algorithm part of the procedures explains the run-time increase of the
GA2+Prices approach compared to the run-time of the GA1+Prices algorithm.
The results of the procedures aggregated over all capacity, demand, and revenue instances are presented
in Table 7.15 and Table 7.16. Similarly to the performance of Genetic Algorithm 1 that is better than the
performance of Genetic Algorithm 2 (compare Section 6.2.2), the results of the GA1+Prices method ex-
ceed the results of the GA2+Prices approach. However, aggregated over all considered instances, both
genetic approaches with transfer price optimization perform better than all compared procedures except
for the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach.
gap22 gap23 gap24 gap25 gap26 gap27 gap28
all instances 0.84 -0.03 7.25 14.41 4.07 10.12 18.24
Table 7.15: GA1+Prices – Results Aggregated over Capacity, Demand, and Revenue Instances
gap29 gap30 gap31 gap32 gap33 gap34
all instances -0.83 6.39 13.50 4.93 9.26 17.18
Table 7.16: GA2+Prices – Results Aggregated over Capacity, Demand, and Revenue Instances
In Table 7.17 and Table 7.18, the results of the procedures aggregated over all demand and revenue
instances are presented. The results of the GA1+Prices method and the GA2+Prices procedure approach
as the capacity increases. The expanded solution space one again causes that the gaps between the ex
post optimal solutions and the results of the genetic algorithm methods with transfer price optimization
decrease when the total capacity increases.
The effect of total demand variation on the compared procedures can be identified in Table 7.19 and Ta-
ble 7.20. In all demand instances assuming the capacity to be 100 and in demand instances 100 and 120
in capacity instance 150, the GA1+Prices approach performs slightly better than the OBP&SPSA+Prices
method. The results of the GA2+Prices approach, however, are inferior to the results of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure in all considered instances. Especially in the instances with higher to-
tal demand, both genetic algorithms with transfer price optimization outperform the FCFS approach
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Capacity gap22 gap23 gap24 gap25 gap26 gap27 gap28
100 1.23 -0.04 8.29 12.87 4.68 11.57 20.33
120 0.74 -0.04 4.99 14.22 4.06 10.17 17.52
150 0.54 -0.01 8.49 16.09 3.48 8.69 16.94
Table 7.17: GA1+Prices – Results Aggregated over Demand and Revenue Instances
Capacity gap29 gap30 gap31 gap32 gap33 gap34
100 -1.22 7.03 11.56 5.97 10.30 18.73
120 -0.76 4.25 13.40 4.83 9.40 16.60
150 -0.54 7.93 15.45 4.03 8.13 16.27
Table 7.18: GA2+Prices – Results Aggregated over Demand and Revenue Instances
and the blocked seat allotment procedure. As mentioned before, the reservation of seat capacity for
higher yielding booking classes by means of promising booking limits pays off, particularly in scenarios
with high total demand.
Capacity Demand in % gap22 gap23 gap24 gap25 gap26 gap27 gap28
100 110 1.54 0.04 5.66 2.32 3.84 5.58 24.43
120 1.26 0.07 8.45 7.82 4.97 9.10 16.49
130 1.06 0.03 11.30 15.55 5.08 13.41 23.27
140 1.12 0.03 7.37 24.16 4.72 17.28 17.75
120 110 0.75 -0.03 5.39 2.15 3.50 5.05 17.18
120 0.50 -0.06 5.24 9.33 4.32 6.10 14.16
130 0.70 -0.04 5.51 17.78 4.41 11.64 17.38
140 1.10 -0.04 3.95 26.74 3.92 15.98 22.33
150 110 0.32 0.09 3.43 3.82 3.27 3.52 11.11
120 0.27 0.08 5.05 10.30 3.65 4.98 15.64
130 0.56 -0.02 10.26 20.42 3.59 10.22 18.34
140 1.06 -0.06 13.59 29.04 3.37 14.29 23.02
Table 7.19: GA1+Prices – Results Aggregated over Revenue Instances
Comparing the procedures in the demand setting in which the total demand is 90% of the capacity re-
veals that the results of the GA1+Prices approach are almost equal to the results of the OBP&SPSA+Prices
method (gap23 = 0.007) and the FCFS procedure results (gap25 = 0.006). In the analysis of the perfor-
mance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach, we already noticed that the OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure
and the FCFS approach perform almost equally in demand instances in which the total demand is 90%
of the capacity (compare Section 7.3.2.1). Since the simulation, introduced in Section 4.2.4, is applied in
the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach as well as in both genetic algorithm versions with transfer price opti-
mization, the decision processes of the carriers only differ in the booking limits which are applied after
their determination by means of the DLPs and the SPSA approach and the genetic algorithm versions,
respectively. However, the booking limits determined by the GA1+Prices approach are superior to the
ones established by the GA2+Prices procedure which is expressed by the inferior performance of the
GA2+Prices approach compared to the GA1+Prices method and the FCFS algorithm. Both genetic algo-
rithm versions with transfer price optimization approach towards the ex post optimal solutions as the
total capacity increases.
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Capacity Demand in % gap29 gap30 gap31 gap32 gap33 gap34
100 110 -1.53 4.06 0.80 5.43 3.99 22.35
120 -1.27 7.15 6.54 6.28 7.80 14.84
130 -1.04 10.19 14.40 6.19 12.31 21.81
140 -1.09 6.25 22.85 5.88 16.13 16.48
120 110 -0.76 4.62 1.41 4.27 4.28 16.30
120 -0 54 4.73 8.81 4.83 5.59 13.56
130 -0 71 4.81 16.99 5.14 10.93 16.56
140 -1.08 2.88 25.42 5.05 14.83 20.83
150 110 -0.22 3.10 3.50 3.59 3.20 10.76
120 -0.18 4.78 10.01 3.93 4.70 15.30
130 -0.56 9.70 19.78 4.16 9.66 17.63
140 -1.07 12.46 27.75 4.45 13.17 21.68
Table 7.20: GA2+Prices – Results Aggregated over Revenue Instances
Capacity Demand in % gap22 gap23 gap24 gap25 gap26 gap27 gap28
100 90 4.34 0.00 6.78 0.00 0.36 5.38 24.50
120 90 3.08 0.00 6.59 0.00 0.20 4.81 19.14
150 90 1.28 0.00 6.16 0.00 0.13 3.86 19.15
Table 7.21: GA1+Prices – Results Aggregated over Revenue Instances in Instances with Demand Inten-
sity 0.9
After analyzing the effect of demand variations on the results of the considered approaches, the effect
of different revenue instances is surveyed in the present computational study. The GA2+Prices results
are inferior to the ones achieved by the GA1+Prices procedure and to the results of the OBP&SPSA
method in all capacity and revenue instances. In capacity instance 100, the GA1+Prices method per-
forms slightly better than the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach in all revenue instances. This also applies for
revenue instance 8 in capacity instance 150. Especially in revenue instances 8, the GA1+Prices approach
and the GA2+Prices procedure clearly outperform the blocked seat allotment method. The results of the
OBP&SPSA+Prices procedure also exceed the results of the blocked seat allotment method especially in
revenue scenario 8 as displayed in Section 7.3.2.2. The same argument, as discussed while explaining
the better performance of the OBP&SPSA+Prices approach compared to the blocked seat allotment al-
gorithm, can be stated discussing the results of the genetic algorithms with transfer price optimization:
The blocked seat allotment ignores the flight ticket revenue of the ticketing carrier that is much higher
than the revenue the operating carrier achieves in revenue instance 8.
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Capacity Demand in % gap29 gap30 gap31 gap32 gap33 gap34
100 90 -4.07 2.43 -4.07 4.72 1.07 19.41
120 90 -2.93 3.46 -2.93 3.28 1.72 15.56
150 90 -1.26 4.82 -1.26 1.41 2.55 17.62
Table 7.22: GA2+Prices – Results Aggregated over Revenue Instances in Instances with Demand Inten-
sity 0.9
Capacity Revenue Instance gap22 gap23 gap24 gap25 gap26 gap27 gap28
100 1 0.36 0.08 5.26 16.60 5.32 8.53 17.99
2 1.36 0.03 1.90 17.15 5.26 1.19 20.37
3 0.47 0.06 7.08 16.37 5.03 14.93 15.48
4 0.90 0.07 13.05 7.14 4.76 12.55 15.49
5 0.45 0.07 6.17 10.27 5.14 6.85 11.93
6 1.13 0.01 2.91 10.70 5.14 2.20 12.07
7 4.21 0.02 2.68 13.93 3.22 2.56 41.49
8 0.98 0.01 27.30 10.79 3.61 43.77 27.82
120 1 0.12 -0.09 2.59 18.39 4.54 7.39 14.39
2 0.82 -0.03 1.33 18.33 4.45 0.97 15.42
3 0.22 -0.06 4.11 18.27 4.31 13.06 17.73
4 0.38 -0.06 10.82 8.62 4.24 10.99 13.35
5 0.13 -0.05 4.12 11.88 4.49 5.84 10.88
6 0.62 -0.02 2.08 11.97 4.44 1.71 15.26
7 3.11 -0.02 2.21 13.68 2.69 2.18 32.53
8 0.54 -0.01 12.67 12.66 3.29 39.18 20.59
150 1 0.08 -0.06 6.94 20.53 3.80 6.21 15.42
2 0.53 -0.06 0.99 20.54 3.76 0.48 14.50
3 0.15 -0.05 11.93 20.32 3.62 11.34 17.67
4 0.10 -0.04 7.74 10.20 3.73 9.25 13.87
5 0.04 -0.06 2.50 13.79 3.87 4.58 9.81
6 0.36 -0.02 1.42 13.93 3.82 0.88 17.78
7 2.61 -0.05 1.65 15.24 2.38 1.62 24.69
8 0.47 0.26 34.76 14.13 2.84 35.14 21.82
Table 7.23: GA1+Prices – Results Aggregated over Demand Instances
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Capacity Revenue Instance gap29 gap30 gap31 gap32 gap33 gap34
100 1 -0.43 4.89 16.23 5.69 8.15 17.54
2 -1.35 0.55 15.64 6.70 -0.15 18.78
3 -0.52 6.57 15.86 5.53 14.40 14.94
4 -0.94 12.07 6.24 5.70 11.57 14.38
5 -0.51 5.70 9.81 5.60 6.38 11.44
6 -1.11 1.77 9.52 6.33 1.07 10.78
7 -3.92 -1.34 9.45 7.55 -1.46 35.48
8 -0.97 26.02 9.76 4.63 42.46 26.50
120 1 -0.21 2.47 18.25 4.67 7.26 14.25
2 -0.83 0.52 17.35 5.31 0.16 14.46
3 -0.28 3.88 18.02 4.55 12.81 17.48
4 -0.43 10.42 8.23 4.64 10.59 12.90
5 -0.18 3.98 11.74 4.63 5.70 10.74
6 -0.63 1.45 11.29 5.09 1.09 14.54
7 -2.96 -0.80 10.25 5.88 -0.83 28.50
8 -0.54 12.08 12.06 3.85 38.44 19.90
150 1 -0.14 6.85 20.42 3.89 6.12 15.35
2 -0.58 0.46 19.89 4.31 -0.05 13.88
3 -0.20 11.75 20.12 3.78 11.16 17.49
4 -0.14 7.63 10.10 3.83 9.15 13.76
5 -0.10 2.46 13.75 3.91 4.55 9.77
6 -0.38 1.05 13.50 4.20 0.51 17.36
7 -2.53 -0.87 12.28 5.04 -0.90 21.39
8 -0.20 34.08 13.58 3.32 34.48 21.22
Table 7.24: GA2+Prices – Results Aggregated over Demand Instances
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Research
The present work has concentrated on situations in which multiple corporations build a strategic al-
liance in sectors in which revenue management concepts are adopted. There are many problems that
arise when dealing with strategic alliances, however, the question of how to distribute the capacity
among the alliance partners plays an important role. In the present work, we have analyzed this prac-
tical problem and have developed capacity control methods to maximize the combined revenue of the
alliance partners. Although, strategic alliances arise in many sectors in which revenue management con-
cepts are adopted, we have focused on the passenger airline industry being the most important sector
in theory and practice in which revenue management is applied.
In Chapter 2, we have started with providing the theoretical background of revenue management. Espe-
cially topics that were essential for the understanding of the revenue management problems, discussed
in this thesis, have been outlined. After the description of the historical development of revenue man-
agement, the requirements to enable an effective revenue management application have been presented.
Additionally, we have discussed revenue management instruments focusing on the capacity control in-
strument. The deterministic linear program and the EMSR heuristics, being two of the most important
concepts for the determination of control variables in capacity control, have been described in detail in
Chapter 2. Capacity control problems that arise within strategic alliances are complex since not only the
capacity needs to be allocated to the different customer segments, but also needs to be divided among
the alliance partners. Therefore, we have chosen the deterministic linear program and EMSR heuristics
to calculate the booking limits in our approaches.
We have presented definitions and basic information concerning strategic alliances in Chapter 3. To
bring together the topics revenue management and strategic alliances, we have provided an overview
of sectors in which revenue management instruments can be applied and the influence strategic al-
liances have on capacity control decisions when strategic alliances arise in the specific sectors. Practical
examples of strategic alliances in the different industries have been mentioned in Chapter 3 as well.
The capacity control concepts for single corporations need to be enhanced to solve the complex decision
problems within strategic alliances arising in practice. In Chapter 4, we have introduced a real option
approach that helps to determine booking limits for the alliance partners. We have formulated an option-
based procedure to solve the capacity control problem which addresses the question of how many seats
should be available on a single flight leg to the booking classes of two partner airlines within an alliance.
Using real options, the partners within the alliance can reserve seats in a considered aircraft. The new
option-based approach helps the airlines to distribute the seat capacity before and during the booking
process in an effective way. This procedure overcomes the drawbacks of the capacity control methods
applied so far for strategic alliances by calculating booking limits for the alliance partners to reserve
117
Conclusions and Future Research
seat capacity for higher yielding booking classes and by allowing the partner airlines to switch their
assigned capacity during the booking process. To calculate the booking limits for the fare classes of the
two airlines, deterministic option-based models as well as EMSR-heuristics with underlying real option
idea have been proposed. We have presented simulation models, which account for the option-based
approach, to simulate the booking processes of the airlines. The results of the option-based procedure
have been compared to a first-come-first-served approach and to ex post optimal solutions. The com-
putational study shows that the option-based approach overcomes the drawback of a first-come-first-
served scenario (not reserving capacity for higher yielding classes and, therefore, accepting to many
lower yielding requests) in most of the considered instances.
To include the benefits of simulation-based optimization in the booking limit determination for strate-
gic alliances, we have implemented a stochastic approximation procedure in combination with our DLP
underlying option-based approach in Chapter 5 which improved the results of the option-based proce-
dures with DLPs, described in Chapter 4, towards the ex post optimal solutions.
In Chapter 6, we have introduced two problem specific genetic algorithm approaches to compare the
promising results of the option-based approach with booking limit determination by means of the DLPs
and combined stochastic approximation with the performance of an evolutionary heuristic with under-
lying real option idea. The results of the genetic algorithm approaches are slightly inferior to the results
achieved by the option-based stochastic approximation, introduced in Chapter 5.
The DLP underlying option-based approach combined with stochastic approximation, which has been
presented in Chapter 5, is a promising procedure for the distribution of the capacity among the cus-
tomer segments of the partners within an alliance. Unfortunately, the results of the proposed procedure
highly depend on the choice of the transfer prices which are treated as given parameters. In order to
improve the performance of the option- and DLP-based approach combined with stochastic approxima-
tion, we have presented an extension of the procedure which optimizes the transfer prices in addition to
the booking limit optimization in Chapter 7. The negotiation process between the two partner airlines
has been outlined, describing the determination of the optimal transfer prices. Furthermore, the prob-
lem specific genetic algorithm versions, introduced in Chapter 6, have been extended by the transfer
price optimization in Chapter 7. In a computational study, the performance of the discussed procedures
has been analyzed. The survey showed, that the results of the option-based approach with booking
limit calculation by means of DLPs and booking limit improvement by stochastic approximation and
transfer price optimization are very promising. Only in a few considered instances, one of the option-
based genetic algorithm approaches with transfer price optimization slightly enhanced the results of the
DLP underlying option-based procedure with stochastic approximation and transfer price optimization.
However, due to the run-time that is considerably higher for the genetic algorithm approaches than for
the option-based procedure with underlying DLPs and stochastic approximation, we recommend the
application of the option- and DLP-based procedure with booking limit improvement by stochastic
approximation and transfer price optimization to solve capacity control problems within strategic al-
liances. Due to its short run-time, the presented approach is applicable in revenue management systems
of airlines and can be easily adopted for real-world problems.
Since many real-world problems appear in a network revenue management setting, future work may
adjust the proposed procedures for the single-leg case to network revenue management problems. Fur-
thermore, our option approach for alliances could be extended to integrate customer-choice behavior in
future work. In this way, the more realistic case of the demand being dependent among the classes of the
alliance partners could be included within the analysis. The described alliance revenue management ca-
pacity control problem could also be regarded as a multi-objective optimization problem. The expected
revenues of the single airlines within the alliance could be considered as a vector of revenues, whereas a
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capacity control decision can increase the expected revenue of one airline while simultaneously decreas-
ing the expected revenue of the other airline. Moreover, future research may discuss the adoption of the
option-based concept to solve capacity control problems in non-airline service sectors. Additionally, the
option-based capacity control mechanism may be generalized to allow the consideration of more than
two partners within the alliance.
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Appendix A
Computational Studies
A.1 Computational Study: Demand Input Data
The tables in Appendix A.1 show the λ values for booking class j of airline l (described in Section 4.2.4)
in the different simulation sectors, demand instances, and capacity settings.
Demand Instance Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
booking class j, airline l 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2
1a 0.05 0.6 0.01 0.5 0.05 0.3 0.08 0.16 0.2 0.1 0.11 0.04
1b 0.01 0.8 0.01 0.6 0.09 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.2 0.06 0.16 0.02
1c 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.06 0.16 0.1 0.1 0.04 0.04
2 0.04 0.6 0.02 0.52 0.1 0.3 0.02 0.14 0.26 0.1 0.06 0.04
3 0.02 0.6 0.04 0.52 0.04 0.3 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.1 0.18 0.041.1
4 0.02 0.64 0.02 0.46 0.06 0.34 0.06 0.12 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.02
5 0.02 0.56 0.02 0.58 0.06 0.26 0.06 0.16 0.22 0.08 0.12 0.06
6 0.04 0.56 0.02 0.52 0.1 0.26 0.06 0.14 0.26 0.08 0.12 0.04
7 0.02 0.64 0.02 0.52 0.04 0.34 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.04
8 0.02 0.6 0.04 0.46 0.06 0.3 0.08 0.12 0.22 0.1 0.18 0.02
1 0.04 0.62 0.03 0.53 0.08 0.32 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.11 0.14 0.06
2 0.04 0.6 0.04 0.52 0.1 0.3 0.08 0.14 0.26 0.1 0.18 0.04
3 0.06 0.6 0.02 0.52 0.14 0.3 0.02 0.14 0.4 0.1 0.06 0.04
4 0.02 0.6 0.08 0.52 0.04 0.3 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.1 0.28 0.04
5 0.02 0.64 0.02 0.58 0.06 0.34 0.06 0.16 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.06
6 0.02 0.74 0.02 0.46 0.06 0.4 0.06 0.12 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.02
1.2 7 0.02 0.56 0.02 0.7 0.06 0.26 0.06 0.22 0.22 0.08 0.12 0.08
8 0.04 0.64 0.02 0.52 0.1 0.34 0.06 0.14 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.04
9 0.06 0.56 0.02 0.52 0.14 0.26 0.06 0.14 0.4 0.08 0.12 0.04
10 0.02 0.74 0.02 0.52 0.04 0.4 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.04
11 0.02 0.6 0.04 0.58 0.06 0.3 0.08 0.16 0.22 0.1 0.18 0.06
12 0.02 0.6 0.08 0.46 0.06 0.3 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.1 0.28 0.02
13 0.02 0.6 0.02 0.7 0.06 0.3 0.02 0.22 0.22 0.1 0.06 0.08
1 0.04 0.64 0.04 0.58 0.1 0.34 0.08 0.16 0.26 0.12 0.18 0.06
2 0.05 0.62 0.05 0.56 0.12 0.32 0.1 0.14 0.28 0.11 0.2 0.05
3 0.07 0.62 0.03 0.56 0.16 0.32 0.04 0.14 0.42 0.11 0.08 0.05
4 0.01 0.62 0.07 0.56 0.04 0.32 0.16 0.14 0.2 0.11 0.32 0.05
5 0.03 0.66 0.03 0.6 0.08 0.36 0.06 0.18 0.24 0.13 0.16 0.07
6 0.03 0.76 0.03 0.5 0.08 0.42 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.03
1.3 7 0.03 0.56 0.03 0.72 0.08 0.3 0.06 0.24 0.24 0.09 0.16 0.09
8 0.05 0.66 0.03 0.56 0.12 0.36 0.06 0.14 0.28 0.13 0.16 0.05
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Demand Instance Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
booking class j, airline l 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2
9 0.07 0.56 0.03 0.56 0.16 0.3 0.06 0.14 0.42 0.09 0.16 0.05
10 0.01 0.76 0.03 0.56 0.04 0.42 0.06 0.14 0.2 0.17 0.16 0.05
11 0.03 0.62 0.05 0.6 0.08 0.32 0.1 0.18 0.24 0.11 0.2 0.07
12 0.03 0.62 0.07 0.5 0.08 0.32 0.16 0.12 0.24 0.11 0.32 0.03
13 0.03 0.62 0.03 0.72 0.08 0.32 0.04 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.08 0.09
1 0.06 0.66 0.04 0.6 0.12 0.36 0.1 0.18 0.28 0.14 0.22 0.08
2 0.06 0.64 0.06 0.58 0.14 0.34 0.1 0.16 0.3 0.12 0.24 0.06
3 0.08 0.64 0.02 0.58 0.22 0.34 0.06 0.16 0.4 0.12 0.12 0.06
4 0.02 0.64 0.08 0.58 0.06 0.34 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.12 0.36 0.06
5 0.04 0.68 0.04 0.64 0.1 0.38 0.08 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.18 0.08
6 0.04 0.8 0.04 0.52 0.1 0.42 0.08 0.14 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.04
1.4 7 0.04 0.6 0.04 0.76 0.1 0.3 0.08 0.24 0.26 0.1 0.18 0.1
8 0.06 0.68 0.04 0.58 0.14 0.38 0.08 0.16 0.3 0.14 0.18 0.06
9 0.08 0.6 0.04 0.58 0.22 0.3 0.08 0.16 0.4 0.1 0.18 0.06
10 0.02 0.8 0.04 0.58 0.06 0.42 0.08 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.06
11 0.04 0.64 0.06 0.64 0.1 0.34 0.1 0.18 0.26 0.12 0.24 0.08
12 0.04 0.64 0.08 0.52 0.1 0.34 0.16 0.14 0.26 0.12 0.36 0.04
13 0.04 0.64 0.02 0.76 0.1 0.34 0.06 0.24 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.1
Table A.1: Demand Instances - Seat Capacity 100
Demand Instance Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
booking class j, airline l 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2
1 0.04 0.65 0.04 0.59 0.1 0.34 0.08 0.16 0.27 0.12 0.19 0.06
2 0.04 0.64 0.02 0.58 0.1 0.34 0.06 0.16 0.28 0.12 0.24 0.06
3 0.06 0.64 0.02 0.58 0.14 0.34 0.04 0.16 0.32 0.12 0.16 0.06
4 0.02 0.64 0.04 0.58 0.06 0.34 0.1 0.16 0.24 0.12 0.28 0.06
5 0.04 0.66 0.02 0.6 0.1 0.34 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.12 0.22 0.06
6 0.04 0.7 0.02 0.54 0.1 0.38 0.06 0.14 0.26 0.14 0.22 0.04
1.1 7 0.04 0.62 0.02 0.66 0.1 0.3 0.06 0.18 0.26 0.1 0.22 0.08
8 0.04 0.66 0.02 0.58 0.1 0.34 0.06 0.16 0.28 0.12 0.22 0.06
9 0.06 0.62 0.02 0.58 0.14 0.3 0.06 0.16 0.32 0.1 0.22 0.06
10 0.02 0.7 0.02 0.58 0.06 0.38 0.06 0.16 0.24 0.14 0.22 0.06
11 0.04 0.64 0.02 0.6 0.1 0.34 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.12 0.24 0.06
12 0.04 0.64 0.04 0.54 0.1 0.34 0.1 0.14 0.26 0.12 0.28 0.04
13 0.04 0.64 0.02 0.66 0.1 0.34 0.04 0.18 0.26 0.12 0.16 0.08
1 0.06 0.67 0.04 0.61 0.12 0.36 0.1 0.18 0.29 0.14 0.23 0.08
2 0.06 0.66 0.04 0.6 0.14 0.36 0.1 0.18 0.3 0.14 0.26 0.08
3 0.1 0.66 0.02 0.6 0.18 0.36 0.04 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.18 0.08
4 0.02 0.66 0.08 0.6 0.06 0.36 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.32 0.08
5 0.06 0.68 0.04 0.64 0.12 0.38 0.08 0.18 0.28 0.14 0.24 0.08
6 0.06 0.76 0.04 0.56 0.12 0.42 0.08 0.14 0.28 0.18 0.24 0.04
1.2 7 0.06 0.6 0.04 0.72 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.22 0.28 0.12 0.24 0.12
8 0.06 0.68 0.04 0.6 0.14 0.38 0.08 0.18 0.3 0.14 0.24 0.08
9 0.1 0.6 0.04 0.6 0.18 0.32 0.08 0.18 0.38 0.12 0.24 0.08
10 0.02 0.76 0.04 0.6 0.06 0.42 0.08 0.18 0.26 0.18 0.24 0.08
11 0.06 0.66 0.04 0.64 0.12 0.36 0.1 0.18 0.28 0.14 0.26 0.08
12 0.06 0.66 0.08 0.56 0.12 0.36 0.16 0.14 0.28 0.14 0.32 0.04
13 0.06 0.66 0.02 0.72 0.12 0.36 0.04 0.22 0.28 0.14 0.18 0.12
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A.1 Computational Study: Demand Input Data
Demand Instance Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
booking class j, airline l 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2
1 0.06 0.72 0.04 0.68 0.16 0.38 0.1 0.18 0.32 0.14 0.3 0.08
2 0.08 0.68 0.06 0.64 0.16 0.38 0.12 0.18 0.32 0.14 0.28 0.08
3 0.1 0.68 0.02 0.64 0.22 0.38 0.08 0.18 0.46 0.14 0.14 0.08
4 0.02 0.68 0.08 0.64 0.06 0.38 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.42 0.08
5 0.06 0.74 0.04 0.66 0.14 0.38 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.14 0.26 0.1
6 0.06 0.84 0.04 0.56 0.14 0.46 0.1 0.14 0.3 0.18 0.26 0.04
1.3 7 0.06 0.6 0.04 0.8 0.14 0.32 0.1 0.26 0.3 0.12 0.26 0.12
8 0.08 0.74 0.04 0.64 0.16 0.38 0.1 0.18 0.32 0.14 0.26 0.08
9 0.1 0.6 0.04 0.64 0.22 0.32 0.1 0.18 0.46 0.12 0.26 0.08
10 0.02 0.84 0.04 0.64 0.06 0.46 0.1 0.18 0.26 0.18 0.26 0.08
11 0.06 0.68 0.06 0.66 0.14 0.38 0.12 0.2 0.3 0.14 0.28 0.1
12 0.06 0.68 0.08 0.56 0.14 0.38 0.18 0.14 0.3 0.14 0.42 0.04
13 0.06 0.68 0.02 0.8 0.14 0.38 0.08 0.26 0.3 0.14 0.14 0.12
1 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.7 0.14 0.4 0.14 0.2 0.4 0.16 0.3 0.1
2 0.06 0.74 0.08 0.66 0.14 0.38 0.16 0.2 0.44 0.14 0.3 0.1
3 0.1 0.74 0.04 0.66 0.24 0.38 0.08 0.2 0.58 0.14 0.14 0.1
4 0.04 0.74 0.1 0.66 0.08 0.38 0.2 0.2 0.24 0.14 0.52 0.1
5 0.08 0.76 0.06 0.74 0.16 0.42 0.12 0.2 0.32 0.16 0.28 0.1
6 0.08 0.94 0.06 0.54 0.16 0.48 0.12 0.16 0.32 0.2 0.28 0.06
1.4 7 0.08 0.72 0.06 0.9 0.16 0.22 0.12 0.28 0.32 0.12 0.28 0.14
8 0.06 0.76 0.06 0.66 0.14 0.42 0.12 0.2 0.44 0.16 0.28 0.1
9 0.1 0.72 0.06 0.66 0.24 0.22 0.12 0.2 0.58 0.12 0.28 0.1
10 0.04 0.94 0.06 0.66 0.08 0.48 0.12 0.2 0.24 0.2 0.28 0.1
11 0.08 0.74 0.08 0.74 0.16 0.38 0.16 0.2 0.32 0.14 0.3 0.1
12 0.08 0.74 0.1 0.54 0.16 0.38 0.2 0.16 0.32 0.14 0.52 0.06
13 0.08 0.74 0.04 0.9 0.16 0.38 0.08 0.28 0.32 0.14 0.14 0.14
Table A.2: Demand Instances - Seat Capacity 120
Demand Scenario Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
booking class j, airline l 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2
1 0.06 0.72 0.06 0.68 0.16 0.4 0.14 0.2 0.355 0.175 0.295 0.115
2 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.66 0.14 0.38 0.14 0.2 0.4 0.14 0.3 0.1
3 0.1 0.74 0.04 0.66 0.22 0.38 0.08 0.2 0.54 0.14 0.14 0.1
4 0.04 0.74 0.1 0.66 0.08 0.38 0.22 0.2 0.24 0.14 0.44 0.1
5 0.08 0.74 0.06 0.7 0.16 0.4 0.12 0.2 0.32 0.16 0.28 0.1
6 0.08 0.88 0.06 0.54 0.16 0.48 0.12 0.16 0.32 0.2 0.28 0.06
1.1 7 0.08 0.72 0.06 0.84 0.16 0.22 0.12 0.28 0.32 0.12 0.28 0.14
8 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.66 0.14 0.4 0.12 0.2 0.4 0.16 0.28 0.1
9 0.1 0.72 0.06 0.66 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.2 0.54 0.12 0.28 0.1
10 0.04 0.88 0.06 0.66 0.08 0.48 0.12 0.2 0.24 0.2 0.28 0.1
11 0.08 0.74 0.06 0.7 0.16 0.38 0.14 0.2 0.32 0.14 0.3 0.1
12 0.08 0.74 0.1 0.54 0.16 0.38 0.22 0.16 0.32 0.14 0.44 0.06
13 0.08 0.74 0.04 0.84 0.16 0.38 0.08 0.28 0.32 0.14 0.14 0.14
1 0.08 0.76 0.08 0.72 0.16 0.42 0.16 0.22 0.41 0.17 0.31 0.11
2 0.08 0.74 0.08 0.7 0.18 0.4 0.16 0.2 0.44 0.16 0.36 0.1
3 0.1 0.74 0.06 0.7 0.24 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.56 0.16 0.24 0.1
4 0.06 0.74 0.1 0.7 0.14 0.4 0.22 0.2 0.3 0.16 0.48 0.1
5 0.06 0.8 0.08 0.76 0.14 0.42 0.14 0.22 0.4 0.18 0.28 0.12
6 0.06 0.92 0.08 0.64 0.14 0.48 0.14 0.18 0.4 0.2 0.28 0.08
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A.1 Computational Study: Demand Input Data
Demand Scenario Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
booking class j, airline l 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2
1.2 7 0.06 0.68 0.08 0.88 0.14 0.38 0.14 0.28 0.4 0.14 0.28 0.14
8 0.08 0.8 0.08 0.7 0.18 0.42 0.14 0.2 0.44 0.18 0.28 0.1
9 0.1 0.68 0.08 0.7 0.24 0.38 0.14 0.2 0.56 0.14 0.28 0.1
10 0.06 0.92 0.08 0.7 0.14 0.48 0.14 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.28 0.1
11 0.06 0.74 0.08 0.76 0.14 0.4 0.16 0.22 0.4 0.16 0.36 0.12
12 0.06 0.74 0.1 0.64 0.14 0.4 0.22 0.18 0.4 0.16 0.48 0.08
13 0.06 0.74 0.06 0.88 0.14 0.4 0.1 0.28 0.4 0.16 0.24 0.14
1 0.08 0.82 0.08 0.78 0.18 0.42 0.16 0.22 0.465 0.185 0.385 0.125
2 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.76 0.2 0.42 0.18 0.22 0.45 0.18 0.37 0.12
3 0.12 0.8 0.06 0.76 0.26 0.42 0.1 0.22 0.62 0.18 0.24 0.12
4 0.06 0.8 0.1 0.76 0.14 0.42 0.24 0.22 0.3 0.18 0.56 0.12
5 0.08 0.84 0.08 0.78 0.18 0.44 0.16 0.26 0.44 0.17 0.36 0.11
6 0.08 1 0.08 0.64 0.18 0.5 0.16 0.18 0.44 0.2 0.36 0.08
1.3 7 0.08 0.68 0.08 0.94 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.32 0.44 0.14 0.36 0.14
8 0.1 0.84 0.08 0.76 0.2 0.44 0.16 0.22 0.45 0.17 0.36 0.12
9 0.12 0.68 0.08 0.76 0.26 0.38 0.16 0.22 0.62 0.14 0.36 0.12
10 0.06 1 0.08 0.76 0.14 0.5 0.16 0.22 0.3 0.2 0.36 0.12
11 0.08 0.8 0.1 0.78 0.18 0.42 0.18 0.26 0.44 0.18 0.37 0.11
12 0.08 0.8 0.1 0.64 0.18 0.42 0.24 0.18 0.44 0.18 0.56 0.08
13 0.08 0.8 0.06 0.94 0.18 0.42 0.1 0.32 0.44 0.18 0.24 0.14
1 0.08 0.9 0.08 0.84 0.2 0.42 0.18 0.24 0.52 0.18 0.44 0.12
2 0.1 0.825 0.1 0.785 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.22 0.555 0.18 0.455 0.12
3 0.14 0.825 0.08 0.785 0.3 0.42 0.14 0.22 0.68 0.18 0.3 0.12
4 0.06 0.825 0.12 0.785 0.14 0.42 0.26 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.64 0.12
5 0.08 0.915 0.08 0.855 0.18 0.46 0.16 0.28 0.465 0.2 0.385 0.14
6 0.08 1.08 0.08 0.72 0.18 0.52 0.16 0.2 0.465 0.22 0.385 0.1
1.4 7 0.08 0.76 0.08 1 0.18 0.4 0.16 0.36 0.465 0.16 0.385 0.16
8 0.1 0.915 0.08 0.785 0.22 0.46 0.16 0.22 0.555 0.2 0.385 0.12
9 0.14 0.76 0.08 0.785 0.3 0.4 0.16 0.22 0.68 0.16 0.385 0.12
10 0.06 1.08 0.08 0.785 0.14 0.52 0.16 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.385 0.12
11 0.08 0.825 0.1 0.855 0.18 0.42 0.22 0.28 0.465 0.18 0.455 0.14
12 0.08 0.825 0.12 0.72 0.18 0.42 0.26 0.2 0.465 0.18 0.64 0.1
13 0.08 0.825 0.08 1 0.18 0.42 0.14 0.36 0.465 0.18 0.3 0.16
Table A.3: Demand Instances - Seat Capacity 150
Demand Scenario Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
booking class j, airline l 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2
Capacity 100
1 0.02 0.54 0.02 0.46 0.04 0.26 0.04 0.1 0.14 0.1 0.04 0.04
2 0.02 0.5 0.02 0.42 0.06 0.26 0.04 0.1 0.18 0.08 0.1 0.02
3 0.02 0.5 0.001 0.42 0.08 0.26 0.001 0.1 0.32 0.08 0.001 0.02
4 0.01 0.5 0.02 0.42 0.02 0.26 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.08 0.2 0.02
5 0.01 0.58 0.01 0.5 0.03 0.3 0.01 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.02 0.04
6 0.01 0.64 0.01 0.4 0.03 0.36 0.01 0.09 0.1 0.12 0.02 0.01
0.9 7 0.01 0.52 0.01 0.6 0.03 0.22 0.01 0.18 0.1 0.06 0.02 0.04
8 0.02 0.58 0.01 0.42 0.06 0.3 0.01 0.1 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.02
9 0.01 0.52 0.01 0.42 0.08 0.22 0.01 0.1 0.32 0.06 0.02 0.02
10 0.01 0.64 0.01 0.42 0.02 0.36 0.01 0.1 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.02
11 0.01 0.5 0.02 0.5 0.03 0.26 0.04 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.04
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A.2 Computational Study: Computational Study OBP&SPSA+Prices
Demand Scenario Sector 1 Sector 2 Sector 3
booking class j, airline l 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2
12 0.01 0.5 0.02 0.4 0.03 0.26 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.08 0.2 0.01
13 0.01 0.5 0.001 0.6 0.03 0.26 0.001 0.18 0.1 0.08 0.001 0.04
Capacity 120
1 0.02 0.59 0.02 0.51 0.06 0.3 0.06 0.14 0.21 0.1 0.11 0.04
2 0.02 0.58 0.02 0.5 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.08 0.16 0.02
3 0.04 0.58 0.01 0.5 0.12 0.28 0.01 0.12 0.38 0.08 0.02 0.02
4 0.01 0.58 0.06 0.5 0.02 0.28 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.26 0.02
5 0.01 0.62 0.01 0.56 0.03 0.32 0.03 0.14 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.04
6 0.01 0.72 0.01 0.43 0.03 0.38 0.03 0.1 0.2 0.14 0.1 0.01
0.9 7 0.01 0.54 0.01 0.68 0.03 0.24 0.03 0.2 0.2 0.06 0.1 0.06
8 0.02 0.62 0.01 0.5 0.08 0.32 0.03 0.12 0.24 0.1 0.1 0.02
9 0.04 0.54 0.01 0.5 0.12 0.24 0.03 0.12 0.38 0.06 0.1 0.02
10 0.01 0.72 0.01 0.5 0.02 0.38 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.1 0.02
11 0.01 0.58 0.02 0.56 0.03 0.28 0.06 0.14 0.2 0.08 0.16 0.04
12 0.01 0.58 0.06 0.43 0.03 0.28 0.12 0.1 0.2 0.08 0.26 0.01
13 0.01 0.58 0.01 0.68 0.03 0.28 0.01 0.2 0.2 0.08 0.02 0.06
Capacity 150
1 0.046 0.68 0.046 0.6 0.1 0.32 0.08 0.16 0.28 0.126 0.2 0.066
2 0.02 0.7 0.03 0.62 0.11 0.34 0.08 0.18 0.28 0.1 0.2 0.04
3 0.04 0.7 0.02 0.62 0.1 0.34 0.02 0.18 0.38 0.1 0.16 0.04
4 0.02 0.7 0.06 0.62 0.04 0.34 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.1 0.24 0.04
5 0.02 0.68 0.02 0.64 0.06 0.34 0.06 0.18 0.32 0.12 0.22 0.04
6 0.02 0.72 0.02 0.56 0.06 0.38 0.06 0.16 0.32 0.16 0.22 0.02
0.9 7 0.02 0.66 0.02 0.7 0.06 0.3 0.06 0.2 0.32 0.08 0.22 0.06
8 0.02 0.68 0.02 0.62 0.12 0.36 0.06 0.16 0.3 0.1 0.22 0.04
9 0.04 0.66 0.02 0.62 0.12 0.3 0.06 0.16 0.38 0.08 0.22 0.04
10 0.02 0.72 0.02 0.62 0.06 0.38 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.14 0.22 0.04
11 0.02 0.68 0.02 0.62 0.06 0.34 0.1 0.18 0.32 0.1 0.22 0.04
12 0.02 0.68 0.06 0.54 0.06 0.34 0.12 0.18 0.32 0.1 0.26 0.02
13 0.02 0.68 0.04 0.68 0.06 0.34 0.04 0.2 0.32 0.1 0.16 0.06
Table A.4: Demand Instances with Demand Intensity 0.9 - Seat Capacity 100, 120, and 150
A.2 Computational Study: Computational Study OBP&SPSA+Prices
Capacity Revenue Demand in % Price gap16 gap17
110 a 0.00 3.25
b 1.69 5.63
c 1.69 5.63
d 33.68 36.55
120 a 0.51 2.59
b 0.10 8.35
c 0.10 8.35
d 23.87 26.22
100 1 130 a 0.71 2.77
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A.2 Computational Study: Computational Study OBP&SPSA+Prices
Capacity Revenue Demand in % Price gap16 gap17
b 0.03 11.41
c 0.03 11.41
d 17.08 18.98
140 a 0.01 2.11
b 0.03 12.93
c 0.03 12.93
d 12.84 14.60
110 a 0.00 2.17
b 14.51 16.27
c 14.51 16.27
d 14.54 16.27
120 a 0.00 1.92
b 7.98 9.54
c 7.98 9.54
d 8.08 9.55
100 2 130 a 0.01 2.03
b 3.45 4.89
c 3.45 4.89
d 3.58 4.89
140 a 0.02 1.83
b 1.02 2.71
c 1.02 2.71
d 1.03 2.37
110 a 2.33 4.38
b 3.06 8.07
c 3.06 8.07
d 46.72 50.16
120 a 2.26 3.78
b 1.15 13.46
c 1.15 13.46
d 35.73 38.54
100 3 130 a 1.74 4.01
b 0.04 19.43
c 0.04 19.43
d 28.20 30.45
140 a 0.60 3.31
b 0.02 22.81
c 0.02 22.81
d 23.40 25.48
110 a 0.04 4.80
b 0.30 7.65
c 0.30 7.65
d 46.39 48.84
120 a 0.41 4.27
b 0.11 11.67
c 0.11 11.67
d 34.81 36.53
100 4 130 a 0.57 4.69
b 0.07 16.33
c 0.07 16.33
d 26.41 27.43
140 a 0.01 3.51
b 0.04 18.08
c 0.04 18.08
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A.2 Computational Study: Computational Study OBP&SPSA+Prices
Capacity Revenue Demand in % Price gap16 gap17
d 20.90 21.57
Table A.5: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-4) – Results in Specific Price Scenario Compared to Results with Trans-
fer Price Optimization, C=100
Capacity Revenue Demand in % Price gap16 gap17
110 a 0.02 2.76
b 0.13 4.54
c 0.13 4.54
d 29.16 31.03
120 a 0.06 2.14
b 0.09 7.31
c 0.09 7.31
d 18.59 20.55
120 1 130 a 0.03 2.03
b 0.05 9.23
c 0.05 9.23
d 13.36 14.99
140 a 0.00 1.85
b 0.04 11.99
c 0.04 11.99
d 10.97 12.47
110 a 0.00 1.66
b 13.22 14.42
c 13.22 14.42
d 13.23 14.42
120 a 0.01 1.36
b 5.81 7.18
c 5.81 7.18
d 5.90 7.18
120 2 130 a 0.02 1.31
b 2.27 3.53
c 2.27 3.53
d 2.40 3.52
140 a 0.02 1.87
b 0.98 2.61
c 0.98 2.61
d 0.72 1.82
110 a 0.37 3.88
b 1.26 6.71
c 1.26 6.71
d 40.22 42.43
120 a 0.69 3.29
b 0.07 12.21
c 0.07 12.21
d 28.40 30.71
120 3 130 a 0.63 3.15
b 0.04 16.11
c 0.04 16.11
d 22.54 24.45
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Capacity Revenue Demand in % Price gap16 gap17
140 a 0.08 2.97
b 0.01 20.83
c 0.01 20.83
d 20.19 21.97
110 a 0.02 4.41
b 0.01 6.63
c 0.01 6.63
d 41.75 43.43
120 a 0.01 3.50
b 0.10 10.43
c 0.10 10.43
d 28.26 29.70
120 4 130 a 0.04 3.38
b 0.07 13.39
c 0.07 13.39
d 21.52 22.30
140 a 0.01 2.92
b 0.05 16.26
c 0.05 16.26
d 18.20 18.69
Table A.6: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-4) – Results in Specific Price Scenario Compared to Results with Trans-
fer Price Optimization, C=120
Capacity Revenue Demand in % Price gap16 gap17
110 a 0.01 1.87
b 0.10 3.72
c 0.10 3.72
d 21.71 24.01
120 a 0.01 1.73
b 0.05 6.12
c 0.05 6.12
d 15.43 17.59
150 1 130 a 0.00 1.73
b 0.03 8.32
c 0.03 8.32
d 11.12 12.70
140 a 0.11 1.81
b 0.04 11.07
c 0.04 11.07
d 9.33 10.57
110 a 0.01 1.01
b 9.64 11.23
c 9.64 11.23
d 9.67 11.24
120 a 0.01 1.08
b 4.82 6.37
c 4.82 6.37
d 4.89 6.37
150 2 130 a 0.01 1.01
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Capacity Revenue Demand in % Price gap16 gap17
b 1.52 2.73
c 1.52 2.73
d 1.62 2.70
140 a 0.04 1.74
b 0.40 2.10
c 0.40 2.10
d 0.38 1.33
110 a 0.01 2.93
b 0.49 5.87
c 0.49 5.87
d 30.36 33.02
120 a 0.00 2.81
b 0.06 10.38
c 0.06 10.38
d 23.71 26.22
150 3 130 a 0.00 2.85
b 0.03 14.77
c 0.03 14.77
d 19.26 21.10
140 a 0.01 2.94
b 0.01 19.30
c 0.01 19.30
d 17.50 18.96
110 a 0.01 2.75
b 0.05 5.19
c 0.05 5.19
d 32.53 34.67
120 a 0.02 2.56
b 0.08 8.67
c 0.08 8.67
d 24.11 25.87
150 4 130 a 0.00 2.66
b 0.03 12.06
c 0.03 12.06
d 18.28 19.07
140 a 0.00 2.81
b 0.03 15.24
c 0.03 15.24
d 15.76 16.12
Table A.7: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-4) – Results in Specific Price Scenario Compared to Results with Trans-
fer Price Optimization, C=150
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A.2 Computational Study: Computational Study OBP&SPSA+Prices
Figure A.1: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-4) – Performance of Procedures Relative to Ex Post Optimal Solutions,
C=100, Demand Scenarios
Figure A.2: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-4) – Performance of Procedures Relative to Ex Post Optimal Solutions,
C=150, Demand Scenarios
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A.2 Computational Study: Computational Study OBP&SPSA+Prices
Figure A.3: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-4) – Performance of Procedures Relative to Ex Post Optimal Solutions,
C=100, Revenue Scenarios
Figure A.4: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-4) – Performance of Procedures Relative to Ex Post Optimal Solutions,
C=150, Revenue Scenarios
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A.2 Computational Study: Computational Study OBP&SPSA+Prices
Figure A.5: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-8) – Performance of Procedures Relative to Ex Post Optimal Solutions,
C=100, Demand Scenarios
Figure A.6: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-8) – Performance of Procedures Relative to Ex Post Optimal Solutions,
C=150, Demand Scenarios
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A.2 Computational Study: Computational Study OBP&SPSA+Prices
Figure A.7: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-8) – Performance of Procedures Relative to Ex Post Optimal Solutions,
C=100, Revenue Scenarios
Figure A.8: OBP&SPSA+Prices (1-8) – Performance of Procedures Relative to Ex Post Optimal Solutions,
C=150, Revenue Scenarios
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